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Abstract
By what means can legislative committees exercise influence on policy outputs? How
and why do committees in different countries differ in their abilities to do so? This
dissertation argues that legislative committee power is a multidimensional concept.
Committee procedures can be distinguished into three analytic dimensions: 1) com-
mittees’ positive agenda power, their power to ensure the placement of their preferred
legislative versions on the floor; 2) committees’ negative agenda power, their power
to delay or block the progress of legislation; and 3) committees’ information ca-
pacity, institutional incentives granted to them to gather and transmit information.
These distinct dimensions benefit different legislative actors. Therefore, they reflect
different features of a political system, and may not be consistently strong or week.
Based on an original cross-national data set, the dissertation shows that commit-
tee procedures cluster empirically in these three distinct dimensions. Furthermore,
the dissertation also demonstrates how legislators’ electoral incentives, the compo-
sition of multiparty governments, preexisting authoritarian incumbents’ uncertainty
and bargaining power, and changes in legislative memberships affect different dimen-
sions of committee power.
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1Introduction
Legislatures1 are the primary national-level agency through which popular prefer-
ences are institutionally represented, laws are passed, and restraint can be imposed
on the executive. The strength of legislatures has long been considered by both po-
litical science scholars and international donor groups as crucial for the quality of
democracy. However, how legislatures in different countries organize themselves to
represent constituent preferences, propose and vote on laws, or oversee the execu-
tive has not been thoroughly studied. Legislative committee procedures and powers
constitute a crucial mechanism for legislatures to exercise democratic representation
and to limit the unilateral power of government executives. This dissertation focuses
on examining how and why committee systems vary across countries.
By what means can legislative committees exercise influence on policy outputs?
How do committees in different countries differ in their abilities to do so? U.S.
Congressional Studies have greatly improved our understanding of the internal or-
ganization of the U.S. Congress. However, committees and their role in the leg-
islative process have received rather scant attention in the cross-national literature
1 In the dissertation, legislatures are also used to refer parliaments in parliamentary systems.
1
on democracies around the world. This may be due to the challenges posed by ac-
curately describing the complexities of legislative institutions and then accounting
for the variance of such institutions with a coherent theoretical framework. These
challenges are aggravated by the lack of cross-sectional data on legislative committee
systems. This dissertation attempts to address these challenges.
Recent scholarship has devoted great effort to explore the functions of legislative
committees in contexts other than the U.S.. For example, data on legislators’ prefer-
ences, voting records, and professional backgrounds has been collected to test whether
the composition of committee members is consistent with the predictions of theo-
ries on the existence of committees based on the U.S. Congress (Batto 2005, Ciftci,
Forrest, and Tekin 2008, Fujimura 2011, Jones et al. 2002, Nemoto 2008). The
assumption about the relationship between electoral systems and committee assign-
ments has been examined (Crisp et al. 2009, Martin 2011). Arguments explaining the
relationship between committee power and partisan composition of government have
been proposed (Martin and Vanberg 2011, Martin and Depauw 2011, Strøm 1984).
Despite these interesting findings, we still have little information about the dif-
ferences in the structures, procedures, and powers of committees across countries.
Not much scholarly effort has been invested in measuring and classifying the formal
procedures of legislative committees2. Based on an original dataset, this dissertation
is aimed to bridge this gap by proposing and testing a framework to classify and
compare committee power. Applying this framework, I also specify the conditions
under which committees tend to be powerful.
2 Martin and Depauw (2009), Mattson and Strm (1996), and Yla¨outinen and Hallerberg (2008)
have made great efforts to collect data on various dimensions of legislative committees. However,
their data sets only covered parliamentary democracies.
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1.1 Alternative Theories for Committee Power
Based on the experience of the U.S. Congress, four main theories have been developed
to explain the existence of committee systems.
Viewing committees as an agent of individual members, the distributive theory
has argued that committees are established to help members secure particularistic
spending for their districts. The theory is based on the assumption that legislative
institutions reflect preferences of individual members and transaction costs of pursu-
ing their goals (Shepsle and Weingast 1994, Weingast and Marshall 1988). To pursue
the reelection goals, legislators have to advance the interests of their constituents by
bringing locally targeted goods to their home districts. Since each locally special
interest is a minority, each needs to form a coalition with other interests, which
generates the needs of exchange and cooperation. Committee systems allow leg-
islators to form durable logrolling coalitions by defining policy areas within which
each committee has legislative authority. To serve members’ needs of securing dis-
tributive benefits, committees should have the power to receive and vote on bills in
their jurisdictions. Committees are especially powerful when legislators have more
incentives to cultivate personal votes and have more heterogeneous policy preferences
(Jenkins 1998, Katz and Sala 1996).
The partisan theory has assumed that a majority party is able to design legislative
organization in order to achieve its collective policy goals, by excluding opponent
parties and coordinating its own members. Committees are creations of parties that
allow parties to maintain control over policies. The influence of committees exists
only when they serve the ends of the majority parties (Cox and McCubbins 1993).
For majority parties to achieve their policy goals, committees are expected to have
the ability of legislation. Extending the partisan theory, scholars have identified
that coalition governments constitute a condition under which government parties
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find it in their interests to institute powerful committees to solve the delegation
problem faced by multiparty governments (Kim and Loewenberg 2005, Martin and
Depauw 2009, Martin and Vanberg 2011).
The informational efficiency theory, developed by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987,
1989), has pointed out that committees exist for the floor to utilize the informational
advantages of members who specialize in particular policy areas. It has assumed
legislators do not have complete information to anticipate the outcomes of policy
instruments. Committee members acquire the authority and resources to specialize
in particular policy areas and explore the consequences of bills more fully than can
members of the floor. To achieve this goal, committees should provide incentives
for members to collect and transmit information. Based on the theory, if policy
outcomes are highly uncertain, such as in period of rapid social and economic change,
committees tend to be granted more power to gather information.
The bicameral rivalry theory has viewed a legislature as one veto player who
wants to maximize ‘rents” paid by lobbyists in the law-making process. The legis-
lature competes for rents with other veto players, such as the upper chamber or the
president with veto power, in the constitutional structure of a government. Com-
mittees serve as an additional veto player within a chamber. To serve the end,
committees should have the negative power to block legislation. Based on Diermeier
and Myerson’s (1999) model, the more veto points there are in a constitutional struc-
ture of a government, the more veto players a legislature will create within its own
chamber.
These four theories have provided different explanations for the existence and
strength of legislative committees. With more variances in contextual and institu-
tional indicators, the literature on legislatures outside of the U.S. has also identified
several conditions under which the general capacity of legislative organization, in-
cluding committee systems, is more likely to be strengthened. Scholars have pointed
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out the importance of socioeconomic modernization and political democratization,
and argued that legislatures tend to be more powerful in higher income countries
(Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2004), because legislators who are willing to challenge
the executive and invest in legislative organization are more likely to emerge in
countries with large and robust civil society (Barkan 2009), and the overall bu-
reaucratic quality of a country is also correlated with the legislature’s resources
(Huber and McCarty 2004). In addition, legislatures are more likely to be strength-
ened only when the authoritarian institutional legacies have been removed (Pe´rez-
Lin˜a´n 2005, Remington 2007). Researches based on case studies has also specified
the effects of political institutions and party systems. It has been argued that legisla-
tors have less incentives to enhance the legislative capacity of their institutions if the
executives are too powerful and dominate the legislative processes (Khmelko, Wise,
and Brown 2010, Kopecky´ 2004); while minority governments may contribute to leg-
islative autonomy (Carey, Formanek, and Karpowicz 1999). Based on the experience
of post-communist countries, scholars have pointed out that unstable party systems
work against the development of institutionalized committee systems (Agh 1995, Ol-
son and Crowther 2002, Whitmore 2006). The impacts of legislators’ electoral incen-
tives and career prospects have also been stressed in the comparative literature. If
legislators tend to rely on the provision of “pork” as a reelection strategy, the legisla-
tures are more likely to be dominated by the executives (Ames 1995, Barkan 2009).
Furthermore, low reelection rates and low parliamentary pay also work against leg-
islative professionalization (Morgenstern and Nacif 2002).
1.2 My Explanation for Committee Strength
Scholar have provided different theories explaining the strength of legislative commit-
tees. Many of the theories focus on different committee functions. Some of them are
contradictory to each other. For example, are “strong” or “weak” parties more likely
5
to lead to powerful committee systems? Is legislators’ reliance on particularistic good
provision conducive to strong committees or legislative organization subservient to
the presidents? This dissertation provides a new look at how and why committee
procedures vary across democratic legislatures. Different from the previous studies,
which usually focus solely on one particular dimension of committee power and ex-
plore explanations for the one-dimensional phenomena, I provide a theory of multiple
dimensions of committee power and specify the conditions under which particular
dimensions tend to be developed. I also argue that the distributive, partisan, and
informational theories can be reconciled under certain conditions; rather than be-
ing viewed as mutually exclusive theories, they may be understood as identifying
determinants of committee procedures with regard to different dimensions. Below, I
provide a summary of my explanation for committee strength.
Legislative committees are a review system that empowers key actors in the polit-
ical system to collect information and make decisions on legislation in the respective
jurisdiction. Committee procedures that enable actors to achieve these goals can
be distinguished into three analytical dimensions: 1) committees’ positive agenda
power, their power to ensure the placement of their preferred legislative versions on
the floor, which rests on committees’ ability to receive and amend most proposals
at an early stage of legislation and the procedures that allow individual members to
have more access to committee affairs; 2) committees’ negative agenda power, their
power to delay or even block the progress of their less-preferred legislative versions,
which rests on committees’ authority to freely decide which referred bills to consider
and when; and 3) committees’ information capacity, institutional incentives granted
to them to gather and transmit information, which rests on committees’ ability to
independently demand documents and evidence.
Committees’ positive power benefits both individualistic members and disciplined
parties who have an opportunity to be included in a winning coalition for committee
6
decisions, because every member has equal voting power once a proposal has been
put on the committee agenda. Committees’ negative power particularly benefits
large and disciplined parties, because they are able to restrict the access to com-
mittee time only to themselves, and push committee decisions further to their side.
The negative power does not necessarily increase individualistic members’ welfare,
because without party leaders’ coordination, the negative power does not increase
individual members’ probabilities of being included in a winning coalition. Commit-
tees’ information capacity reduces the information asymmetry between executives
and legislatures, and thus potentially benefits all legislators.
Based on these arguments, I identify three conditions conducive to strong com-
mittees with regard to different dimensions. First, if legislators tend to rely on the
provision of particularistic benefits as a reelection strategy, and if party leaders have
less control over members, committees are likely to have extensive positive power. As
a way to decentralize legislative authority, committees’ positive power allow members
more opportunities to express preferences and affect legislative outputs. In contrast,
committees are expected to have strong negative power if party leaders exert more
control over members.
Second, if parties in multiparty governments tend to be confronted with other
relatively powerful coalition partners, committees are likely to be strong with regard
to all three dimensions. With these authorities, the information asymmetry between
ministers and coalition partners can be reduced, and coalition partners can scrutinize
and amend proposals to prevent ministerial drift. Since the larger coalition partners
are pivotal voters to ministers’ proposals, they are able to utilize committees’ negative
power to delay legislation without fear of being excluded from the winning coalition.
Finally, I focus on countries’ regime transition experience. Authoritarian incum-
bents have interests in choosing institutions of the newly created democracy that
limit other actors’ access to power. Only if politicians were less certain about the
7
future political composition of the legislature at the time of institutional design,
and if the pre-existing authoritarian parties largely lost power through democrati-
zation, the resulting committee procedures are more inclusive. That is, committees
are expected to have extensive positive power which allow individual members more
opportunities to vote on bills.
1.3 Plan of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 presents my theoretical framework in detail. The chapter specifies the
separation of the three dimensions of committee power and the conditions under
which certain dimensions are more likely to be strengthened.
Chapter 3 details the legislative procedures that contribute to more or less com-
mittee strength with regard to the positive and negative agenda power, and the
information capacity. It describes the construction of the research tool, the expert
survey of legislative committee powers, and the implementation of the data collec-
tion. Based on expert surveys, I have collected an original dataset that empirically
characterizes the role of committee systems in more than 70 countries around the
world.
Chapter 4 explores whether committee procedure empirically cluster in the three
dimensions as hypothesized. Confirmatory factor analysis suggests that committee
powers indeed cluster on three distinct dimensions. The strength of committees on
one dimension does not predict their scores on the other dimensions. One factor com-
bines committees’ early involvement in the law-making process and their authorities
to consider and amend most draft bills. In legislatures scoring high on this factor,
there tend to be no restrictions on multiple referrals and committee minority reports,
and members are likely to have more committee assignments. Another factor mainly
includes committees’ authorities to freely decide which bills to be considered and
when. The procedure that the floor has to consider committees’ version in prece-
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dence over the original bill also loads on this factor. The third factor comprises
institutional instruments for committees to collect and transmit information, includ-
ing the authority to demand documents and to summon government officials, and
the restriction on amendments by the plenary after the committee stage. Committee
systems scoring high on this factor have more staff support, and members tend to
find serving in the same committee for consecutive terms is desirable.
Chapter 4 also tests the invariance of the three-factor framework across some
background covariates. It also displays how national legislatures score on different
dimensions of committee power. To evaluate the reliability of the data and the
validity of the dimensionality framework, the chapter contrasts the factor scores
with alternative measures of committee and general legislative capacity.
Chapter 5 empirically explores the hypotheses on the relationships between politi-
cians’ electoral incentives and committees’ positive power. The results suggest that
in countries where legislators more heavily rely on the provision of locally targeted
goods to secure reelection, the electoral systems tend encourage intra-party compe-
tition, and party leaders have less control over committee memberships, committees
are likely to have extensive positive power. In addition, the relationships between
legislators’ reelection strategy and committee power are conditional on party orga-
nization features. If legislators’ career opportunities are controlled by party leaders,
committee procedures are less likely to be designed to reflect legislators’ reelection
strategies.
Chapter 6 presents empirical tests of the hypotheses on the relationships be-
tween the composition of a government coalition and committee powers. Consistent
with theoretical expectations, regression analysis suggests that committees tend to
be stronger on all three dimensions of committee functions in countries where the
government coalitions are composed of parties of relatively equal size. I also show
that the relationship between the sizes of coalition partner parties and committees’
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negative power is strengthened when parties’ policy positions are polarized. Com-
mittees’ negative power especially benefits larger coalition partners who have distinct
positions, because they can use the negative power to increase the policy bias toward
their side.
Finally, in Chapter 7, I explore how countries’ transition experience is related
to committee power. The chapter assumes that elections under authoritarianism
serve an informational role. The empirical results suggest that if the preexisting
authoritarianism had not held elections, and thus the relative power of political
groups was less obvious at the time of institutional choice, or if the authoritarian
legacy parties largely lost power after regime transition, committees tend to be strong
with regard to their positive power. The regression analyses also show that when
there tend to be great changes in legislative membership, either during or after
democratic transition, committees are likely to have more information capacity.
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2Committee Power as a Multidimensional Concept
Committees have various functions. As Shepsle and Weingast (1987) have listed,
committees are repositories of policy expertise, policy proposers, and gatekeepers
that possess control over the agenda in their respective jurisdictions. All these mech-
anisms make committees influential in the democratic process. However, how can
these different functions be classified? As committee powers vary along many dimen-
sions, do committee systems tend to be consistently strong or weak on all these di-
mensions? Which aspects are more likely to be strengthened under given conditions?
The literature has not reached a consensus. Existing theories for the strength of leg-
islative committees are mostly based on particular functions of committee power,
and do not specify how different conditions account for the development of different
dimensions of committee power. For example, theories stressing that committees are
established to help members trade favors and secure distributive benefits for their
districts emphasize committees’ function of providing opportunities for members to
form durable logrolling coalitions and their ability to block legislation (Groseclose
and King 2001, Weingast and Marshall 1988). Theories claiming committees as
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the agent of majority parties focus on committees’ power to amend or block bills
(Cox and McCubbins 1993, Martin and Vanberg 2011), and the ability to gather
information about policy issues (Martin and Vanberg 2011). Theories highlighting
the collective gains from committee specialization emphasize the institutional incen-
tives for members to collect and transmit information (Diermeier 1995, Gilligan and
Krehbiel 1987, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990).
In this chapter, I outline a theory of multiple dimensions of committee power
and the conditions under which particular dimensions tend to be developed. This
chapter first identifies three main dimensions of committee power. After reviewing
the incentive structure faced by legislators, the chapter examines how these three
dimensions of committee procedures could benefit different legislative actors. Finally,
it discusses three conditions under which particular dimensions tend to be developed
to fulfil the needs of legislative actors.
2.1 Institutional Privilege of Committees
As the subunits of legislatures, committees are a review system that empowers key
actors in the legislature to collect information and make decisions on legislation in
the respective jurisdiction. Various committee procedures are established to per-
form these functions. These procedures can be classified into those that determine
committees’ positive and negative agenda-setting power, and those that authorize
committees to investigate and gather information. Committees’ positive and nega-
tive agenda power refers to committees’ ability to determine which legislative versions
are submitted to the floor and under what procedures. Committees’ information ca-
pacity rests on the procedures and resources that allow committees to gather and
transmit information about policy consequences. In this section, committee proce-
dures with regard to these three main aspects are discussed.
Committees’ positive agenda-power is defined as committees’ ability to ensure the
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placement of legislative versions preferred by them on the floor. Committees possess
positive agenda-power if they have the right to initiate legislation. In addition, when
committees are authorized to bring alternatives to the status quo up for a vote and
decide whether to reject or amend the legislation in their jurisdictions, committees
can ensure that the floor reviews legislative versions chosen by them. The posi-
tive power is enhanced if the floor is required to consider committee amendments
in precedence over the original bill. With the positive power, committee members’
preferences can be reflected in proposals submitted to the floor. When all proposals
have to be referred to committees before they are voted down by the floor, commit-
tees can express their preferences on more bills and their positive agenda power is
particularly extensive.
Committees’ negative agenda power is defined as their power to delay or even
block the progress of bills. Once legislative proposals are referred to committees,
if committees are allowed to decide their own agenda freely and are not obliged to
report back all bills within time constraints, they can prevent the appearance of bills
on the floor. These procedures grant committees effective negative agenda power.
In addition, when committees have the rights to rewrite a bill, and the plenary
subsequently considers the version as reported by committees, committees can delay
the progress of their less-preferred versions. Committees’ negative power may be
in conflict with their positive power. For example, if committees are obliged to
submit reports for all referred measures, committees can express their preferences on
more bills and ensure that the plenary reviews their preferred versions, but cannot
effectively block the progress of the legislation. That is, committees have extensive
positive agenda power, but lack negative agenda power.
As various researches have pointed out, the other main function of committee sys-
tems is achieving policy specialization within different jurisdictions (Baron 2000, Be-
niers and Swank 2004, Diermeier 1995, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Gilligan and
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Krehbiel 1989, Krishna and Morgan 2001, Prince and Overby 2005). The literature
has emphasized the difficulty of knowing the consequences of bills ex ante. In ad-
dition, it has also stressed the informational asymmetry between the executive and
the legislative branches. Government officials are expected to have more information
access to know the precise effects of legislative proposals, available policy alterna-
tives, and their feasibility. Committees are able to collect and scrutinize relevant
information more closely than would be possible by the entire chamber. Commit-
tees’ capacity of gathering information and understanding the potential outcomes
of policy proposals enables them to effectively oversight the executive branch. To
achieve the objective, committees have to be granted institutional incentives to inde-
pendently collect information about topics related to bills and transmit information
to the entire chamber.
2.2 Implications of Committee Procedures
How and why do committee systems vary with regard to these three aspects? Con-
sistent with previous works on the choices of legislative organization (e.g. Baron and
Ferejohn 1989a, Cox and McCubbins 2005, Diermeier and Myerson 1999, Gilligan
and Krehbiel 1987, Weingast and Marshall 1988), I assume that committee proce-
dures are endogenous. Legislators set up the committee system to enhance their
power and realize their interests. However, where do their interests lie? Do legisla-
tors act as agents of parties or behave in accordance with some primitive preferences
irrespective of their party affiliations? Can legislators be postulated as individualistic
or should parties be considered as the analytic units in explanations for committee
procedures? Before examining how the three aspects of committee power serve the
benefits of legislators, this section first discusses the prominent principals to whose
demands legislators may respond.
As various researches (Carey 2009, Cox and McCubbins 1993, Cox and McCubbins
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2005) have pointed out, party leaders are a key principal that control resources to
influence legislators’ behavior. Within legislatures, parties are essential components
of legislative organization (Cox 2006), and most legislators are members of party
groups. To varying degrees, party leaders control the allocations of legislative offices
among rank-and-file members, legislative agenda, access to plenary time, staff, and
perks. Outside legislative arenas, party leaders also have control over resources crit-
ical to legislators’ political career prospects, such as the nomination for elections of
various offices, candidates’ positions on the party list, and their access to campaign
finance. Through these mechanisms, legislators are pressured by party leaders to a
certain extent.
In addition to party leaders, another key principal identified in the literature
is the support constituency of legislators. Voters and party leaders may have di-
vergent interests, and compete for the influence over legislators’ behavior. Whether
constituents’ demands might predominate over the pressure from party leaders is con-
ditional on the extent to which the resources controlled by voters are more valuable
to legislators than those controlled by party leaders. The relative value of resources
managed by the competing principals is further determined by the respective institu-
tional environments faced by legislators. It has been pointed out that when electoral
rules tend to encourage intraparty competition (Carey 2007), and when party lead-
ers have less control over candidate nominations and the allocation of legislative
resources (Sieberer 2006), legislators are less likely to behave in accordance with the
party line.
As the literature has suggested, there are more than one principal that may
shape legislators’ interests. Certain institutional arrangements tend to encourage
legislative individualism; while under some other conditions, collective and partisan
representation is more likely to prevail. In the following three subsections, how
committee procedures benefit legislative actors as self-interested legislators or as
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cohesive voting blocs is discussed.
2.2.1 Effects of Committees’ Positive Agenda Power
Committees’ positive agenda power refers to their power to ensure floor considera-
tion of legislative versions approved by committee members. This ability to make
proposals to the floor benefits those who have voting power in a committee, includ-
ing individualistic legislators and disciplined parties. Committees’ positive agenda
power rests on their ability to initiate, amend, rewrite, and cast votes on bills, and
the requirement that the floor has to consider bills supported by committees in prece-
dence over other versions. Their positive agenda power is more extensive if all draft
bills have to be referred to committees prior to plenary votes or amendments.
In most legislatures, committee decision making is under majority rule and each
individual member has equal voting power. Under these conditions, once a bill gets
access to committee time, all members’ preferences can potentially be expressed in
the committee’s collective decisions reported to the floor. With the non-unanimous
decision rule, none of committee members control committee decisions individually.
As various voting and bargaining models have suggested (e.g. Banks 2006, Baron
and Ferejohn 1989a, Dal Bo 2007, Krehbiel and Wiseman 2012, Volden and Wiseman
2007), either for the allocations of distributive benefits or for public policy positions,
if a group of voters have power to collectively make decisions on whether to support,
reject, or amend a proposal, the resulting proposal has to satisfy at least a majority of
voters’ preferences, and make them better off than under the status quo or alternative
proposals.
The extent to which members’ preferences can be reflects in committee reports
depends on the probabilities that these members are included in the winning coalition
for a bill. Parties in coalition governments, whose support is supposed to be crucial
to the passage of ministers’ proposals, can thus utilize committees’ decision-making
16
power to ensure their preferences are reflected in bills relating to each jurisdiction.
If there is coordination through legislative parties, groups of members may have
different voting power. Groups of members can be treated as unified actors if there
are internal mechanisms that enforce members’ cohesive voting behavior. As the
literature on weighted voting (Banzhaf 1964, Shapley and Shubik 1954, Snyder, Ting,
and Ansolabehere 2005) has pointed out, the probability of being pivotal to collective
decisions is conditional on party sizes. Generally, the expected payoffs of larger
voting blocs are higher. However, even though parties may have different voting
power, any member/party with a chance to be included in a winning coalition to
pass a committee decision can affect the collective decisions, and thus potentially be
benefited from committees’ proposing power.
Committees’ proposing power increases the probabilities that committee mem-
bers’ preferences are recognized on the floor. Committee proposals may still be
overturned on the floor. However, the prerogative of being proposers in their re-
spective jurisdictions increases their likelihood of obtaining the advantaged position
in winning coalition formation on the floor for a bill. Given the first-mover status,
committees are able to craft bills that are more likely to win support on the floor,
as well as prevent submitting legislation that make themselves worse off than the
status quo. As the literature on legislative bargaining and collective decision-making
has shown, even though amendments to committee versions may be offered and
supported afterwards, compared to other actors in the legislature, committees as the
proposers are still advantaged (Baron and Ferejohn 1989a, Breitmoser 2011, Krehbiel
and Wiseman 2012, McCarty 2000, Volden and Wiseman 2007).
Through these mechanisms, committees’ positive agenda power benefits individ-
ual members and parties who are likely to be included in a committee majority.
Nevertheless, the decentralization of proposing power does not necessarily benefit
the whole chamber. As Cox (2006) has pointed out, distributing the positive agenda
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power to more legislators implies a larger set of bills that the floor has to decide
upon. This leads to the possibility that each committee can impose external costs
on others to push programs that satisfy special interests relevant to their jurisdic-
tions. Spending will therefore be greater than if all proposals have to be screened by
an agent who can internalize these external costs (Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006). If
parties can control their members’ behavior in each committee, this tendency could
be mitigated (Cox and McCubbins 1993).
2.2.2 Effects of Committees’ Negative Agenda Power
Committees’ negative agenda power is defined as their ability to delay and block the
progress of bills. The negative power benefits actors in committees who are most
able to decide which referred bills to be put on the committee agenda. This power
is based on committees’ authority to decide when and which bills to consider freely,
their right to refuse to report back a bill, and the privilege from the floor action of
recalling or relocating bills. With these procedures, committees are able to delay
or even veto the placement of bills on the plenary agenda. Committees’ negative
power is reduced if other actors are granted the power to remove certain bills from
the committee agenda or urge committees to produce reports for particular bills.
Committees lack negative power if they are required to review all measures, and
report them back to the floor within time constraints.
The previous subsection indicates that once a bills are put on the committee
agenda, the voting power among committee members is equal. However, the pro-
cedures determining which referred bills have access to committee time may create
inequality. When committees are required to report back all referred bills, all re-
ferred bills have more equal access to committee time, and members are allowed
to express their preferences for all of them. Under this condition, committees have
extensive positive agenda power, but do not have the negative power to obstruct the
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legislation. When committees are allowed to decide their agenda freely, a committee
majority can keep the status quo and delay until their demands are met. The nega-
tive agenda power prevents a committee being rolled on the floor and left worse off
than it would have been had it kept the gate closed. In addition, this ability allows
committees to only devote time to bills for which their positions are more likely to be
improved. Combined with committees’ positive power, the negative agenda power
allows committees to more effectively control the set of bills considered and voted on
the floor.
The ability to freely decide which bills to consider potentially creates inequality
of recognition probabilities among referred bills. As the previous section mentions,
bill proposers have higher payoffs than other members included in the winning coali-
tions, even when amendments to the initial proposals are allowed. Therefore, the
power to put ones’ preferred bills on the committee agenda and leave other bills
unaddressed is a crucial source of power (Kalandrakis 2006). All member want to
put the issues in which their interests are most likely to be realized on the committee
agenda. If there is no groups of members that hold similar positions on most issues
and can vote cohesively, all committee members ex ante have equal chances to be
included in a coalition supporting a bill. Since no members is more likely to be in-
cluded than any other in a winning coalition, the procedures that allow a committee
majority to decide which proposals to deliberate first are not particularly beneficial.
These conditions can be illustrated by the widely applied formal model on legislative
bargaining developed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989a). In the model, a legislator is
randomly selected to propose a division of a given budget. Other members then
announce simultaneously the acceptance or rejection of the proposal. The proposal
is implemented if and only if a majority of members accept it. If it is rejected, the
process of appointing a new proposer and voting on the proposed allocation repeats.
Assume that there is no disciplined parties and members vote on proposals en-
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tirely based on their individual expected payoffs. Since all members prefer more
benefits to less, no members is more likely to be included than any other in the win-
ning coalition for a given proposal. Before a bill proposer is selected, all members
have the same expected payoffs from the bargaining process. Under this expecta-
tion, members prefer the procedure that all members can be recognized with equal
probability to make a proposal. In addition, from an ex ante perspective, there is no
particular orders of proposing players in bargaining that is preferred by a majority of
members. The procedures that allow a committee majority to determine the agenda
are not beneficial, since without parties, every member has an equal chance of being
excluded from the majority coalition.
There are two conditions under which the procedure that allows committees to
determine their own agenda is particularly preferred by a committee majority. One
condition is when there are cohesive voting blocs; another is when members bargain
over ideological policy positions and there are groups of members (parties) holding
distinct positions. When parties can enforce members’ cohesive voting behavior,
each party can be treated as a unified actor in the bargaining process. Once a party
member is selected as the proposer, all other members of the party will be included in
the winning coalition. That is, members have different expected payoffs depending on
the sizes of their groups. When a group of members can vote cohesively for bills across
issues, they prefer the procedure that restricts proposing power to their group, so that
they will be included in the winning coalition to get benefits. As Snyder et al. (2005)
have pointed out, in the Baron-Ferejohn bargaining framework, when all parties have
the same probability of being selected to make proposals, small parties are likely to be
disproportionately benefited. In contrast, if parties’ proposal probabilities are more
closely approximated their voting weights, the chances that a party is a member of
a winning coalition1, their expected payoffs are more proportional to their voting
1 Ansolabehere et al. (2005) have clarified that the relationship between parties’ seat shares and
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weights. It is expected that if parties within a committee can vote cohesively, larger
parties tend to prefer the procedure that grants large parties more chances to be
recognized to make a proposal to procedure that all parties can be recognized with
equal probability. When committees are allowed to decide their own agenda under
a majority rule, larger parties whose members are able to vote identically are more
likely to put their preferred proposals on the committee agenda. However, small
parties may prefer the procedures that require committees to review all referred
bills, so that proposals initiated by them can also have access to committee time.
The other factor that may affect committee members’ preferences over different
agenda-setting procedures is their policy positions. Within the bargaining frame-
work, members can be assumed to possess single-peaked spatial preferences with
unique ideal points (Banks and Duggan 2000). Members with policy positions closer
to the proposer are more likely to be included in a winning coalition. The resulting
policies may deviate from the median position to the bill proposer’s ideal position.
The deviations are especially pronounced when members are impatient or when the
bargaining process may be terminated before reaching an agreement due to the costs
of time (Banks and Duggan 2000, Diermeier and Vlaicu 2011). Therefore, members
have different expected payoffs depending on their ideal policy positions. As Dier-
meier and Vlaicu (2011) have argued, in the Baron-Ferejohn bargaining framework,
if there is a group of members sharing similar positions on most issue dimensions,
they have incentives to form an agenda-setting group and prefer the procedure that
restricts proposal power to their own group to procedure that guarantees equal pro-
posal power to all members. It is expected that when the size of this group is larger
and its position is more distinct from other members on most issue dimensions, the
procedures that require committees to review all referred measures are less likely to
their voting weights is not linear, but approximately logarithmic. Empirically, seat shares tend to
overstate the voting weights of larger parties and understate the voting weights of smaller parties.
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be established. When committees are allowed to decide their own agenda freely, these
larger and cohesive groups are better able to put their proposals on the committee
agenda. With this proposing power, they can push policy outcomes further to their
side.
The analysis suggests that the existence of cohesive voting blocs in a commit-
tee and the types of bargaining targets have effects on legislators’ preferences over
different agenda-setting procedures. When there is no cohesive voting blocs in a
committee, and members on average have equal chances to be included in a winning
coalition across all issues, members are indifferent between the equal access and the
majoritarian agenda-setting rules. The procedures that allow a committee major-
ity to decide which bills to consider first are not particularly beneficial. Because
when there is no parties’ coordination, every member has an equal chance of being
excluded from a majority coalition. In contrast, when there are disciplined parties
within committees, legislators find it in their interests to form agenda-setting coali-
tions and share the proposing power only with members in their parties. Larger
parties prefer procedures that allow committees to decide their own agenda freely
so that bills supported by larger parties are more likely to get reviewed at the com-
mittee stage2. The tendency is strengthened when these parties have consistently
distinct policy positions on most issue dimensions. Committee minorities prefer pro-
cedures that guarantee all referred bills equal access to committee time so that their
proposals can also be reviewed.
2 Cotton (2012) provides alternative explanation for the conditions under which committee mem-
bers prefer the procedure that the bill proposer is decided by a committee majority rather than
randomly selected. Cotton argues that when a majority coalition has been established and members
are patient, members of the coalition prefer procedure that allows all members to vote and decide
who has the authority to propose a bill. The bill proposer has to share a larger portion of the
budget with the winning coalition members to not only pass the proposal but also be again selected
as the bill proposer. In contrast, those not included in the majority coalition prefer procedure
that randomly selects a bill proposer, and all members can be recognized with equal probability.
Before a majority coalition has been established, members are indifferent between the two different
agenda-setting procedures.
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In contrast to committees’ positive agenda power, which benefits both individu-
alistic members and disciplined parties who have positive probability to be included
in a coalition supporting a committee report, committees’ negative agenda power
particularly benefit groups of committee members who can vote cohesively or share
similar positions on most issues. Committees’ authority to freely decide their own
timetable allows these larger voting blocs to potentially restrict the access of bills
proposed by other members/minorities to committee time. With this power, these
groups can push legislation placed on the floor further to their side. Larger parties,
and parties/members of an existing majority coalition are especially benefited by the
negative power, since they have higher chances to put their desired proposals on the
committee agenda by utilizing the agenda-setting authority.
Committees’ negative agenda power does not necessarily serve the interests of the
entire chamber. As the literature has pointed out, the decentralization of negative
power implies a smaller set of bills submitted to the floor, which may lead to legisla-
tive gridlock (Cox 2006, Tsebelis 2002). The floor median would prefer procedures
that allow floor members to raise motions to relocate or recall referred bills, or urge
upon committees’ immediate action, especially when the preferences of a committee
majority and the floor median are divergent (Krehbiel and Meirowitz 2002).
2.2.3 Effects of Committees’ Information Capacity
The third aspect of procedures that determines committee power is not directly
related to committees’ ability to make legislative decisions, but their ability to know
payoffs associated with different decisions. Committees’ information capacity rests on
their institutional privileges to collect and transmit information. The consequences
of many policy decisions are complicated and difficult to foresee. Since information is
usually not free, individual legislators do not possess enough resources and expertise
to make accurate decisions on all issues. With the authorities to demand documents
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and hold hearings, and professional staff support, committee members are better
able and have more incentives to invest in specialization.
It has been argued that committee procedures reflect a legislature’s informa-
tional needs. Committees are established by the chamber as a whole to provide the
expertise it needs to develop policies preferred by the chamber median (Gilligan and
Krehbiel 1987, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989). Such policy expertise does not only
serve individual committee members or majority parties, but would be potentially
beneficial to all legislators. As the literature has pointed out, there are several mecha-
nisms through which the acquired information is conveyed from committees to fellow
legislators, including initiating legislation (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Gilligan and
Krehbiel 1989, Krishna and Morgan 2001), holding hearings (Brasher 2006, Diermeier
and Feddersen 2000), submitting policy reports or sending unofficial communications
(Bianco 1997).
While committees may be created under the expectation of performing the ser-
vice on behalf of the whole legislature, this is not necessarily the role they perform.
Committee members may have incentives to reveal biased information due to the dif-
ferences in policy preferences between them and the floor median. In addition, a com-
mittee majority is able to only devote time and resources to gather information for
bills through which their interests are most likely to be realized. This tendency can be
reduced by several procedural tools, such as the appropriate composition of commit-
tee members (Bianco 1997, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989),
repeated interactions between committees and the floor (Diermeier 1995), and pro-
cedures that restrict floor amendments after the committee stage. These procedures
provide committees incentives to act more in accordance with the chamber median’s
preferences. In general, committees’ information capacity advances the provision of
policy-relevant knowledge that potentially serves the entire chamber. However, the
institutional privileges to collect information can be utilized by a committee majority
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to pursue its own interests, especially when committee members consistently have
divergent preferences from the chamber median.
There are several conditions under which information about policies is especially
required. Based on the experience of the U.S. Congress, it has been pointed out
that in periods of rapid social, economic, and political changes, policy outcomes
are highly uncertain and committees tend to be granted institutional incentives
to accommodate increasingly complex policy-making responsibilities (Gilligan and
Krehbiel 1987, Polsby 1968). In addition, the demands for information are usually
not equal across legislators. There are other institutions that may serve legislators’
needs for information. The executive branches have more information about the pol-
icy outcomes and the availability of alternative policies. It is expected that legislators
from the same party with cabinet ministers have more access to relevant information.
In contrast, legislators of non-governing parties and with less experience have higher
demands for policy information provided by legislative committees.
2.2.4 Dimensionality of Committee Power
The previous three sections review the three aspects of committee procedures and
discuss how they serve legislative actors as self-interested legislators or as cohesive
voting blocs. Committees’ positive and negative agenda power allow them to directly
shape the contents of legislation, while their information capacity helps them to learn
the exact payoffs associated with different versions of legislation.
Committees’ positive agenda power serves the needs of both individualistic mem-
bers and cohesive parties who have a chance to be part of a committee’s winning
coalition. It is because when a proposal has been put on the committee agenda,
every member has equal voting power. Committees’ negative agenda power espe-
cially serve larger and disciplined parties who have distinct policy positions, since
these parties are better able to utilize the agenda-setting authority to push commit-
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tee decisions to their side. When parties have less control over committee members
and no members are more likely to be included in a winning coalition than others,
committee procedures that allow members to be involved in more voting games are
a way to increase individual members’ chances of having their preferences reflected
in committee reports. Procedures that guarantee all referred bills equal access to
committee time thus increase minorities and individual members’ expected payoffs.
Procedures that allow committees to decide their own agenda and refuse to report
a referred bill do not necessarily improve individual member’s welfare, since these
procedures do not increase their chances of being included in a winning coalition.
Committees’ information capacity potentially benefits all actors in a legislature.
It is important to recognize that all these three aspects of committee power can
be utilized by the legislative majority party to push legislation to their benefit (Cox
and McCubbins 1993, Cox and McCubbins 2005). What the arguments suggest is
that in addition to the organized legislative majority coalition, committees’ positive
agenda power also allows individual members to have chances to express preferences
on bills, while their information capacity could benefit all legislative actors.
These three aspects provide different functions and legislative actors with different
interests. This suggests a separation between committees’ positive and negative
agenda-setting powers, and their information capacity. It then leads to the question
of how these distinct mechanisms of influence are correlated to each other. Previous
research tended to treat them as one-dimensional phenomena or focus solely on one
dimension of them. However, since these different functions are designed to serve
the needs of different actors, individualistic legislators and/or cohesive parties with
distinct policy positions, and these actors’ preferences may be in conflict, committees
should not be consistently strong or weak with regard to all mechanisms. In addition,
since the distributions of powers among these actors vary across countries, partly due
to the arrangement of other institutions, committees in different countries should
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display varying combinations of strength and weakness on these three. It is expected
that committees’ information capacity, positive and negative agenda-setting powers
constitute empirically distinct dimensions. Two hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis 1 : Powers of legislative committees cluster empirically in more than
one distinct dimension.
Hypothesis 2 : These dimensions correspond to committees’ functions with regard
to 1) power to ensure the placement of their preferred legislative versions on
the floor; 2) power delay or block the progress of bills; and 3) institutional
instruments to collect and transmit information.
2.3 Conditions for Strong Committees
The previous sections review three different aspects of committee procedures and
explore whether they serve the needs of legislative actors as individualistic members
or disciplined parties. Under what conditions are these different dimensions of com-
mittee power especially developed? How does other institutional environment shape
the relative power and incentives of these different legislative actors and thus create
needs for different committee procedures?
In the following subsections, three conditions conducive to strong committees
with regard to different dimensions are discussed. They include when legislators more
heavily rely on distributive benefits to be reelected, when there tends to be multi-
party government, and when there tends to be great changes in the composition of
the legislature.
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2.3.1 Legislators’ Electoral Incentives
One of the main explanations for the existence of the committee system in the U.S.
Congress is the distributive theory. Stressing that committees are established to help
members trade favors and secure distributive benefits for their districts, the theory
builds on the assumption that legislative institutions reflect preferences of individual
members and transaction costs of pursuing their goals (Shepsle and Weingast 1994,
Weingast and Marshall 1988). Based on the distributive theory, legislators are less
controled by party leaders, but are primarily motivated by the desire to secure their
reelection. Faced with the need of cultivating personal votes, one way to pursue the
reelection goals is advancing the interests of their constituents by bringing locally
targeted goods to their home districts.
Since each locally special interest is a minority, each needs to form a coalition with
other interests, which generates the needs of exchange and cooperation. Members
may support the interests of other members in return for others’ endorsements of her
or his own preferences. However, relying on temporary coalitions to pass bills can cre-
ate a variety of problems (Groseclose and King 2001, Weingast and Marshall 1988).
For example, once a group of legislators’ preferred policy has been implemented,
nothing prevents them from reneging their commitments of supporting a bill that
other members desire. In addition, anticipating being reneged, legislators may decide
not to make the agreement of forming a coalition in the first place. Committee sys-
tems constitute a solution to the commitment problem. Under a committee system,
instead of exchanging votes in support of bills, members exchange legislative author-
ity within particular policy areas. Through institutionalizing exchanges of policy in-
fluence, committees provide protection against opportunistic behavior. Committees
are created to decentralize legislative authority, and help district-oriented legislators
deliver particularistic spending projects to their constituents.
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The distributive theory has pointed out that to serve members’ needs of securing
distributive benefits, committees have to provide opportunities for members to form
durable logrolling coalitions. Each committee should be associated with a specific
policy area over which it has jurisdiction, so that logrolling coalitions formed based
on the committee system are more durable, and credible commitments on exchanges
can be made. In addition, committee assignments are expected to be a self-selection
process, so that legislators are able to form coalitions for policy areas which they care
most about (Shepsle and Weingast 1994, Weingast and Marshall 1988). In addition,
committees should have the power to receive and support/oppose referred bills within
their jurisdiction. Otherwise, there is no benefit can be traded via the committee
system.
The implication of the distributive theory is that candidate-centered electoral
systems and politicians’ demands for distributive benefits should result in legisla-
tures with strong committees (Jenkins 1998, Katz and Sala 1996). There have been
several research finding support for the theoretical implication outside of the U.S.
context. Stratman and Baur (2002), looking at the German Bundestag, have found
that committee assignments of legislators elected from first-past-the-post districts
and proportional representative party lists are systematically different. FPTP legis-
lators are more likely to serve in committees through which funds can be channeled
to their home districts. Testing the distributive theory against cross-sectional data
of parliamentary systems, Martin (2011) has found that in countries where electoral
systems encourage intra-party competition and where legislatures have more budget
authority, committees tend to have more power to amend bills and compel execu-
tive officials to attend hearings. Based on the data of Taiwanese legislators, Batto
(2005) has focused on the effects of politicians’ different reelection strategies under
the same electoral system, and has found that legislators who spend heavily during
their election campaign serve significantly more time on committees with the most
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opportunities to yield rents.
These studies suggest that as a way to decentralize legislative authority, commit-
tees, especially those can help channel funds to districts, are attractive to legislators
who seek personal votes and those who rely on the distribution of targeted bene-
fits to get elected. What is less clear in the studies is among various procedures
that determine committees’ power, which of them are most likely to meet the inter-
ests of legislators who are district-oriented and those who demand for particularistic
benefits. To serve these legislators’ needs, committees must enjoy some policy mak-
ing privileges, such as the power to support/oppose referred bills and the power to
amend/rewrite them, so that their preferences can be reflected in legislative outputs.
However, do these members prefer procedures that guarantees each referred bill
equal access to committee time or procedures that allow a committee majority to
control the committee’s agenda? I argue that due to two features of committees
composed of legislators who seek personal votes, the lower voting unity within parties
and a common preference for higher levels of distributive benefits shared by members,
members do not particularly prefer procedures that allow a committee majority to
decide when and which bills to consider.
As the distributive theory has suggested, since members seek personal votes,
party leaders have less control over the behavior of committee members. Members
are less prone to vote cohesively as a party unit. In addition, members bargain over
allocations of pork to legislative districts rather than ideological policy positions.
Members have a common desire for high levels of benefits from bills within their
committee’s jurisdiction.
As the previous section suggests, when there is no cohesive voting blocs across is-
sues and when members share a common preferences for more to less benefits, ex ante
no member is more likely to be included in a winning coalition supporting a commit-
tee decision. Therefore, procedures that allow a committee majority to decide which
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bills to review first is not particularly beneficial. In contrast, committees’ positive
agenda power provides each member opportunities to incorporate their preferences
in legislative versions submitted to the floor. Once a bill is put on the committee
agenda, each member has equal voting power. Committees’ ability to vote against
and amend bills ensures that the bills placed on the floor have to satisfy at least
a majority of members’ preferences for distributive benefits, and make them better
off than under the status quo or alternative proposals. It increases the likelihood
that members’ preferences are recognized on the floor. Under the condition that no
member is certain they will be in the winning coalition for most bills with higher
probabilities than others, committee procedures that allow members to be involved
in more voting games can increase individual members’ chances of getting perks.
Procedures that allow committees to have full access to all bills and have power to
make binding decisions on the bills thus serve legislators who seek particularistic
goods and personal votes. In general, these legislators prefer committee systems
that have extensive positive agenda-setting power, the power to make decisions on
most draft bills before plenary deliberation; but committees’ negative agenda-setting
power, the power to refuse to review a referred bill, does not meet their needs.
Committees tend to be strong with regard to their positive power when mem-
bers more heavily rely on local goods provision as a reelection strategy, when the
electoral systems encourage more candidate-centered patterns of competition, and
when parties have less control over members’ behavior. Committees’ power to de-
cide their own agenda and choose not to consider certain proposals is not expected
to increase with members’ tendency to rely on particularistic benefits, since the neg-
ative agenda power does not increase these members’ chances of being included in
a winning coalition and hence does not improve their welfare. There is expected to
be a positive relationship between committees’ positive agenda power and members’
tendency to rely on distributive benefits, and parties’ lack of control over committee
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members. However, there should be no significant positive relationships between
committees’ negative agenda power and members’ tendency to rely on distributive
benefits. Based on the idea, a hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 3 : If 1) legislators more heavily rely on the provision of locally targeted
goods to secure reelction, and 2) party leaders have less control over committee
members’ behavior, committees are more likely to be strong with regard to the
positive agenda-setting power.
The power of committee systems reflects individual legislators’ electoral incen-
tives, which are also shaped by parties’ nomination procedures and how parties al-
locate campaign resources. It is thus hypothesized that the positive effects of politi-
cians’ tendency to rely on locally targeted goods on committees’ positive agenda
power are strengthened or weakened, depending on party organization. When party
leaders control candidate nomination procedures and legislators’ career prospects are
restricted, features of committee systems are less likely to reflect legislators’ electoral
incentives. As Jones et al. (2002) have pointed out, in Argentina, where local party
branches dominate the renomination process, legislators are not substantially aided
in their career progression by their performance in the Congress, and thus have little
incentives to develop strong legislative institutions. It is expected that the positive
relationships between legislators’ demands for distributive benefits and committees’
positive power is attenuated if parties have centralized candidate nomination proce-
dures.
Parties’ organizational extensiveness may have similar contingent effects. There
are many institutional mechanisms by which legislators can channel benefits to their
districts, and party organization is one of them. When parties have extensive orga-
nization that penetrates into most districts, the local offices can offer some form of
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extra-legislative constituency service. If legislators can distribute benefits to their
constituents through party local offices, they may less heavily rely on legislative or-
ganization to fulfill their electorate’s demands. It is expected that the relationship
between legislators’ electoral incentives and committees’ positive power is weakened
if parties have extensive local organization to distribute benefits. A hypothesis is
proposed:
Hypothesis 4 : If 1) parties have more centralized candidate nomination proce-
dures, or 2) parties have more extensive organization,the effects of legislators’
electoral incentives on committees’ positive power are weakened .
2.3.2 Multiparty Government
As the literature has pointed out, committees may also be established to serve the
needs of parties (Cox and McCubbins 1993, Groseclose and King 2001). Contrary
to theories emphasizing preferences and costs of individual legislators, the research
views parties as a solution to various collective action problems in legislatures. Par-
ties are able to seize legislative authority and design legislative organization in order
to achieve its goals. If the functions of committees meet parties’ needs, and as-
signments to committees are under party control, powerful committees could exist
side-by-side with disciplined parties (Kim and Loewenberg 2005). To reduce agency
loss from ministerial drift, coalition governments constitute a condition under which
governing parties find it in their interest to maintain strong committees to monitor
ministers from coalition partners and ensure the implementation of coalition policies
(Carroll and Cox 2012, Kim and Loewenberg 2005, Martin and Vanberg 2011, Martin
and Depauw 2011).
Decision-making within a coalition government has been conceived as a principal-
agent relationship (Andeweg 2000, Strøm 2000). The cabinet delegates the power
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of implementing coalitional policies to individual ministers. However, due to policy
differences between coalition partner parties, ministers have incentives to deviate
from the coalition agreement and push the implementation of policies further to the
ideal positions of ministers’ parties. The tendency is even exacerbated as a result
of information asymmetry between ministers and other coalition parties. With the
resources of the executive branch, ministers can more easily acquire information
about policy consequences and the availability of policy alternatives. Ministers can
exploit the informational advantage and send biased signals to defend their preferred
policies (Martin and Vanberg 2011). In addition, the determination of budgets for
different ministers approximate a common pool problem, and coalition governments
may lead to excessive spending since there is no centralized enforcement mechanism
(Hallerberg 2000). All these suggest that to solve the problem of delegation, coalition
parties have incentives to establish institutional instruments to monitor ministers
from other parties and enforce the implementation of coalitional policies.
The literature has pointed out several ways by which coalition partners may
monitor one another. First, junior ministerial positions can be used to hold each
other’s ministers accountable (Thies 2001). Second, coalition partners may directly
utilize the legislative process to delay and scrutinize ministerial proposals (Martin
and Vanberg 2004). Third, scholars have increasingly recognized committee systems
as a solution to the delegation problem faced by coalition partner parties. Martin and
Depauw (2009) have found that across parliamentary systems, strong committees
tend to exist in multiparty coalition systems. Kim and Loewenberg (2005) have
pointed out that in the German Bundestag, committee chairs are distributed in
a way that makes it possible for parties to “shadow” their coalition partners in
the executive branch. The similar pattern has also been found in Lithuania (Clark
and Jurgeleviciute 2008). Carroll and Cox (2012) have further investigated this
relationship and shown that ministers are more likely to be “shadowed” by committee
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chairs from their partner parties in countries where committees are more powerful
and the policy disagreement between the minister’s party and its partners is greater.
Martin and Vanberg (2011) have examined the effects of committees, and found
that in legislatures where committees are more powerful, government bills are more
significantly scrutinized and amended.
These studies suggest that coalition governing parties do rely on committees to
enforce coalition agreements on policies. What has not been systematically tested
in the literature is among various procedures that determine committees’ power,
which of them are most likely to serve governing parties’ interests for monitoring one
another. Carroll and Cox (2012) have emphasized committees’ function in delaying
ministerial proposals. With the function, committees allow coalition parties to review
legislation that may deviate from coalition agreements. Martin and Vanberg (2011)
have stressed that committees should have the power to gather information about
policy outcomes and alternatives and the power to amend ministerial proposals.
As the previous section suggests, committees’ information capacity potentially
benefits all actors in the legislature, including coalition partner parties who have
less information access than ministers. Committees’ positive agenda power allows
committee members to incorporate their preferences in proposals submitted to the
floor. The positive power enables coalition governing parties to rewrite ministerial
proposals and make sure that legislation complies with coalition agreements.
Coalition governments also constitute a condition under which committees’ nega-
tive agenda power tends to be preferred. As the previous section argues, committees’
negative agenda power particularly serve cohesive voting blocs who have distinct
policy positions and will be included in the winning coalition for most bills. When
committees are granted the power to decide their own agenda rather than required
to review all bills, legislation proposed by the governing coalition is more likely to
be put on the committee agenda than legislation that may benefit parties excluded
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from the coalition. Coalition partners are pivotal voters to bills proposed by min-
isters, especially when the coalition partners control larger seat shares. In order to
make sure that the resulting policies are closer to the median position of the coalition
than to the median of the whole chamber, governing parties prefer to sharing agenda
control with one another to sharing it with oppositions. Since these partner parties
will not be excluded from the agenda-setting coalition, they can utilize committees’
negative agenda power to delay legislation and prevent bills distant from coalition
agreements from reaching the floor.
Based on these arguments, to serve as counterweights of cabinet ministers, com-
mittees should form a review system through which all ministerial bills have to pro-
ceed. Committees must have the power to vote against, amend, and delay referred
bills. In addition, committees have to be granted more rights to extract information
from ministers. That is, committees are expected to have stronger informational and
legislative power, which includes both positive and negative agenda setting power,
when a country tends to have coalition governments. To explore these relationships,
a hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 5 : If countries have higher rates of multi-party government, commit-
tees tend to be stronger in all three dimensions of committee power.
To test whether committees’ negative agenda power particularly serves cohesive
voting blocs, another hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 6 : If party leaders have more control over committee members’ be-
havior, committees tend to have stronger negative agenda power.
The previous section also suggests that the negative agenda power is particularly
beneficial when parties have distinct positions on most issues. With the ability to
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control committee agenda, larger parties can restrict oppositions’ proposing power.
The negative power is thus especially required when larger parties tend to have
policy positions distant from other members. It is hypothesized that the positive
effects of the propensity for multiparty governments on committees’ negative agenda
power are strengthened or weakened, depending on parties’ policy positions. It is
expected that when policy positions among parties are more polarized, coalition
partner parties have more incentives to invest in committees’ negative power as a
tool to push policies to their side. A hypotheses is proposed:
Hypothesis 7 : If parties’ policy positions are more polarized, the effects of a
propensity for multi-party governments on committees’ negative agenda power
are strengthened .
2.3.3 Changes in Legislative Composition
This section discusses the effects of changes in legislative personnel on committee
power. It first focuses on the circumstances when politicians are less certain about
the political composition of the legislature and then on when there tends to be great
changes in the composition of the legislature.
To examine how politicians’ uncertainty about parties’ fortunes in legislative
elections has effects on the development of different dimensions of committee power,
it is worth exploring the condition of regime transition. The literature on institutional
design of new democracies has pointed out several factors that account for variation
in institutional choices. It has been argued that if electoral favorite is not evident at
the time of institutional choice, the resulting institutions should be more inclusive
and grant more rights to minorities. In contrast, if the relative power of political
actors is known at the time of bargaining, the resulting institutions are likely to be
designed to ratify the existing advantage. When actors who have bargaining power
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over institutions anticipate losing popularity through democratization, the resulting
institutions should also allow more checks and balance (Carroll and Nalepa 2010,
Frye 1997, Przeworski 1991). These arguments have not been systematically tested
against the internal organization of legislatures.
Elections under authoritarianism, while not totally free and fair, serve an infor-
mational role. The results of multi- or one-party elections help regime incumbents to
identify their bases of support, opposition strongholds, and the competence of their
local party officials (Blaydes 2008, Brownlee 2007, Magaloni 2006). It is expected
when there had been elections under preexisting authoritarian regimes, relative power
of political groups was more evident at the time of institutional choices, and com-
mittees were less likely to be designed to provide minorities with equal opportunities
to affect policies. If the relative power of potential participants and issue cleavages
were less clear, committee procedures are expected to be more inclusive.
To provide committee minorities with more opportunities to exert influence, com-
mittees should have extensive positive power. When most proposals have to be re-
ferred to committees before floor consideration, and when committee members have
the power to vote against and rewrite the referred bills, members’ preferences can
be incorporated into reports placed on the floor. Minorities’ proposing power is fur-
ther enhanced if they are able submit minority reports without the agreement of a
committee majority, and if legislators can have more committee assignments. These
procedures allow individual members and minorities to have more chances to be in-
cluded in the winning coalition for a bill. Committees’ negative agenda power is less
inclusive, and tends to benefit already established majorities. Based on this idea, a
hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 8 : If the preexisting authoritarian regimes did not hold elections, com-
mittees tend to provide individual members with more positive agenda-setting
38
power.
When the relative power of political actors is known at the time of bargaining,
and authoritarian incumbents anticipate losing popularity through democratization,
the resulting institutions should also be more inclusive. Assumed to be one of the
actors that had bargaining power at the time of institutional choice, authoritarian
incumbents preferred committee systems that allow more checks and balance if they
anticipated their power to be largely diminished under newly created democracies.
A hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 9 : If the authoritarian incumbents anticipated losing popularity through
democratization, committees tend to provide individual members with more pos-
itive agenda-setting power.
The frequency of changes in the composition of the legislature may also have
impacts on committee power. When only a small percentage of membership of one
legislative term is reelected to the next turn, committees are less likely to main-
tain a stable membership. The instability of legislative membership may constitute
a condition under which instruments that foster committee specialization are espe-
cially required. New legislators are less familiar with legislative process and it is
more costly for them to acquire expertise. As there tends to be large influx of new
legislators, the information asymmetry between executive and legislative branches
is exacerbated. Committees may be granted more instruments to reduce the costs
of information collection, since committees are the primary devices through which
specialized knowledge and expertise can be acquired and applied to policy-making.
It is expected that when the legislative turnover tends to be great, it is in legislators’
interests to have committee systems that facilitate information collection and reduce
policy uncertainty.
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Diermeier (1995) has provided alternative explanation for the relationship be-
tween legislative stability and committee power. Diermeier has argued that the
longer legislative terms facilitate the development of floor deference to committees’
decisions, which sustains committee specialization even in the absence of restrictive
amendment procedures. Explicit restrictive amendment procedures could serve as a
focal point that encourages this coordination. It is expected that when legislative
terms are short and the norms of deference have not been established, restrictive
amendment procedures and other instruments that foster committee specialization
are likely to be established to meet the demand for information. As described in the
previous section, these instruments include committee authorities to conduct inves-
tigation, demand documents, and compel attendance to hearings. Based on these
arguments, a hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 10 : If there tend to be great changes in legislative membership, com-
mittees are granted more instruments to gather and transmit information.
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3Measuring Committee Power
A broad array of indicators of committee powers is needed to test the hypotheses
on their clustering with regard to the three theoretically derived mechanisms of
influence. Political scientists have collected information about the powers of many
formal political institutions. Fish and Kroenig’s (2009) pioneering effort in measuring
various dimensions of legislative powers around the globe has largely broadened our
knowledge of institutional arrangements of legislative branches. The data collection
project on legislative oversight tools supported by the World Bank (Stapenhurst et al.
2008) has more specifically provided indicators about how a legislature keeps an eye
on the activities of the executive. However, information about the features of internal
organization and procedures of legislatures has not been thoroughly covered in these
cross-national data sets. Martin and Depauw (2009), Mattson and Strøm (1996), and
Yla¨outinen and Hallerberg (2008) have made great efforts to measure several aspects
of committee systems. Based on country specialists’ responses to questionnaires, they
have shown that there is a great variety of committee powers and procedures across
countries. In addition, these institutional features have significant influence on the
nature and extent of legislative control over the executive. However, these works have
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only focused on Western or Eastern European parliamentary democracies. There is
still no single dataset addressing internal legislative organization across the world in a
consistent manner. To more thoroughly examine the powers of legislative committees
across different institutional and contextual settings, I assemble an original data set
on structures, procedures and functions of committees in democratic legislatures
around the world.
The data collection endeavor is not the first attempt to measure the powers
of legislative committees, but it covers more aspects of committee procedures and
includes a larger number of countries than previous studies. In this chapter, I first
discuss the method used to measure committee power, then present indicators of the
three theoretically derived mechanisms of committee influence specified in Chapter
2 and the coding procedures of these indicators, and then explain how experts and
countries included in the expert survey were identified. This chapter finally evaluates
the reliability of expert ratings and shows the distributions of some indicators across
national legislatures.
3.1 Committee Power Survey
As the previous data collection projects on legislative institutions have suggested
(e.g. Fish and Kroenig 2009, Martin and Depauw 2009, Mattson and Strøm 1996),
country experts are often the most reliable and efficient information source to clas-
sify such a complex institution. There are various procedures governing legislative
committees, and many of the procedures are contained in a diverse set of documents.
The documents for many countries are either not easily accessible or would require
translation. In addition, in many cases, a great deal of country-specific knowledge
is required to know what documents to look for in the first place. Furthermore,
several institutional features that are also relevant to committees’ influence are not
always encoded in law. Such indicators include the extent to which committees
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are supported by professional staff, how parties control committee assignments, and
whether legislators are inclined to serve in the same committees for consecutive terms.
To include these variables and to solve the problem of the inaccessibility of some le-
gal documents, I conducted a cross-national expert survey to collect information on
various dimensions of committee power.
I designed an expert survey to gather information about the procedures and
structure of permanent, policy-oriented committees in the lower house of legislature
where citizens are represented approximately equally. To explore whether a legisla-
ture has an institutionalized committee system to deal with legislation, the survey
only focuses on permanent (standing) committees, and ignores those appointed to
perform a special function for a temporary time, and those established to deal with
the administration or to organize the work of legislatures. The survey is also re-
stricted to committees as subunits of the legislature, and ignores procedures such as
a “Committee of the Whole.”
The questionnaire of the expert survey consists of three parts. The first part
covers questions on the composition of standing legislative committees, such as how
committee seats are allocated among parties, who make assignments to legislative
standing committees, and whether legislators find it desirable to serve in the same
committee for consecutive terms. The second part concerns how committees are
involved in the law-making process. Questions of this part included whether bills
can bypass the consideration of committees, whether there is any floor action before
bills are referred to committees, whether there are restrictions on multiple referrals,
whether committees are obliged to report all referred bills within a time constraint,
and whether committees can amend referred bills and introduce legislation. For
this part, experts were also asked to assess whether committees have the capacity to
compel executive to attend meetings and submit documents, and whether the plenary
body can amend bills after the committee stage. The third part is on committee
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resources, which asked experts the number of staff a committee has to help with
committee procedures and the extent to which these staff provide administrative
support or conduct research.
For the second part of the questionnaire, experts were asked to answer the ques-
tions based on formally codified rules. I realize that indicators based on codified
rules are not able to fully capture how committees operate in a legislature. Pow-
ers of legislative committees are determined by both formal and informal rules. As
the research on the U.S. Congress has indicated, procedural arrangements govern-
ing legislative organization range from informal practices to codified standing rules
(Evans 1999). Informal rules have been defined as socially shared rules, which are not
written down in official documents with legal standing (Helmke and Levitsky 2004).
The importance of informal rules and the interactions between informal and formal
rules vary across legislatures. As Helmke and Levitsky (2004) have argued, some
informal rules enhance the efficiency of formal rules, some work as substitutes of
formal rules, while others directly contradict formal institutions.
However, there are several reasons for which the current inquiry focuses on rules
encoded in law, particularly for indicators of committees’ role in the law-making pro-
cess. First, even though formal institutions cannot solely determine how committees
operate in practice, they still have extensive effects in shaping actors’ behavior and
available choices. As the literature has pointed out, formal rules contribute to the
generation of shared expectations among actors, which help sustain cooperative out-
comes (Carey 2000, Diermeier 1995). It is worthwhile to collect data documenting
formal committee rules, which offers the possibility of further research on various top-
ics. Second, measures of committee power that incorporate both formal procedures
and informal practices require more subjective judgements by experts, and would
be less stable. As the potential measurement instability and uncertainty rise, a far
larger panel of experts is required to collect information for each indicator. Finally,
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the exploration of conditions for different committee procedures assumes that insti-
tutions reflect the outcomes of struggle among political actors. It is expected that
compared to formal institutions, informal rules are more closely correlated to societal
characteristics that lead to particular institutional choices. Formal institutions may
lag behind informal arrangements in adjusting to changing incentives of political ac-
tors. Therefore, using indicators of formal committee power poses a harder test for
the hypotheses on conditions for different types of committee procedures.
3.2 Indicators of Committee Powers
This section specifies survey items measuring the three dimensions of committee
power. Indicators described in this section, their coding procedures, and the descrip-
tive statistics are listed in Table 3.1.
3.2.1 Indicators of Committees’ Positive Power and Members’ Access to Committee
Affairs
Committees’ positive agenda power refers to their ability to ensure the placement
of legislative versions preferred by them on the floor. Committees’ positive agenda
power rests on their ability to initiate, vote against, amend, and rewrite bills, and the
requirement that the floor has to consider bills supported by committees in prece-
dence over other versions. Their positive agenda power is more extensive if all draft
bills have to be referred to committees prior to plenary votes or amendments, so
that committees can express their preferences for most measures placed to the floor.
In addition to items that characterize committees’ ability to propose legislation and
amendments to the floor, this section includes four items on procedures that allow
individual members to have more access to committee affairs to utilize committees’
proposing power, including the procedures of multiple committee assignments, mul-
tiple referrals, and minority reports. With these procedures, individual members and
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committee minorities have more chances to be included in committee voting games
and propose their preference to the floor.
1. Do standing legislative committees have authority to amend bills? If
so, which version of the bill is subsequently presented for vote to the
plenary?
With the right of choosing either to support, oppose, or amend draft proposals, a
proposal has to reflect the preferences of at least a majority of committee members
in order to be presented to the floor. No matter the bills are about distributing
particularistic goods or bargaining over policy positions, individual members and
parties thus can exert influence over legislation through the committee stage. As
research based on bargaining models has pointed out (Baron and Ferejohn 1989b,
Krehbiel and Wiseman 2012, Rubinstein 1982), if voters of a bill are allowed to make
a substitute proposal once the initial bill has been rejected, the voters have higher
payoffs: they get larger shares of benefits when bargaining over distributive goods,
and the resulting policy is closer to the committee median when bargaining over a
single-dimensional policy space. Mattson and Strom (1996) have pointed out that
the right to redraft bills is principally a committee function, since plenary assemblies
are less able to elaborate on legislative details due to their size.
There are several variations in committees’ amending procedures that determine
committees’ positive agenda power. When committee amendments are automatically
incorporated into legislation and are considered by the floor in precedence over the
original bill, committees can ensure that the floor reviews legislative versions chosen
by them. In some legislatures, such as those of Czech Republic, Latvia, and Ukraine,
committees’ suggestions are considered side by side with the original bills by the
floor. In some other countries, committees are not allowed to amend bills initiate
by the executive branches. For example, in France, for certain policy areas, such as
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social security financing bills, the plenary has to consider proposals submitted by
the executive. Under these conditions, committees’ ability to make proposals to the
floor is relatively limited.
To reflect these variations, in addition to the two polar categories that distin-
guish between legislatures in which committees cannot amend bills or can only make
suggestions and those where the plenary body considers proposals as amended by
committees, two intermediate categories are also specified. The indicator is coded as
‘1’ when committees may amend bills, but the plenary considers original bills if com-
mittee amendments are not accepted by the executive1. ‘2’ refers to that committees
may amend bills, and committee amendments are considered side by side with origi-
nal bills by the plenary body. Experts were asked to rate the committee procedures
based on formal rules. In the sample, in around half of the national legislatures, the
floor reviews proposals as amended by committees.
2. Do standing legislative committees have the right to introduce bills on
the floor?
The ability to introduce bills is another way for committees to make proposals to
the floor. Similar to the amending power, with the authority to initiate or reorganize
legislation, committees can ensure floor consideration of bills approved by them.
In addition to the two polar categories that distinguish between legislatures in
which bills can be introduced under the name of a committee and those where com-
mittees cannot introduce, consolidate, or split bills, the intermediate category refers
to committees that can consolidate and split bills but cannot initiate new proposals.
3. Do all drafted bills have to be referred to committees for consideration
in order to become laws?
1 If the procedures only apply to bills in certain policy areas, the indicator is coded as 1.5.
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The ability of committees to receive bill proposals affects the extent to which
committee members can express their preferences on bills. If only a small portion
of bills are referred to committees, committees do not have extensive influence over
legislation, even though they may have sufficient amending power. When more pro-
posals are submitted to committees, members have more opportunities to incorporate
their preferences into bills placed on the floor.
In the survey, experts were asked whether all drafts have to be referred to com-
mittees for consideration in order to become laws and the conditions under which
the committee stage can be bypassed. One extreme is the UK’s House of Com-
mons, bills are not referred to standing committees. The indicator is coded as ‘1’
if bills are referred to committees only when a floor majority so decide, such as in
the parliaments of Australia, India, and Ireland. ‘2’ refers to conditions when bills
of certain policy areas are not referred to committees, or when executive ministers
can decide whether to bypass the committee stage. For example, in New Zealand,
appropriation bills are not referred to committees. ‘3’ means that a floor majority
may determine to bypass a measure’s referral to standing committees or refer bills
to ad hoc committees. Around one fifth of the national legislatures in the sample
belong to this category. ‘4’ means that a floor supermajority or consensus among
legislative party leaders is required to bypass the committee process. The indicator
is coded as ‘5’ if all proposals have to be referred to committees for consideration.
4. Before bills are referred to committees, is there any floor action by the
entire body of the legislature?
Another procedure that determines committees’ positive agenda power is whether
the committee stage takes place prior to floor deliberations. In the parliaments of
Canada and Ireland, the floor can vote down or amend a proposal before committees
have an opportunity to review it. Under this condition, bills must pass through the
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plenary veto gates before they can reach committees, which largely restrict the scope
of policies on which committees can exert influence. If all bills are submitted to
committees prior to floor action, members can have more access to bills without the
approval of the plenary majority.
The indicator is coded as ‘3’ if the floor cannot take any action prior to the
committee stage, or can have debates on bills, but the debates are generally not
considered binding at the committee stage. It is coded as ‘2’ if the floor may take
any one of the following three actions: taking votes on bills, amending bills, or having
debates, which are generally considered binding at the committee stage, on bills. It
is coded as ‘1’ if the floor may take any two of the three actions, and as ‘0’ if the floor
may do all of them. Committee systems in around seventy percent of the legislatures
are assigned a score of 3.
5. Are committee minorities allowed to submit minority report to the
plenary?
As Chapter 2 specifies, the extent to which individual members’ preferences can
be reflected in committee reports depends on the probabilities that these members
are included in the winning coalition for a bill. There are several procedures that
provide individual legislators’ with more chances to incorporate their preferences into
committee reports submitted to the floor. One of the procedures is minority reports.
Where minority reports are allowed, members of a committee minority are also able
to place their preferred legislative versions to the floor, and have more incentives
to spend time on committee affairs (Mattson and Strøm 1996). For this indicator,
the intermediate category refers to when minorities can submit reports only under
certain conditions, such as with the consent of a committee majority or the chair.
A committee system receives the maximum score for this indicator if minorities can
submit reports without any restriction.
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6. On average, on how many committee does a legislator serve?
If legislators are allowed to have more committee assignments, they have higher
probabilities to be included in one committee’s winning coalition for a bill, and
thus their personal goals are more likely to be accommodated. Every additional
committee assignment may offer a new set of issues that the members can address
(Schiller 1995). Jenkins (1998) has explained, the creation of more new committees in
the nineteenth-century American House was a direct response to legislators’ demands
for more opportunities to serve constituents.
The information about the average number of committee assignments per legisla-
tor was not collected from the expert survey. I calculate the indicator by dividing the
overall number of committee seats by the total number of legislators in the current
national legislature. Legislators’ average committee assignments vary greatly across
countries. In around twenty percent of the legislatures included in the sample, only a
portion of all legislators are assigned to standing legislative committees. In countries
such as Argentina and the Philippines, each legislator on average serves on more
than four committees.
7. Are there restrictions on referral of bills to multiple committees?
Similar to multiple committee assignments, multiple referral may also have the
effects of allowing individual members to have more chances to express their pref-
erences for a variety of bill proposals. Once a bill is submitted to more than one
committee, either jointly or sequentially, a legislative version has to satisfy more
members to be proposed to the floor. In addition, as the size of the winning coalition
for a bill increases, the preferences of individual members and parties also become
less influential to the collective decisions (Alter 2002, Bawn 1996, Young 1996).
For this indicator, committee systems are distinguished between where multiple
referrals are not allowed, where multiple referrals are allowed but rarely occur, and
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where multiple referrals are common. Legislatures included in the sample distribute
relatively evenly across the three categories.
8. Do committee meetings have to be scheduled at different times from
plenary meetings of the chamber?
The last item is about the procedural aspect of committee consideration. If com-
mittee and plenary meetings are scheduled as the same time and members have to
choose between them, members may be less inclined to focus on committee assign-
ments. This scheduling problem will be even more severe when legislators have more
committee assignments. The regulation that committee and plenary meetings have
to be scheduled at different times is likely to allow members more access to committee
affairs.
The indicator of unique meeting time is coded as ‘0’ if they they may be scheduled
as the same time, and ‘2’ if they have to be scheduled at different times. The
intermediate category refers to the condition when there is no clear regulation, but
almost all plenary and committee meetings are scheduled as different times.
3.2.2 Indicators of Committees’ Negative Power
Committees’ negative agenda power is defined as their ability to block the progress
of bills. This power is based on committees’ authority to decide when and which bills
to consider freely, their right to refuse to report back a bill, and the privilege from the
floor action of recalling or relocating bills. With these procedures, committees are
able to delay or even veto the placement of bills on the plenary agenda. Committees’
negative power is reduced if other actors are granted the power to remove certain
bills from the committee agenda or urge committees to produce reports for particular
bills. The following items were included in the expert survey to measure committees’
negative power.
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9. Are committees obliged to consider and report all referred bills back
to floor?
Once bills reach committees, who are allowed to determine when and which re-
ferred bills to be reviewed? The two extremes of the procedural variation are when
committees are required to report back all referred bills within time constraints, and
when committees can decide their own agenda freely. When committees are obliged
to report all referred legislation, bills tabled before a committee constitute its agenda.
Procedures between the two extremes include rules that allow floor members to raise
motions to bypass the committee stage, relocate bills, or expedite committee review
process. When committees have the autonomy to set their own agenda freely, it can
be guaranteed that only proposals preferred by a committee majority are considered.
Bills proposed by a minority are less likely to be presented and discussed. In ad-
dition, committees can refuse to report bills that are not preferred by a committee
majority. This prevents the floor from considering them, which gives the committee
majority effective veto power. In contrast, when committees are required to consider
all referred legislation, bills have more equal access to committee time.
In the survey, experts were asked whether committees are obliged to report all
referred bills back to floor. The responses are coded as ‘0’ if committees have to
report all referred bills. It is coded as ‘1’ if committees are obliged to report bills
submitted by the executive branch. ‘2’ refers to the condition when a floor majority
can decide to pass by, relocate, or recall measures tabled in committee; while ‘3’ refers
to if such decisions have to be approved by a supermajority. The indicator is coded
as ‘4’ if committees are free to determine their own agenda, and the plenary body
does not have rights of recall. In around half of the national legislatures included in
the sample, committees are obliged to report all referred bills to the floor.
10. Are standing legislative committees obliged to report referred bills
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within a time constraint?
Another procedure that determines committees’ negative power is whether com-
mittees have to submit reports within time limits. When there is no time constraint
on committee reports, committees can effectively delay the progress of bills.
The two polar categories distinguish between legislatures where there is no time
constraint on committee reports, and where the time constraints are less than one
legislative session on reports for all referred bills. The intermediate category refers to
conditions when time constraints can be imposed on some bills by a floor majority or
other presiding officers. Legislatures in the sample distribute relatively evenly across
the three categories.
11. Who formally controls a committee’s agenda?
This item more specifically measures the extent to which committee members
can freely determine what proposals to consider and when. In the survey, experts
were asked about the actors who are granted power to make the following agenda-
setting decisions: calling committee meetings, deciding what referred bills shall be
considered and when, and deciding whether or not to hold hearings and when. For
each of the decisions, a score of ‘2’ is assigned if it is determined entirely by committee
members and chairs; a score of ‘1’ is assigned if both committee members or chairs
and other actors, such as a floor majority, speakers of the legislature, or executive
branch officials, are granted power to exert influence on the agenda-setting decision;
and ‘0’ refers to when the decision is exclusively made by these actors outside of
committees. The indicator is created by summing a committee system’s score of
each of the three agenda-setting decisions.
In addition to these three indicators, committees’ authority to amend bills (the
first item) also affects their negative agenda power. When committees are able to
rewrite a bill, and the plenary subsequently considers the version as reported by
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committees, committees can block the progress of their less-preferred versions.
3.2.3 Indicators of Committees’ Information Capacity
As Chapter 2 lays out, one of the main functions of committees is providing incentives
for members to collect and transmit information. The consequences of many policy
decisions are complicated and difficult to foresee. Since information is usually not
free, individual legislators do not possess enough resources and expertise to make
accurate decisions on all issues. Indicators on committees’ information capacity hence
should measure the extent to which committees are granted institutional privileges
that allow members to be better able and have more incentives to invest in policy
specialization. These include whether committees are able to demand documents and
compel the attendance of government officials, whether committees have sufficient
resources, and whether members find it desirable to serve in the same committee in
consecutive terms.
As committees become better informed, there tends to be an informational asym-
metry between committee members and other legislators. With the institutional
privileges and resources, committee members have more information about policy
issues in their respective jurisdictions than their fellow legislators. There are sev-
eral processes through which committees transmit information to the floor, such as
bill proposals (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989, Krishna and
Morgan 2001), debates and hearings (Austen-Smith 1990, Brasher 2006, Diermeier
and Feddersen 2000), or unofficial communications (Bianco 1997). Indicators on
committees’ information capacity should also measure whether there are incentives
to induce committees to share unbiased information to other members. The follow-
ing items were included in the questionnaire to characterize committees’ information
capacity in different legislatures.
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12. Do standing legislative committees have rights to demand or compel
documents from government?
To scrutinize and construct legislation effectively, committees have to be able to
independently collect information about topics related to bills. The power to demand
documents from government officials is crucial for committees to obtain information
and expertise. This question aims to capture whether committees are able to ask
government officials to supply information without the consent of a floor majority or
executive ministers. When committees can only demand but not compel the supply
of documents, their informational right is restricted.
In the survey, experts were provided with multiple alternatives and were asked
to choose one that best describes the institutional features of committees in their
country’s legislature. The indicator is coded on a 0–3 scale, where ‘0’ refers to when
committees cannot demand documents from government officials, and ‘3’ means that
committees can compel government officials to supply documents. It is coded as
‘1’ if committees can only demand but not compel government officials to supply
documents. ‘2’ refers to when committees can demand documents from government,
but they may compel government officials to supply documents only under certain
conditions, such as with the consent of the plenary body or the presiding officers, or if
certain government ministers are granted power to refuse such demands. Legislatures
are also classified as this category if committees can only compel documents through
their “investigation subcommittees,” and the establishment of such subcommittees
is upon the consent of the floor. In the sample, committees in seventy percent of the
national legislatures are classified as being able to compel documents or being able to
compel documents under certain conditions.
13. Do standing legislative committees have rights to invite or compel
executive branch officials to attend a committee meeting and supply oral
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testimony?
The power to summon the attendance of witnesses is also crucial for commit-
tees to gather information. This question also aims to assess the extent to which
committees are granted power to ask government officials to supply information. If
committees can only invite but not compel government officials to attend hearings,
their information capacity is relatively limited. The classification of this indicator is
similar to the indicator on committees’ right to demand documents.
14. How many staff does a committee have and do these staff provide
administrative support, help draft legislation, or conduct research?
To be better able to collect information, it is also important to have profes-
sional staff support. Committee resources vary greatly across countries. The costs
of specialization are reduced if committees have staff with professional training who
can help them prepare legislative documents and conduct research. The standing
committees of the U.S. Congress stand at one extreme with extensive professional
staff who could help conduct research and draft legislation. In some other countries,
several committees have to share a single secretary mainly providing administrative
support. The indicator should measure both the number of staff personnel and the
functions they can provide to assist committee members.
The indicator of committees’ staff support is constructed based on several items.
Experts were asked to supply the number of shared staff (including clerical and
professional employees), on average, that one committee has to help with committee
procedures. In addition to shared staff, experts were also asked about the number
of personal staff, on average, that one legislator has, in his or her position as a
committee member. For these two categories of staff, experts were asked to assess
the extent to which they provide the functions of administrative support, legislative
document preparation, and research. For each of these three functions, committee
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staff were evaluated on a three-point scale, on which yes is coded as ‘2’, limited is
coded as ‘1’, and no is coded as ‘0’.
To construct an aggregate indicator, I add committee staff’s scores for these three
function, and multiply the total scores by the number of staff personnel. For each
national legislature, I take average scores that experts assigned to each of these items,
since committees’ staff support is a more subjective indicator, and disagreement
between experts can hardly be reconciled. The descriptive statistics of this indicator
suggests that legislatures vary greatly with regard to committees’ staff support. At
one extreme, each committee has less than one staff person, and the staff provide very
limited assistance. At the other extreme, each committees has more than sixty staff,
and the staff provide sufficient support with regard to administration, legislation
preparation, and research.
15. How desirable is it for legislators to serve in consecutive terms in the
same committees?
In terms of the composition of committees, if members serve longer terms in the
same committees, the costs of committee specialization in a policy area are lower.
Research based on the experience of the U.S. Congress has argued that if committees
have reasonably stable membership, legislative expertise in a particular policy area
is more likely to develop (Katz and Sala 1996).
It is more difficult to compute an indicator of committee retention rates in the
cross sectional dataset. In the survey, experts were asked to assess whether legislators
find it desirable to serve in consecutive terms in the same committees. The indicator
captures the extent to which legislators find it attractive to build up competence in
a particular policy area covered by a committee. Experts’ answers were coded on
a 0–3 scale, in which ‘0’ means that on average, it is not desirable, while ‘3’ refers
to members’ great desirability to serve in the same committees. It is also a more
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subjective indicator, and I take the averages of expert scores for each committee
system.
16. Can the plenary body subsequently amend bills after the committee
stage?
When the floor tends to comply with committees’ decisions, either by appropriate
composition of committee members (Bianco 1997, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Gilli-
gan and Krehbiel 1989), through formal regulations that restrict floor amendments
after the committee stage (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989)
or through repeated interactions that lead to credible commitment (Diermeier 1995),
committees have more incentives to engage in specialization and transmit non-biased
information. In the survey, I focus on whether committees’ decisions are protected
by restrictive amendment procedures.
Experts were asked according to formal rules, whether the plenary body can sub-
sequently amend bills after the committee stage and if there is any rule restricting
such amendments. In the sample, in around seventy percent of the national legis-
latures, the plenary can amend committee decisions freely. The indicator is coded
as ‘1’ when the plenary cannot subsequently amend committee decisions in certain
policy areas. ‘2’ refers to that a floor majority can decide whether to grant a closed
rule on a bill. The U.S. Congress, where the Rules Committee can disallow any floor
amendment to a proposal, is also classified into this category. It is coded as ‘3’ if
the plenary body may amend bills, but all these amendments shall be sent back to
committees for reconsideration, such as in Brazil, Lithuania, and Sweden. It is coded
as ‘4’ if the floor cannot amend bills after the committee stage.
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3.2.4 Other Indicators
The survey also included three items that measure whether the policy areas of com-
mittees correspond to the jurisdictions of executive departments and whether the
memberships of committees are proportional to the relative strength of legislative
parties. These items may capture the extent to which committee organization is
institutionalized and reflects policy needs and political composition in a political
system.
The other item measures the extent to which party leaders exert control over
committee assignments. Experts were asked to assess how committee memberships
are determined. This variable is coded on a three-point scale, where ‘1’ indicates that
committee assignments are based on individual initiative and non-partisan criteria,
and ‘3’ indicates that party leaders discretionarily determine committee assignments.
To construct a country level measure, the averages of parties’ scores in each country,
weighted by the vote share of each party in the most recent two elections are com-
puted. This indicator is included in the analysis on the relationships between parties’
control over committee members and committees’ positive and negative power. All
these four indicators were composed by taking the averages of expert assessments.
Table 3.1: Indicators of committee power
Indicators and coding Obs. Mean Sd. Min–Max
Whether the plenary considers bills as amended
by committees
75 2.32 .91 0–3
0= committees cannot amend bills;
1= plenary considers original bills if committee amendments are not accepted by executive;
2= plenary considers committee amendments side by side with original bills;
3= plenary considers bills as amended by committees
Whether committees have the right to introduce
bills
75 .90 .88 0–2
0= committees cannot split, consolidate, or introduce bills;
1= committees can only split or consolidate bills;
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1 – continued from previous page
Indicators and coding Obs. Mean Sd. Min–Max
2= committees can introduce bills
All bills have to be referred to standing commit-
tees to become laws
75 4 1.43 0–5
0= bills are not referred to committees;
1= bills are referred to committees if approved by the House;
2= bills of certain policy areas are not referred to committees;
3= plenary majority can decide not to refer bills to committees;
4= super majority can decide not to refer bills to committees;
5= all bills have to be referred to standing committees
Plenary action before the committee stage 75 2.57 .75 0–3
0= taking votes, amending, and having binding debates on bills;
1= two of the actions; 2= one of the actions;
3= no plenary action or only non-binding debates
Whether committees can submit minority re-
ports
75 1.13 .93 0–2
0= no; 1= with some restriction; 2= yes
The average number of committee assignments
per legislator
75 1.77 1.27 .36–8.39
number of all committee seats/ number of parliamentary seats
Whether there is a restriction on multiple refer-
rals
75 1.02 .80 0–2
0= yes; 1= no, but multiple referrals are rare;
2= no, multiple referrals are common
Whether committee time is unique 75 1.41 .77 0–2
0= committee and plenary meetings may be at the same time;
1= no such regulation, but almost all are at different times;
2= they have to be scheduled at different times
Whether committees have to report back all re-
ferred bills
75 1.22 1.62 0–4
0= all bills have to be reported back;
1= bills submitted by the executive have to be reported;
2= plenary majority can pass by, recall, or relocate bills;
3= super majority can pass by, recall, or relocate bills;
4= committees determine their own agenda freely;
Whether there is a time constraint on committee
reports
75 .89 .87 0–2
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1 – continued from previous page
Indicators and coding Obs. Mean Sd. Min–Max
0= time limits on all bills;
1= time limits on some bills; 2= no time limits
Who controls a committee’s agenda 75 5 1.07 2–6
0= actors other than committee members or chairs;
1= committee members or chairs along with other actors;
2= committee members or chairs;
Summing the scores with regard to calling committee meetings,
deciding what referred bills shall be considered and when,
and deciding whether or not to hold hearings and when
Whether committees can demand documents
from government
75 2.28 .93 0–3
0= committees cannot demand documents from gov.;
1= committees can demand but not compel gov. to supply documents;
2= committees can compel gov. to supply documents under some conditions;
3= committees can compel gov. to supply documents
Whether committees can compel government of-
ficials’ attendance
75 2.34 .89 1–3
0= committees cannot invite the attendance of officials;
1= committees can invite but not compel their attendance
2= committees can compel their attendance under some conditions;
3= committees can compel the attendance of officials
Number of committee staff and their functions 70 35.07 53.46 2.5–408
Number of committee staff members ˆ Sum of their scores
with regard to providing administrative support (0–2),
helping draft legislation (0–2), and conducting research (0–2)
Whether it is desirable for legislators to serve in
consecutive terms in the same committee
68 2.22 .59 0–3
0= not at all; 3= greatly desirable
Whether committees can grant a closed rule 75 .78 1.35 0–4
0= the plenary can amend bills freely;
1= closed rules for bills of certain policy areas;
2= closed rules are granted when the plenary majority so decides;
3= all plenary amendments have to be recommitted;
4= closed rules for all bills
Whether the policy areas of committees are
clearly stated
75 2.77 .40 1–3
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1 – continued from previous page
Indicators and coding Obs. Mean Sd. Min–Max
0= not clearly stated; 3= mostly clearly stated
Whether the policy areas of committees corre-
spond to the jurisdictions of executive depart-
ments
75 2.44 .79 0–3
0= not at all; 3= mostly
Whether committee seats are allocated propor-
tionally to the relative size of parties
75 .88 .32 0–1
0= no; 1= yes
Who makes assignments to standing legislative
committees
67 2.06 .50 1–3
1= based on individual initiative and non-partisan criteria;
2= party leaders assign memberships, with the consideration of members’ preferences;
3= party leaders discretionarily determine committee assignments;
3.3 Data Collection and the Reliability of Expert Ratings
This section provides a description on the implementation of the data collection.
In the sample, countries are selected to reflect polities where there are free and
fair elections and the composition of the national legislature reflects the results of
electoral competition. All the 75 countries meet the criteria of having experienced
at least two consecutive lower chamber elections before 2009 when the country’s
Polity score was 4 or higher. Based on the construction of the Polity scale , a
polity score of 4 or higher ensures that elections are reasonably free and fair and
the authority of chief executives is constrained to a certain degree (Jaggers and
Gurr 1995). In addition, only countries that have at least two million inhabitants as
of 2008 are included2. It has been argued that small legislatures encourage consensus
and informality, and are less likely to sustain committee systems for specialized
2 Mauritius meets all the criteria but is not included in the sample, since standing committees in
its legislature mainly deal with the administration and do not have legislative functions
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division of labor (Baldwin 2012). All countries included in the analysis are listed
in Table 3.2. This sample covers a sufficient variety of political systems, in terms
of executive-legislative relations, electoral rules, and experience with democracy, to
enable the characterization of internal legislative organization across countries.
For each country, panels of 5-20 experts were asked to fill out the questionnaire
on procedures, powers, and structures of legislative committees via e-mail. Experts
chose either to answer the questionnaire online or with Word document. The ex-
perts consisted of scholars whose research concern the internal organization of na-
tional legislatures; parliamentary staff, especially committee secretaries and library
and information sector staff; and representatives of non-governmental international
organizations that have had projects aiming to enhance the capacity of national leg-
islatures. The surveys were conducted during the period from April to August 2012.
Experts were asked to answer questions based on the current legal and institutional
features of standing committees in the national legislature.
Response rates varied across countries. For each country, initially five experts
were identified and contacted. Some of those I contacted declined and some of them
kindly suggested contact with colleagues. In these cases, my search for and contact
with experts continued. I secured at least one response per country for 72 coun-
tries3. Table 3.2 lists the number of responses collected for each country. For 35
countries included in the sample, more than one responses were obtained. The aver-
age numbers of responses per country are lower across Latin American and African
countries. Totally 117 completed questionnaires were received. 59 percent of them
were answered by academic scholars, another 29 percent were filled by parliamentary
staff, and the other 12 percent were provided by NGO representatives. Among all
3 For New Zealand, Taiwan, and the United States, I coded the indicators in the second part of
the questionnaire bases on legislative standing rules and relevant literature. Parliamentary staff
helped fill in an abridged version of the questionnaire only including questions of the first and the
third parts, those that are not addressed in formal rules.
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the countries for which I contacted experts, I failed to get any response for Mongolia
and Nicaragua.
Table 3.2: Numbers of responses of the committee power
expert survey (by countries and regions)
Country Scholar Staff NGO All
Australia 1 1 2
Austria 4 1 5
Belgium 2 2
Canada 1 1
Denmark 1 1
Finland 2 1 3
France 1 1
Germany 2 1 3
Greece 1 1
Ireland 1 1 2
Italy 3 3
Netherlands 1 1
New Zealand 0
Norway 1 1 2
Portugal 1 1 2
Spain 1 1
Sweden 3 3
Switzerland 2 2
UK 1 1
USA 0
Albania 1 1
Bulgaria 1 1 2
Croatia 1 1
Czech Rep. 1 1
Estonia 1 1 2
Georgia 1 1
Hungary 1 1 2
Latvia 2 2
Lithuania 2 2
Macedonia 1 1
Moldova 1 1
Poland 1 1 2
Romania 1 1
Serbia 1 1 2
Slovakia 1 1
Slovenia 1 1 2
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2 – continued from previous page
Country Scholar Staff NGO All
Ukraine 1 1 2
Argentina 1 1 2
Bolivia 1 1
Brazil 1 1 1
Chile 1 1
Colombia 2 2
Costa Rica 1 1
Dominican Rep. 2 2
Ecuador 1 1
El Salvador 1 1
Guatemala 1 1
Honduras 1 1 2
Jamaica 1 1
Mexico 2 2
Panama 1 1 2
Paraguay 1 1
Peru 1 1
Uruguay 1 1
Venezuela 1 1
Benin 1 1
Botswana 1 1 2
Ghana 2 2
Mozambique 1 1
Namibia 1 1
Nigeria 2 2
S. Africa 1 1
Senegal 1 1
Zambia 1 1
Bangladesh 1 1 2
India 2 2
Indonesia 1 1
Israel 2 2
Japan 3 1 4
Kenya 1 1
Philippines 1 1
ROK 3 3
Taiwan 0
Turkey 2 2
I evaluate inter-rater agreement for countries where more than one responses were
received. To explore the extent to which experts agree among themselves, Table
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Table 3.3: Inter-rater agreement of the committee power expert survey
Indicator Avg. within Across Within country
country sd. country sd. 90% PI
Floor considers bills as amended by com-
mittees
0.16 0.91 ˘ 0.45
Committees have the right to introduce
bills
0.22 0.88 ˘ 0.64
All bills are referred to committees 0.07 1.43 ˘ 0.20
No plenary action before committee stage 0.19 0.75 ˘ 0.56
Minority reports 0.13 0.93 ˘ 0.39
Multiple referrals 0.27 0.8 ˘ 0.77
Committee time is unique 0.23 0.77 ˘ 0.66
Committees do not have to report all re-
ferred bills
0.23 1.62 ˘ 0.65
No time constraint on committee reports 0.14 0.87 ˘ 0.41
Agenda control 0.49 1.07 ˘ 1.41
Committees can demand documents from
government
0.23 0.93 ˘ 0.67
Committees can compel government offi-
cials attendance
0.20 0.89 ˘ 0.59
Committees can grant a closed rule 0.26 1.35 ˘ 0.76
Number and functions of committee staff 3.33 53.46 ˘ 9.67
Serving in the same committee is desirable 0.17 0.59 ˘ 0.50
3.3 reports the average within-country standard deviation of each indicator among
countries that more than one experts provided ratings4. Countries for which only
one completed questionnaire was received are excluded from the calculation. The
lower the standard deviation of expert ratings for each indicator, on average, the
more consensus exists among experts over the classification of a committee system.
This table provides a simple assessment of inter-rater reliability by comparing the
within-country and across-country variability of each indicator.
Except for the function of committee staff and whether it is desirable for mem-
bers to serve in consecutive terms in the same committee, experts were asked to rate
all other indicators on the table based on formal rules rather than subjective judge-
ment. It is expected that the discrepancies among experts for these formal institution
4 The information about the average number of committee assignments per legislator was not
collected from the expert survey, and thus is not listed on the table.
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measures are small. The table suggests that the within-country standard deviations
are generally low, compared to the cross-country standard deviations of the same
indicators. Among the indicators of committees’ positive power, the procedure gov-
erning multiple referrals was rated less reliably than the other indicators, although
its within-country standard deviation is still much smaller than the cross-country
standard deviation.
Among the indicators of committees’ negative power, the average level of dis-
agreement on the aggregate measure of committees’ agenda control is especially
high. This measure was created by summing a committee system’s scores on three
agenda-setting decisions. When experts disagree over one of the items, they tend to
also disagree over the other two. Consequently, the discrepancies among experts are
aggravated by aggregation of the three scores. The average levels of disagreement on
measures of committees’ information capacity are all relatively low. The comparison
of standard deviations suggests that experts also tend to agree in their ratings on
the more subjective indicators, the capability of committee staff and the desirability
of serving in consecutive terms in the same committee.
The evaluation of inter-rater agreement based on the comparison between within-
country and across-country standard deviations shows that the similarity among
expert ratings for a committee system is high, compared to the variation across
countries. This general tendency of inter-rater consistency suggests that the small
sample size of the survey for each country is acceptable. Since experts tend to assign
similar ratings to the same procedure of a committee system, it is less important to
have a large sample of experts.
For the 35 countries that more than one complete questionnaires were received,
I sought to reconcile the disagreement between experts shown in Table 3.3. Except
for the measures of the capability of committee staff and the desirability of serving
in the same committee, conflicting survey responses were resolved based on formal
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documents. The most current version of formal legislative rules, including constitu-
tions, standing procedures, resolutions and other relevant documents for individual
countries, were used to supplement information from expert surveys. For the two
above-mentioned subjective indicators, the indicators of legislative organization in-
stitutionalization (the extent to which committees’ policy areas are clearly stated
and correspond to the jurisdictions of executive departments), and parties’ control
over committee assignments, I took averages of expert responses.
For the countries where only one response was received, I calculate the 90%
prediction interval to estimate if two more responses had been collected for each of
these countries, how the expert ratings would distribute around the country mean.
The 90% prediction interval of each indicator is listed in the last column of Table
3.3. These prediction intervals are calculated in terms of the observed within-country
standard deviations listed in the first column, and assume that the expert ratings for
these countries are in a t-distribution5. The estimation is based on a conservative
assumption that experts were randomly selected for these countries, and may assign
very different ratings. The table shows that the prediction intervals are still smaller
than the cross-country variation. However, it also suggests that if the conservative
assumption is true, for countries where only one response was received, there might
be a one score difference between the current ratings and the ratings if a larger
sample had been obtained for some indicators, such as multiple referrals, agenda
control, and closed rules. The ratings for indicators of committees’ amending power,
bill referral procedures, minority reports, time constraints on committee reports are
more stable.
5 Specifically, the prediction interval is calculated as country mean ˘ within country sd.ˆt0.05,2,
in which t0.05,2 “ 2.92.
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3.4 Distributions of Key Indicators
This section displays the distributions of several indicators of committee power based
on the expert survey. All the data points on the following four figures are jittered
slightly to improve visibility of overlapping points. The figures aim to show the
general distribution patterns of the key measures, and explore whether the coun-
try scores are consistent with previous assessments of strong and weak committee
systems. More detailed discussions of relationships between indicators and cross-
validation with other datasets are presented in the next chapter.
ALB
ARG
AUS
AUT
BGD
BEL
BEN
BOL
BWA
BRA
BGR
CAN
CHL
COL
CRI
HRV
CZE
DNK
DOM
ECU
SLV
EST
FIN
FRA
GEO
DEU
GHA
GRC
GTM
HNDHUN
IND
IDN
IRL
ISR ITA
JAM
JPN
KEN
LVA
LTU
MKD
MEX
MDA
MOZ
NAM
NLD
NZL
NGA
NOR
PANPRY
PER PHL
POL
PRT
KOR
ROMZAF
SEN
SRB
SVK
SVN
ESP
SWE
CHE
T N
TZA
TUR
GBR
USA
UKR
URY
VEN
ZMB
0
1
2
3
0 1 2 3
No plenary action before committee stage
Fl
oo
r c
on
si
de
rs
 b
ill
s 
as
 a
m
en
de
d 
by
 c
om
m
itt
ee
s
Region
a
a
a
a
a
Advanced Capitalist
Post Communist
Latin America
Africa
Asia/Mideast
Figure 3.1: Committees’ amending power and plenary action before committee
stage
Figure 3.1 shows how committee systems score on two indicators of committees’
positive power. As the previous section points out, if committees can amend bills
before they are reframed or voted down on the floor, and if the floor subsequently
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considers bills as amended by committees, committees are able to ensure the place-
ment of legislative versions preferred by them on the floor. The figure suggests that
the majority of committee systems included in the sample have high scores on both
measures. The committees in the UK House of Commons and the parliaments of
other countries with Westminster systems were rated low on one or both of these
indicators. The U.S. Congress and the German Bundestag were both classified in the
highest category for the two committee procedures. These country scores are roughly
consistent with expectations. In addition, committees in most post-communist and
Latin American countries score high on both indicators.
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Figure 3.2: Multiple referrals and average committee assignments per legislator
Figure 3.2 displays the distributions of multiple referrals and average commit-
tee assignments per legislator. These indicators both capture the extent to which
individual members have access to committee affairs. The figure shows a positive
relationship between the two indicators. Countries distribute relatively evenly across
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the three categories of multiple referrals. The distribution of the number of com-
mittee assignments is heavily skewed to the right, and natural log transformation is
taken. Legislators in Latin American countries tend to serve in more committees. In
most advanced democracies, legislators usually have one or two committee assign-
ments, and are located in the middle of the figure. In countries considered to have
weak committee systems, such as Australia, Ireland, and the UK, not all legislators
are assigned to committees.
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Figure 3.3: Committees’ reporting obligations and time limits
Figure 3.3 shows two indicators of committees’ negative power: whether commit-
tees are obliged to report all referred bills back and whether there are time constraints
on such reports. The figure shows that most African legislatures were classified as
low on both measures. The U.S. Congress was rated in the highest category for
both indicators. Committees in the majority of post-communist and Latin Ameri-
can legislatures are required to report most referred bills, although there are no time
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constraints on the reports in many of these countries. Across the Western European
parliaments, the country scores displayed in the figure are generally consistent with
the classification specified by Do¨ring (1996): the government has less control over the
committee timetable in Denmark and Germany, but has more control in France and
Southern Europe. Three clear exceptions of the consistent patterns between the two
measures are Finland, Sweden, and the UK. While the divergent scores for the UK
House of Commons are due to ratings for different types of committees, either the
ad hoc or the standing committees; the discrepancies in scores for Finland and Swe-
den may reflect that the relative power of the parliament has changed in contrasting
directions in these two countries during the past decade (Strøm and Bergman 2011).
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Figure 3.4: Committees’ power to compel evidence and staff support
Figure 3.4 displays the distributions of committees’ power to compel government
officials to attend hearings and their staff support. They are measures of commit-
tees’ information capacity. The figure suggests that in majority of the countries
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included in the sample, committees have the authority to compel government offi-
cials’ attendance. The scores of committees’ staff support are skewed to the right,
and natural log transformation is taken. Most African legislatures were scored below
the average for this indicator; while committee systems in the advanced democracies
were generally rated around or above the average, with Austria and Spain as excep-
tions. Consistent with expectation, the U.S. Congress was classified as an outlier
with regard to professional staff for its committees.
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4Dimensionality of Committee Power
As Chapter 2 specifies, committees’ information capacity, positive, and negative
agenda power serve the needs of different actors, including individual legislators,
cohesive voting blocs, and the entire chamber. In addition, since these actors’ pref-
erences may be in conflict, committees should not be consistently strong or weak
with regard to all mechanisms. It is expected that committees’ information capacity,
positive and negative agenda-setting powers constitute empirically distinct dimen-
sions. With the data discussed in Chapter 3, the hypotheses about the separation of
the three dimensions of committee power can be tested. In this chapter, I first use
confirmatory factor analyses to examine the data for the dimensionality framework
and conduct tests of measurement invariance across several background variables.
Then the chapter discusses how national legislatures score on different dimensions of
committee power. Finally, to evaluate the reliability of the data and the validity of
the dimensionality framework, I compare the factor scores with alternative measures
of committee and general legislative capacity.
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4.1 The Underlying Dimensions of Committee Power
Hypotheses specified in Chapter 2 argue that committees’ information capacity po-
tentially benefits all legislators who want to have more information about policy
consequences; the positive agenda power provides committee members with oppor-
tunities to express preferences for measures placed to the floor; while the negative
agenda power tends to benefit organized voting blocs in committees and allow them
to block the progress of certain bills. Based on these arguments, indicators that
empirically measure one of these three dimensions should covary to a certain degree,
because they all reflect the variance of committees’ strength with regard to the di-
mension. In contrast, intercorrelation between indicators of different dimensions is
expected to be lower. This section empirically tests the hypotheses on patterns of
covariation among indicators of committee power.
To verify the number of underlying dimensions of various indicators of commit-
tee power and the patterns of indicator-dimension relationships, confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) is conducted. CFA identifies latent factors that account for the ob-
served relationships among a set of indicators. It evaluates the prespecified patterns
of indicator-dimension relationships in terms of how well they reproduce the corre-
lations observed in the sample data. That is, CFA provides statistical tests to assess
whether the theoretical assumptions about the number of underlying dimensions and
the patterns of indicator-dimension relationships are empirically supported. In ad-
dition, CFA allows one to examine the stability of the dimensionality model across
countries of different development levels and other potentially influential covariates.
Before moving to a confirmatory model to verify the hypotheses, to more thor-
oughly explore the variances and covariances among indicators of committee power, I
first conduct “exploratory factor analysis (EFA) within the CFA framework” (Brown
2006, Jo¨reskog 1969). In this strategy, only the number of underlying factors and an
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anchor indicator for each factor whose cross-loadings are fixed to zero are prespeci-
fied. As Brown (2006) has indicated, this approach represents an intermediate step
between EFA and CFA. It is less restrictive than CFA, since the indicator-dimension
relationships are not fixed, except for the anchor indicators. It also provides more
information than EFA model, such as the statistical significance of item loadings.
Most of the indicators of committee power are coded as ordinal variables. Two
indicators, the number and functions of committee staff and average committee as-
signments per legislator, are continuous variables. Since the distributions of these
two variables are skewed to the right, natural log transformation is taken to generate
more symmetrical distributions. To accommodate this mixed ordinal and continuous
data, robust weighted least squares (WLS) estimation using polychoric correlations
are computed (Olsson 1979). WLS estimation adjusts standard errors and model
test statistics to reduce bias due to the conventional maximum likelihood estima-
tion assumption that observed indicators are measured on a continuous normal scale
(Flora and Curran 2004, Schmitt 2011).
Table 4.1 shows the results of EFA within the CFA framework of the 17 indi-
cators of committee procedures. In the model, it is specified that there are three
distinct dimensions of committee power. In addition, three anchor items are se-
lected, which include whether there is plenary action before the committee stage,
whether committees are obliged to report all referred bills back to the floor, and
whether committees can compel executive branch officials to attend hearings. That
is, these three indicators are assumed to load on only one factor. The loadings of
other non-anchor indicators are freely estimated on each factor. More specifically,
within each factor generated by the EFA within CFA approach, the patterns of as-
sociations between each of these three anchor indicators and all other indicators are
specified. In addition, the correlations between these three anchor indicators are cap-
tured by relationships between factors. These three anchor points are chosen because
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Table 4.1: Parameter estimates of the dimensionality of committee powers (EFA
within the CFA framework)
Factor
Positive power Negative power Information
Indicator
No plenary action before committee
stage
.779 (.11)*** .000 (.00) .000 (.00)
All bills are referred to committees .760 (.10)*** -.048 (.16) .102 (.16)
Minority reports .406 (.14)*** .133 (.18) .167 (.17)
Multiple referrals .531 (.11)*** .012 (.16) .084 (.16)
(log) Committee assignments per
legislator
.357 (.11)*** .079 (.13) -.126 (.15)
Committee time is unique .370 (.12)** .190 (.17) .123 (.14)
Floor considers bills as amended by
committees
.451 (.14)*** .339 (.15)** .192 (.18)
Committees do not have to report
all referred bills
.000 (.00) .792 (.12)*** .000 (.00)
No time constraint on committee re-
ports
.012 (.13) .890 (.13)*** -.132 (.16)
Agenda control .234 (.15) .500 (.10)*** .026 (.15)
(log) Number and functions of com-
mittee staff
.179 (.13) .322 (.14)** .343 (.12)***
Committees can compel executive
branch officials’ attendance
.000 (.00) .000 (.00) .797 (.09)***
Committees can demand documents
from government
.042 (.15) -.063 (.21) 1.032 (.13)***
Committees have the right to intro-
duce bills
.161 (.15) -.355 (.20)* .669 (.14)***
Committees can grant a closed rule .248 (.14) -.056 (.20) .643 (.14)***
Serving in consecutive terms in the
same committee is desirable
.172 (.12) .027 (.14) .240 (.11)**
Correlation Matrix of Factors
Positive power Negative power Information
Positive power 1.00
Negative power -.200 (.21) 1.00
Information capacity -.185 (.25) .290 (.22) 1.00
Note: Parameters were estimated with Mplus. N=75. Multiple imputations were used for the
indicators of the desirability of serving in consecutive terms in the same committee (N=68) and
committee staff (N=69). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. χ2=60.43 (p “ 0.83). RMSEA
= .000 (90% CI: .000/.041). CFI= 1.00.
as specified in Chapter 3, these three procedures have crucial implications for the
three dimensions of committee power. If proposals are referred to committees before
they are reframed or voted down on the floor, committees are able to express their
preferences on more bills; if committees are not required to report all bills back, they
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can effectively block the progress of legislation; if committees can compel government
officials to attend hearings and supply information, their capacity to independently
gather information is enhanced. The EFA within CFA framework with these three
indicators as the anchor items allows the exploration of how each of these three indi-
cators are correlated to other indicators and jointly constitute the three dimensions
of committee power.
As the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) (Steiger 1990) and
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) (Bentler 1990) indicate, the three-factor model fits the
data quite well. The table reports the estimates of the linear relationship between the
observable indicators and the three latent variables, and the estimated coefficients of
correlations between the three latent variables. Except for the indicator of whether
members find it desirable to serve in the same committees, all other 16 items have
primary factor loadings above .30. The estimated correlations between any two of
the three dimensions are not significant.
There are seven indicators that significantly load on the first factor. The first
factor combines committees’ early involvement in the law-making process, their au-
thorities to consider and amend most draft bills, and submit minority reports. In
legislatures scoring high on this factor, there tend to be no restrictions on multiple re-
ferrals; members are likely to have more committee assignments; and committee and
plenary meetings tend to be scheduled at different times. Consistent with theoretical
expectations, rules that determine committees’ power to make decisions and place
their preferred legislation to the floor constitute one distinct dimension. In addition,
procedures that allow individual members more access to committee affairs also load
on the same factor. These indicators do not significantly covary with other indicators
that are expected to measure committees’ negative power and information capacity.
Multiple referrals and large numbers of committee assignments per legislator have
been considered unfavorable to the “property rights” of each committee in the re-
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search based on the experience of the U.S. Congress (Weingast and Marshall 1988).
However, as Table 4.1 shows, these two items significantly share variances with other
indicators of committees’ positive agenda power. In addition, the exclusion of these
two items does not change the three-factor structure. These patterns suggest that
across countries, committees’ authorities to place decisions to the floor tend to in-
crease with individual legislators’ opportunities for committee participation rather
than with committees’ monopoly right within their jurisdictions.
The second factor relates mainly to committees’ negative power to block the
progress of legislation, including their authorities to freely decide which bills to be
considered and when. Committee systems scoring high on this factor also tend to
have stronger amending power. These patterns are also consistent with theoretical
expectations and suggest that there is one single factor accounting for the variation
of various procedures that determine committees’ negative power across legislatures.
The indicator of committees’ staff support also loads significantly on this factor.
More specifically, committees’ staff support correlates more substantially to two of
the indicators of committees’ negative power, including committees’ amending power
(r “ .37) and no time constraints on committee reports (r “ .39). These relation-
ships may suggest that professional staff support not only contributes to committees’
information capacity, but also strengthens committees’ ability to delay and revise
their less-preferred legislative versions.
The third factor comprises institutional instruments for committees to collect and
transmit information, including the authority to demand documents and to summon
government officials, and the restriction on amendments by the plenary after the
committee stage. Committee systems scoring high on this factor have more staff
support, and members tend to find serving in the same committee for consecutive
terms is desirable. These patterns support the hypothesis that procedures about
committees’ ability to gather information and share their policy expertise with the
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floor constitute a distinct dimension of influence.
What is different from the theoretical expectation is the indicator of committees’
authorities to introduce bills loads significantly on this factor, but does not load on
the factor of committees’ positive power. Committees’ rights to introduce bills con-
siderably correlate to their authorities to demand documents (r “ .56) and compel
government officials’ attendance (r “ .38), and to restrictive amending processes
(r “ .38). It is not very clear why committees’ proposing rights are less correlated
with measures of committees’ positive power, but substantially covary with their
information capacity. It may suggest proposing bills is an effective mechanism of in-
formation transmission1. Further studies will be required to examine the implications
of committees’ power to initiating legislation.
Following the hypotheses specified in Chapter 2 and the findings from the EFA
within CFA model, I perform a CFA whose structure is presented in Figure 4.1.
Except for the indicators of committees’ amending power and staff support, all other
cross-loadings are fixed to zero. The model allows the verification that when most
indicators are prespecified as being accounted for by one single factor, their primary
loadings are still significant and the three-factor structure fits the data well. Different
from the EFA within CFA model, the CFA approach clearly specifies the item-factor
relationships, and helps generate factor scores, for which most indicators are assumed
to load on one single factor. Table 4.2 reports the linear relationships between the 17
measures of committee power and three factors and a set of goodness of fit indicators.
Based on the goodness of fit indicators, the CFA model fits the data quite well.
All loadings of the prespecified item-factor relationships are significant. Consistent
with the results of the EFA within CFA model, the factor of committees’ positive
1 Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989) have assumed that making bill proposals has the effects of
sending a costly signal about the policy consequences. The empirical patterns revealed by the
factor analysis seem to be consistent with the assumption. However, a more detailed exploration
is required to determine how different information transmission mechanisms have different signally
effects.
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Figure 4.1: Path diagram of the three-factor model
power comprises their early involvement in the legislative process, authorities to
receive and amend almost all bills, and procedures that allow multiple committee
assignments, multiple referrals, and the submission of minority reports. Further-
more, indicators of committees’ ability to freely determine their agenda and revise
bills share common variance, and constitute the dimension of committees’ negative
power. Finally, the factor of committees’ information capacity is composed of their
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Table 4.2: Parameter estimates of the dimensionality of committee powers (CFA)
Parameter Standardized WLS estimate
λ11 .739 (.13)***
λ12 .787 (.10)***
λ13 .380 (.14)***
λ14 .511 (.10)***
λ15 .332 (.10)***
λ16 .368 (.13)***
λ17 .395 (.12)***
λ21 .405 (.13)***
λ22 .788 (.13)***
λ23 .803 (.12)***
λ24 .486 (.09)***
λ25 .372 (.13)***
λ31 .311 (.11)***
λ32 .817 (.10)***
λ33 .978 (.09)***
λ34 .536 (.11)***
λ35 .635 (.11)***
λ36 .251 (.11)**
Correlation Matrix of Factors
Positive power Negative power Information
Positive power 1.00 – –
Negative power -.011 (.15) 1.00 –
Information capacity .128 (.14) .171 (.14) 1.00
Note: Parameters were estimated with Mplus. N=75. Multiple imputations were used for the
indicators of the desirability of serving in consecutive terms in the same committee (N=68) and
committee staff (N=69). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. χ2=84.66 (p “ 0.79). RM-
SEA= .000 (90% CI: .000/.043). CFI= 1.00.
abilities to demand documents, compel attendance to hearings, initiate bills, restrict
subsequent amendments, and their professional staff support.
The three-factor model includes two cross-loading items. The indicator of com-
mittees’ amending power loads on both the first and the second factors; while the
indicator of committees’ staff support loads on both the second and the third fac-
tors. Compared to a model excluding the cross-loading items or a model forcing
these items to load on a single factor, the current model fits the data significantly
more closely2. Two of the items, the desirability of serving in consecutive terms in
2 The χ2 of a CFA model in which the indicator of committees’ amending power is forced to only
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the same committee and the staff support of committees, contain missing values,
and multiple imputations are used to estimate the missing cases. Excluding the two
items does not change this three-factor structure. In addition, factor scores gener-
ated from the current model and those from the reduced models are highly correlated
at r “ .95 „ .99. These suggest the three-factor model is quite stable.
Three additional items, whether the policy areas of committees are clearly spec-
ified, whether those policy areas correspond to the jurisdictions of executive de-
partments, and whether the allocation of committee seats is proportional to the seat
shares of parties, comprise a separate factor, if they are also included in the analysis3.
This factor seems to capture the extent of the institutionalization of a committee
system. Since this factor is not correlated with the three main factors of commit-
tee powers, and their factor loadings are less significant, the three indicators are
not included in the subsequent analyses. The less significance of the factor loadings
may be mainly due to the lack of variation of these three indicators. In the sample,
88% and 66% of the national legislatures were scored above 2.5 on the 0–3 scale
of the indicators of committees’ policy areas and their correspondence with minis-
ters, respectively. In 88% of the national legislatures, committee seats are allocated
proportionally to the relative size of parties.
The results of the EFA within CFA and the CFA models provide unambiguous
support for the first two hypotheses raised in Chapter 2. The performance of the
three-factor framework verifies the multidimensional nature of committee power ex-
pected in hypothesis 1. There is no single factor that accounts for the variances of
all different committee procedures. In addition, these three factors correspond to the
load on the first factor is 96.750 (df “ 97). χ2 “ 90.993 pdf “ 97q when the indicator of staff
support only loads on the second factor, while χ2 “ 92.385 pdf “ 97q if it only loads on the third
factor. The χ2 difference test suggests that the current model provides a significantly better fit to
the data than these alternative models
3 The factor loadings of these three indicators are .888 (.29), .358 (.16), and .348 (.15), respectively.
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theoretically derived mechanisms and thus support hypothesis 2. Across legislatures,
committees are not consistently strong or weak with regard to all three dimensions
of influence. Almost all indicators load significantly on only one factor; these factors
capture clearly distinct dimensions of committee power.
Utilizing the capacity of CFA approach of incorporating covariates, I also evalu-
ate the equivalence of the CFA parameters across covariates that represent countries’
levels of development, democratic quality, and executive-legislative relations. Some
indicators of committee power may function differently in different countries. For ex-
ample, regardless of the level of the underlying dimension of committees’ information
capacity, legislatures in higher income countries with well functioning institutions are
more likely to be supported by effective administrative services. That is, irrespec-
tive of the demands for committees to collect and transmit information, committees
systems in higher income countries tend to be scored higher for the indicator of pro-
fessional staff support. In addition, countries’ legislative-executive relations may also
affect the equivalence of the CFA parameters. Decision-making under presidentialism
is considered to be more decentralized; while the role of parliaments and their com-
mittees in drafting legislation appears to be more limited in parliamentary systems
(Strøm 2000). It is likely that regardless of the levels of committees’ positive power
and information capacity, committees in presidential systems tend to be granted the
right to initiate legislation.
To verify whether certain indicators function differently in countries with differ-
ent contextual variables, I conduct CFA with covariates (Brown 2006, Muthe´n 1989).
This approach tests if certain covariates have significant effects on indicators once
the latent factors are held constant, by regressing the indicators onto covariates that
represent various features of countries. A significant effect of the covariate on an
indicator means that countries with different levels of the covariate are scored differ-
ently for the indicator, even when the latent factors are held constant. The models
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also examine if the three-dimensional framework still holds when the covariates are
controlled.
The results are shown in Table B.1, B.2, and B.3 in Appendix B. Countries’ eco-
nomic development levels, democratic quality, and executive-legislative relations are
included as covariates to test the invariance of the three-factor model. The estimated
parameters and the goodness of fit indicators suggest that the three-factor model still
fits the data well. None of the covariates alter the factor structure and the patterns
of item-factor loadings established in Table 4.1. The only difference from the original
model is that, as Table B.1 shows, when countries’ log transformed per capita GDP is
included as the covariate, the loading of the indicator of committees’ staff support on
committees’ negative power becomes insignificant. As expected, countries’ income
levels have substantial effects on committees’ staff support. At any given level of
committees’ negative power and information capacity, legislatures in higher income
countries tend to have more professional staff to help with committee affairs. Once
the effects of countries’ income levels on indicators are accounted for, the covari-
ance between committees’ staff support and other indicators of committees’ negative
power is diminished; while its factor loading on committees’ information capacity
is still significant. These results suggest that the significant covariation between
committees’ staff support and negative power found in the original model mainly re-
sults from the association between higher income countries and more sufficient staff
resources.
With the approach of CFA, hypotheses on the dimensionality of committee power
are verified in this section. The results suggest that various committee procedures
cluster into three dimensions. The dimension of committees’ positive power combines
their ability to receive and amend bills at an earlier stage of legislative process and
procedures that allow individual legislators more access to committee affairs. The
dimension of committees’ negative power is constituted of their authorities to freely
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decide which bills to consider and when. The dimension of committees’ information
capacity is composed of their staff resources and their authorities to demand doc-
uments, compel attendance, introduce bills, and restrict subsequent amendments.
The equivalence of the three-dimensional structure across covariates that represent
countries’ income levels, democratic quality, and executive-legislative relations is also
tested. The separation of these three dimensions still holds with the inclusion of the
covariates. Committees’ staff support is highly associated with countries’ levels of
developments, and its loading on the dimension of negative power is diminished with
the inclusion of the covariates. Other indicator-factor relations established in the
original model are not affected by different levels of the covariates.
4.2 The Distributions and Correlations of Factor Scores
How do national legislatures score on these three dimensions of committee power?
Do committee systems tend to combine any set of the mechanisms? This section
discusses how the factor scores of the three dimensions distribute and correlate across
the sample.
Chapter 2 argues that committees’ positive and negative power both benefit cohe-
sive voting blocs. Committees’ positive and negative power may be both developed
and serve the interests of disciplined parties. However, the negative agenda power
is less beneficial to individualistic members. It implies that there may be the com-
bination of “high scores on the dimension of positive power and low scores on the
dimension of negative power”, but it is less likely to find committee systems that
have significant negative power but limited positive power. Figure 4.2 displays com-
mittee systems’ strength on these two dimensions, based on factor scores generated
from a three-dimensional CFA model4. The figure shows that with some exception,
4 The CFA model follows the path diagram presented in Figure 4.1, but the indicator of commit-
tees’ staff support is forced to only load on the factor of their information capacity to reflect the
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particularly those with Westminster traditions, most countries with above-average
scores on negative agenda power have at least middle-level scores on the dimension
of positive power. The committee system in the UK’s House of Commons is one
clear exception. Its scores are calculated based on features of the select committees
(standing committees without law-making authorities) but not the general commit-
tees (ad hoc committees created for each draft bill). The general committees may be
scored very low on the dimension of negative power but higher on the dimension of
positive power. The select committees are classified as having more negative power.
However, since no bills are referred to select committees, it only means they have the
authority to determine their agenda freely but have no power to block legislation.
Figure 4.3 locates all the 75 countries’ legislative committees on the three dimen-
sions. The figure divides the countries into eight categories based on their scores on
the three factors. As parameters estimated in Table 4.1 and 4.2 suggest, all the pair-
wise correlations between the factor scores are small. These patterns suggest there
are no significant substitutes between any two of the dimensions. The categories of
the combination of “high scores on two of the dimensions but a low score on the other
one” are more crowded; while the categories of “low scores on two of the dimensions
but a high score on the other one” include fewer cases. Committee systems that
are scored as “high on all three dimensions” are also rare. These patterns suggest
committee systems are less likely to be consistently strong with regard to all three
dimensions.
Figure 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 display the distributions of each of the three dimensions of
committee power. Figure 4.4 suggests that committee systems in nearly all post-
communist countries are classified as having extensive positive power. They provide
members with more opportunities to be involved in the law-making process. The
results of measurement invariance tests discussed in the previous section. The model is reported in
Table B.4 in Appendix B
87
ALB
ARGAUS
AUT
BGD
BEL
BEN
BOL
BWA
BRA
BGR
CAN
CHL
COL
CRI
HRV
CZE
DNK
DOM
ECU
SLV
EST
FIN
FRA
GEO
DEU
GHA
GRC
GTM
HND
HUN
IND
IDN
IRL
ISR
ITA
JAM
JPN
KEN
LVA
LTU
MKD
MEX
MDA
MOZ
NAM
NLD
NZL
NGA
NOR
PAN
PRY
PER
PHL
POL
PRT
KOR
ROM
ZAF
SEN
SRB
SVK
SVN
ESP
SWE
CHE
TWN
TZA
TUR
GBR
USA
UKR
URY
VEN
ZMB
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
-2 -1 0 1
Positive agenda power
N
eg
at
iv
e 
ag
en
da
 p
ow
er
Region
a
a
a
a
a
Advanced Capitalist
Post Communist
Latin America
Africa
Asia/Mideast
Figure 4.2: Powers of legislative committees (factor scores generated from a CFA)
similar tendency has also been identified in previous research (Martin and Depauw
2009, Yla¨outinen and Hallerberg 2008). The authors have found that on average,
committees in post-communist countries tend to have more institutional instruments
than committees in Western European countries. Martin and Depauw have explained
that the fall of communism in these countries provided them an opportunity to
reinvigorate their legislatures, and the influence of US-based agencies and scholars
may have shaped the reorganizations.
Figure 4.4 also shows that with the exception of France and Senegal, all countries
scored below -0.5 on the dimension with regard to committees’ positive power were
once part of the British Empire, which is consistent with the Westminster tradition
of weak committees.
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Figure 4.3: Powers of legislative committees (factor scores generated from a CFA;
vertical lines indicating the first quartile, median, and third quartile)
Most sub-Saharan African countries locate in the upper two panels of Figure 4.3,
where committees are weak in both positive and negative power. Figure 4.5 shows
that committee systems in the sub-Saharan African countries with more democratic
experience, such as Botswana, Mozambique, Benin, and South Africa, tend to have
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Figure 4.4: Committees’ positive agenda power (factor scores generated from a
CFA; vertical lines indicating the first quartile, median, and third quartile)
more authorities to determine their own agenda.
The institutional arrangements of committees are more heterogeneous across
countries in Asia. Committees in countries of British colonial origin, Bangladesh
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Figure 4.5: Committees’ negative agenda power (factor scores generated from a
CFA; vertical lines indicating the first quartile, median, and third quartile)
and India, score below average on all three dimensions; while committees in the
more affluent countries, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, are classified as having
stronger negative power and information capacity, as Figure 4.5 and 4.6 suggest. The
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Figure 4.6: Committees’ information capacity (factor scores generated from a CFA;
vertical lines indicating the first quartile, median, and third quartile)
Philippine Congress, whose institutional design was largely influenced by the U.S.
colonial experience (Wilson 1999), has the committee system that reaches higher-
than-average values on all dimensions.
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Advanced capitalist countries spread across all categories, except the “high on
everything” one. In addition to committees of the French parliament, which was
meant to be weak (Huber 1996), those in the parliaments of Southern Europe also
have lower scores on some of the dimensions. The committee system of the U.S.
Congress, which has been considered as a model of strong committees, is classified
as having an average level of positive power, and scores fairly high on the dimensions
of negative power and information capacity. The Western European countries that
have been argued as having strong parliaments, including Austria, Denmark, and
Germany, also score above average in committees’ negative power.
More analyses are shown in the subsequent chapters to explore reasons accounting
for the variations in these three dimensions across countries.
4.3 Cross-Validation
Section 4.1 shows the tests of the reliability of the three-dimensional structure across
covariates. This section further evaluates the validity of the factor scores by contrast-
ing them with alternative measures of committee and general legislative capacity.
One of the alternative measures based on similar indicators of committee power
is the index developed by Martin and Depauw (2009). This index covers 12 dummy
indicators of committee procedures in 31 parliamentary countries. The indicators
include whether committees are jurisdictional to ministerial portfolios, whether bills
are considered by committees prior to the plenary stage, whether committee time is
unique, who control committee agenda, whether the floor consider bills as amended
by committees, and whether committees are allowed to demand documents and com-
pel ministerial attendance. All of these items are also included in my dataset, and
most of them load on the factor of committees’ positive power, while some load on the
information capacity factor. The coefficients of the correlations between the index
and the three factors are shown in Table 4.3, which suggests that this index is highly
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correlated with committees’ positive power, and is correlated with their information
capacity to a lesser extent. The relation between this index and the factor scores of
committees’ positive power is displayed in the left panel of Figure 4.7. The figure
shows that, except for the cases of Greece and Ireland, the location of committee
systems with regard to their positive power generated by the CFA solution matches
closely the index by Martin and Depauw.
Table 4.3: Coefficients of correlations between alternative measures and the three
factors
Positive Negative Information Overlapping
power power capacity cases
Committee power index 0.61 0.15 0.26 28
(Martin & Depauw 2009)
“Drafting authority” factor 0.61 -0.12 -0.01 16
(Mattson & Strøm 1996)
“Agenda control” factor 0.44 -0.28 0.01 16
(Mattson & Strøm 1996)
Legislative policy strength 0.84 -0.04 -0.11 15
(Martin & Vanberg 2011)
Rank of “control structure” -0.57 -0.15 -0.10 21
(Harfst & Schnapp 2003)
Rank of “personnel resources” 0.07 -0.31 -0.47 21
(Harfst & Schnapp 2003)
Rank of “information rights” -0.06 -0.40 -0.30 21
(Harfst & Schnapp 2003)
Power of the purse (Wehner 2006) 0.39 0.37 0.27 35
PPI (Fish & Kroenig 2009) 0.08 0.06 -0.14 75
PPI: influence over executive -0.17 -0.05 -0.16 75
PPI: institutional autonomy 0.15 0.09 -0.05 75
PPI: specified power 0.46 0.03 -0.07 75
PPI: institutional capacity -0.23 0.18 -0.07 75
Note: p ă 0.05 are in bold.
Another measures based on similar indicators are the two factor scores developed
by Mattson and Strøm (1996). These two factors are generated from 5 items that
measure the strength of committee systems in 16 Western European countries. The
“drafting authority” factor comprises committees’ power to initiate and rewrite bills,
and their authorities to demand documents. This factor is also highly associated with
94
minority reports to the floor and committee deliberation prior to the major floor
debate. The items associated with this factor mainly load on the positive power
dimension based on my CFA solution. As expected, Table 4.3 suggests that these
two factor scores are highly correlated. The right panel of Figure 4.7 displays that
except for the UK House of Commons, for which Mattson and Strøm’s measures are
based on the procedures of both the ad-hoc and standing committees, these two scales
are generally consistent. The other factor, named as committees’ “agenda control,”
includes committees’ capacity to control their timetable and compel witness. This
factor is also highly associated with the number of specialized standing committees
and committee stage prior to the major floor debate. These items load on all three
dimensions of my CFA model. Table 4.3 suggests that this factor is more correlated
with committees’ positive power.
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Figure 4.7: Comparison between the factor scores of committees’ positive power
and indices by Martin & Depauw and by Mattson & Strøm
Martin and Vanberg (2011) have developed an index of legislative policing strength
based on factor analysis of eight indicators for 16 Western European parliaments. The
index measures the extent to which legislative institutions enable coalition parties to
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gain informational expertise and change ministerial proposals. The index combines
six features of a committee system, including the number and size of committees,
the correspondence between committee and ministerial jurisdictions, binding plenary
debate before the committee stage, committees’ amending power, and committees’
authority to compel documents and witnesses; and two plenary procedures, urgency
and guillotine procedures, that allow ministers to restrict legislative debates and
amendments. It is expected that the index is correlated with the dimensions of com-
mittees’ positive power and information capacity, given its constituent indicators.
Table 4.3 shows that this index is closely associated with the factor of committees’
positive power, but does not covary with the factor scores of information capacity.
The lack of correlation between this index and committees’ information capacity may
be due to that in Martin and Vanberg’s factor analysis used to generate the index of
legislative policing strength, the factor loading of the item of committees’ authority
to compel is smaller than other items (2011, p. 49).
Harfst and Schnapp (2003) have developed three indices to explore whether legis-
latures have means to oversight the executives in 21 advanced capitalist democracies.
The “control structure” index measures the internal structural differentiation of leg-
islatures. This index is based on the number of committees, the parallelism of the
jurisdiction of committees and ministries, and the average committee assignments
per member. The “personnel resources” index is based on the number of parliamen-
tary staff, the number of committee staff, the number of parliamentary library staff,
and the budget and responsibility of the library. The “information rights” index
comprises committees’ authorities to demand documents and summon officials, the
time that a legislature has at it proposal to prepare and review the state budget, and
the existence of audit offices and ombudspersons. Only the ranks but not the orig-
inal scores of the 21 countries on the three indices are available. Table 4.3 suggests
that the “control structure” index is highly correlated with the factor of committees’
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positive power; while the “personnel resources” index is more closely correlated to
the other two factors. The “information rights” index is correlated with commit-
tees’ negative power and information capacity to a lesser extent. These patterns
are generally consistent with expectations, given the constituent items of the three
indices.
Wehner (2006) has constructed an index to assess legislatures’ capacity to scru-
tinize budgets. The index is based on expert survey conducted in 36 countries. It
captures six aspects of legislatures’ institutional instruments, including the extent
to which the legislature can amend the budget, the consequences if the budget is
not approved, the extent to which the executive can reallocate, withhold, or reserve
funds without legislative consent, whether the legislature has a budget office with
professional staff, whether the budget is referred to committees, and the time the
legislature has to review the budget. Most of the items do not directly measure
committees’ ability. However, it is expected that the index covaries with committee
power to some extent. Legislatures’ ability to amend budgets and the involvement of
committees in the process are likely to be reflected in procedures that determine com-
mittees’ positive power. Whether legislatures have sufficient time to review budgets
may depend on how effectively committees involved in the process can control their
agenda. In addition, legislatures supported by an independent budget office are likely
to also have more sufficient staff resources to help with committee affairs. Table 4.3
shows the relations and suggests that this index substantially correlated with com-
mittees’ positive and negative power, and correlated with committees’ information
capacity to a lesser degree. These patterns are consistent with expectations.
The relations between the three dimensions and the Parliamentary Power Index
(PPI) developed by Fish and Kroenig (2009) are also explored. PPI is constructed
based on 32 dummy indicators assessing legislature’ influence over the executive,
its institutional autonomy, the specified powers it possesses, and its institutional
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capacity. The aspect of legislatures’ influence over executives reflects legislatures’
authorities to appoint, remove, and investigate executive officials. Legislatures’ in-
stitutional autonomy measures whether legislatures are independently elected and
immune from dissolution, and whether the executives lack decree, gatekeeping, and
veto power. Legislatures’ specified power includes their power to amend constitu-
tions, ratify treaties, and appoint several offices. Legislatures’ institutional capacity
measures legislative session duration and staff support. As Table 4.3 shows, com-
mittees’ positive power is correlated to legislatures’ specified power. None of other
components of PPI is significantly correlated with the three dimensions of committee
power. Similar patterns with regard to the relation between general parliamentary
power and committees’ institutional instruments have been identified by Sieberer
(2011). Based on the data of 15 Western European parliaments, Sieberer has found
that committees’ authorities to initiate and amend bills do not covary with parlia-
mentary power to appoint cabinet members.
In general, the comparison with alternative indices that measure committee pow-
ers and legislative authorities to scrutinize executive decisions, especially with those
based on similar indicators, mostly supports the validity of my measures for Eu-
ropean and other advanced industrial democracies. In addition, the coefficients of
correlations between the alternative measures and each of the three dimensions seem
to suggest that the three-factor structure is more thoroughly capturing some ele-
ments that each of these alternative measures is missing. The correlations between
measures of general legislative power and these three factors are most not signif-
icant. In the subsequent chapters, more exploration on the relationships between
committees’ power and the general capabilities of a legislature is shown.
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5Politicians’ Electoral Incentives and Committee
Power
This chapter displays empirical tests of the hypothesis that when legislators tend to
demand for particularistic goods distribution and when parties have less control over
committee members, committees are likely to have strong positive agenda power, and
the hypothesis that the relationships between legislators’ accountability strategies
and committee power are conditional on features of party organization.
5.1 Introduction
The exploration builds on the assumption that legislators are goal oriented, and one
of their main goals is to gain reelection. The design of internal legislative organiza-
tion, such as committee procedures, is shaped by legislators’ electoral needs. To be
reelected, legislators have to expend effort on competing for nomination and cultivat-
ing votes. As Chapter 2 argues, party leaders and constituency voters, as competing
principals for influence over legislators’ behavior, both control resources critical to
legislators’ political career prospects. The extent to which one of them more heav-
ily shapes legislators’ reelection incentives and then affects the design of committee
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procedures is determined by other institutional environments faced by legislators.
This chapters examines three mechanisms that shape legislators’ reelection in-
centives. The first one is electoral rules. Carey and Shugart (1995) have suggested
that electoral systems affect legislators’ relative responsiveness to party leaders and
to alternative interests in the electorate. Legislators elected from closed party lists
have less incentives to respond to individual constituents and establish direct link
with the electorate. Politicians under electoral systems that encourage candidates
to compete against members of their own parties have more incentives to cultivate
personal votes. The needs for personal votes may urge legislators to secure particu-
laristic benefits to their constituents. Committee systems provide opportunities for
members to differentiate themselves with regard to constituent interests and claim
credit in their home districts.
In addition to testing the arguments postulating that candidate-centered elec-
toral rules promote the provision of locally targeted goods and thus affect commit-
tee power, this chapter also directly examines the relationship between one special
type of local goods provision, clientelism, and the design of committee procedures.
Clientelism is defined as the delivery of targeted goods and services by politicians
to voters in exchange for their vote. Different from other types of district-focused
benefits, such as pork barrel projects or extra-legislative service for individual con-
stituents, clientelism especially refers to the explicit practice of contingent exchange,
whereby benefits are provided only to those who uphold their promise to vote for
the candidates that have offered them (Kitschelt 2000). In single country studies,
it has been found that politicians may use legislative committees to engage in clien-
telist relations with their supporters (Batto 2005, Ciftci, Forrest, and Tekin 2008).
The argument on the effects of politicians’ needs in providing clientelistic benefits
on committee power is more systematically tested in this chapter.
The other mechanism shaping legislators’ incentives is the extent to which party
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leaders control resources valuable to legislators within legislatures. It is expected
that when committee assignments tend to reflect a self-selection process, legislators
are more likely to use committees to achieve their individualistic goals. In contrast,
when party leaders have more control over legislators’ access to committee positions,
committees are more likely to serve parties’ collective needs.
As Chapter 2 argues, as a way to decentralize legislative authority, committee
systems provide opportunities for members to express preferences and affect legisla-
tive outputs. To serve individualistic legislators’ needs, committees should have the
power to vote on and amend bills, and place their preferred versions on the floor.
That is, when the electoral systems encourage more candidate-centered patterns of
competition, and when parties have less control over members’ behavior, commit-
tees tend to have extensive positive agenda power. However, committees’ negative
power, the authority to freely decide their own agenda, is less relevant, because
without party leaders’ coordination, the agenda-setting authority does not increase
individual members’ probabilities of being included in a winning coalition.
5.2 Measuring Electoral Incentives
To test these hypotheses, factor scores generated from the analysis reported in Ta-
ble B.4 are used as the dependent variables. The “positive agenda-setting power”
factor mainly combines committees’ early involvement in the law-making process
and their authorities to consider and amend most draft bills. The indicators of mi-
nority reports, multiple referrals, large numbers of committee assignments, and the
uniqueness of committee time also load on this factor. The “negative agenda-setting
power” factor mainly include committees’ authorities to freely decide which bills to
be considered and when. Committees’ amending power is also a component of this
factor but is weighted less. The factor of committees’ “information capacity” com-
bine their authorities to demand documents, compel attendance, initiate legislation,
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and grant closed rules after the committee stage. Committees’ staff support and the
desirability of serving in the same committees for consecutive terms also load on this
factor.
All the independent variables are lagged by at least one year. If time-series data
is available, the variables are annual averages over the 2000s and 1990s.
Electoral systems. The measure of the extent to which legislators are district-
oriented is indicators of personalized electoral systems, including district magnitudes,
the ballot structure in terms of whether there is vote pooling among all candidates
on the same partisan list, and the interaction term of these two. These indicators
are from the data set collected by Johnson and Wallack (2006). In the analysis, the
natural log of district size is used. The indicator of ballot structure is coded on a
three-point scale, where ‘2’ indicates no vote pooling and ‘0’ indicates full pooling
among all candidates within parties.
The reliance on particularistic benefits. The measure of the extent to which
legislators rely on the distribution of particularistic goods as a strategy for reelection
is taken from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (Kitschelt et al.
2009). The indicator of clientelism is constructed based on experts’ assessment of
the effort each party in a country makes in offering five types of benefits to specific
individuals or small groups of citizens in exchange of their votes. The five types of
benefits include consumer goods, preferential access to social policy, employment in
public sector, government contracts, and influence over the application of government
regulations. The answers to the five items were coded on a 1-4 scale, in which ‘1’
refers to a negligible effort or no effort at all, while ‘4’ means parties devote major
effort to provide the benefit in question. To construct a country level measure of
clientelism, the averages of parties’ scores in each country, weighted by the vote
share of each party in the most recent two elections before 2009, are computed.
Parties’ control over committee members. The indicator of parties’ control
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over committee assignments is from my expert survey. Experts were asked to assess
how committee memberships are determined. This variable is coded on a three-point
scale, where 0 indicates that committee assignments are based on individual initiative
and non-partisan criteria, and 2 indicates that party leaders discretionarily determine
committee assignments. To construct country level measures of these three variables,
the averages of parties’ scores in each country, weighted by the vote share of each
party in the most recent two elections are computed.
Interaction variables. The measures of the extensiveness and centralization of
party organization are also from the Democratic Accountability project. To measure
the extensiveness of party organization, experts were asked to assess whether parties
maintain permanent local offices. The variable is coded on a four-point scale from
1 (no local offices) to 4 (maintaining permanent local offices in most districts). The
indicator of the extent of party centralization is based on experts’ judgements on how
parties select candidates in national legislative elections. The measure is also coded
on a 1-4 scale, in which 1 refers to that candidates are chosen by local level actors,
while 4 means that candidates are chosen by national party leaders. To construct
country level measures, the averages of parties’ scores in each country, weighted
by the vote share of each party in the most recent two elections before 2009, are
computed.
Control variables. Several indicators of institutional features are included in
the analysis. The literature has pointed out that legislatures have little incentive to
invest in internal organization if the presidents are too powerful (Khmelko, Wise,
and Brown 2010, Kopecky´ 2004, Nijzink, Mozaffar, and Azevedo 2006). To capture
the presidential power, an aggregate measure is constructed. All countries with par-
liamentary systems are coded as 0 for this variable. For countries with presidential
or semi-presidential systems, this variable is constructed by summing the reversed
values of eight indicators collected in Fish and Kroenig’s (2009) dataset. They in-
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clude four indicators of executives’ legislative powers: whether the executive has veto
and decree powers, whether the executive has reserved policy areas, and whether the
executive can withhold funds appropriated by the legislature. The other four indica-
tors of presidents’ executive powers includes whether the legislature can impeach the
president, whether the cabinet is appointed by the president without legislative ap-
proval needed, whether the legislatures cannot vote no confidence, and whether the
president can dissolve the legislature1. The sum of the four indicators of executives’
legislative powers is highly correlated to the sum of the indicators of their executive
power at r “ .88. They are then combined as one index. Higher values on the index
indicate the president has more legislative and executive power.
Countries’ GDP per capita is included to capture their levels of development. It
has been argued that legislatures in countries with higher income levels tend to have
1 The recoding procedures are the following:
Executives’ veto power: 1= cannot be overridden by the legislature or requires a 2/3 leg-
islative majority to be overridden; 2= requires a absolute majority but less than 2/3; 3=
requires a simple majority.
Executives’ decree powers: 1= no decree powers; 2= decree powers subject to legislative
approval; 3= unrestricted decree powers.
Executives’ reserved policy areas: 1= no reserved areas; 2= reserved areas only related to
taxation and government spending; 3= many reserved issue areas including spending.
Executives’ power to impound funds: 1= the executive cannot withhold funds appropriated
by the legislature; 2= the executive can cut expenditures if actual revenues are lower; 3=
the executive can impound funds.
Legislative impeachment: 1= the legislature cannot impeach the president or replace the
prime minister; 2= legislative impeachment is upon the approval of other agencies; 3= the
impeachment can be initiated by the legislature single-handedly.
Legislative approval for cabinet appointment: 1= the legislature must approve both the
prime ministers and the cabinet; 2= the legislature must approve the prime ministers or the
cabinet; 3= legislative approval is not needed.
Confidence vote: 1= the legislature can vote no confidence freely; 2= the legislature can only
censure individual ministers but not the whole cabinet; 3= the legislature cannot vote no
confidence.
Executives’ power to dissolve legislatures: 1= the legislature are immune from dissolution;
2= the executive can only dissolve legislatures under certain conditions; 3= the executive
can dissolve legislatures without restrictions.
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a greater number of oversight tools (Barkan 2009, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2004).
The overall bureaucratic quality and administrative performance of a country is
also likely to be correlated with the legislature’s resources. Countries’ democratic
quality, as measured on the Polity IV scale, is included in the analysis. It has been
argued that legislatures can be strengthened only when the institutional tools used
by authoritarian rulers have been eliminated and the constitutional environment
has stabilized (Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n 2005, Remington 2007). A dummy variable indicating
whether the country was colonized by the British, which was collected by Hadenius
and Teorell (2005), is included to account for the effects of the Westminster tradition.
Descriptive statistics for all the independent variables are listed in Table A.1 in
the Appendix A.
5.3 Empirical Results
Table 5.1 shows the results of models estimating the effects of legislators’ electoral
incentives on committees’ positive agenda-setting power. They provide unambigu-
ous evidence in support of hypotheses 3. In countries where legislators heavily rely
on particularistic goods distribution as a reelection strategy and where party lead-
ers have less control over committee assignments, committees tend to have strong
positive power.
The first model in Table 5.1 shows that when legislative candidates compete in
large districts in which there is no vote pooling among all candidates on the same
partisan list, that is, when the electoral systems encourage intra-party competition,
committees are more likely to have the authority of receiving and amending most
bills in the early legislative process. Figure 5.1, which displays the relations between
electoral rules and committees’ positive power estimated with the first model, clearly
shows the different effects of district magnitudes and ballot structure. If the votes
citizens cast for a party list are redistributed among all candidates on the same list
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Table 5.1: Politicians’ electoral incentives and committees’ positive agenda power
(OLS regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV Positive agenda power
ln District magnitudes -0.0430 -0.0116 -0.0221
[0.0666] [0.0662] [0.0666]
No pooling -0.470*** -0.377** -0.357**
[0.154] [0.155] [0.151]
ln District magnitudes X No pooling 0.175** 0.136** 0.124*
[0.0684] [0.0640] [0.0678]
Clientelism 0.0730*** 0.0563** 0.0544**
[0.0253] [0.0252] [0.0242]
Parties’ control over assignments -0.346***
[0.116]
Presidential power 0.00721 -0.000474 0.00332 -0.00596
[0.0100] [0.0101] [0.00990] [0.00983]
Polity -0.0508 -0.0400 -0.0489 -0.00427
[0.0370] [0.0381] [0.0359] [0.0386]
ln GDP per capita PPP 0.0144 0.0917 0.119 -0.00253
[0.0860] [0.101] [0.0958] [0.0970]
British colonialism -0.138 -0.733*** -0.184 -0.244
[0.262] [0.207] [0.255] [0.256]
cons 0.447 -1.411 -1.313 0.320
[0.793] [1.100] [1.102] [1.112]
N 75 75 75 67
adj. R-sq 0.290 0.234 0.330 0.394
ll -47.46 -51.39 -44.72 -34.37
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01
(full-pooling system), district size does no have much effects on committees’ positive
power. In contrast, the effects of district magnitudes on committee procedures are
significant among countries with no-pooling systems. With no-pooling systems, votes
cast for a candidate are not distributed to those on the same list. That is, candidates
do not benefit from the support for other candidates of the same party. Under this
condition, it is expected that the increase of district size intensifies the personal
contest among candidates. It has to be noted that single-member district, first-past-
the-post system is also classified as a no-pooling system. SMD system has been
considered as more likely to encourage the establishment of individual candidates’
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personal reputation than closed-list proportional representation elections, and thus
may result in the enhancement of committees’ “property rights” (Katz and Sala
1996). However, the model suggests that on average, committees in countries with
SMD systems are not stronger in terms of their positive power than those in countries
with closed-list PR rules. It is legislators’ needs to compete with and differentiate
themselves from other co-partisan candidates that especially lead to the development
of committee procedures allowing individual members more opportunities to vote on
bills.
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Figure 5.1: Estimated relationship between electoral rules and committees’ positive
agenda power
Figure 5.2 displays the bivariate correlation between parties’ tendency to rely
on clientelism and committees’ positive power, and suggests a positive relationship
between them. The second model in Table 5.1 further examines the relationship
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by controlling for other relevant variables. Consistent with theoretical expectations,
politicians’ tendency to rely on targeted benefits is closely correlated with commit-
tee strength in terms of their positive power. The third model suggests that the
effects of electoral rules are still substantial when the indicator of candidates’ clien-
telistic tendency is controlled. The results are consistent with the finding that the
correlation between personalized electoral systems and clientelistic effort is not very
significant (Kitschelt 2011). The association between clientelism and committees’
positive agenda power does not result from the spurious effects of electoral systems.
It implies that the demands for clientelistic benefits and other non-contingent club
goods both lead to legislators’ interests in the decentralization of legislative authority.
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Figure 5.2: Clientelism committees’ positive agenda power
Model 4 includes the indicator of the extent to which party leaders control com-
mittee member assignments. It is expected that when party leaders exert heavy
108
Table 5.2: Politicians’ electoral incentives and committees’ negative agenda power
and information capacity (OLS regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV Negative agenda power Information capacity
ln District magnitudes -0.0162 0.00120 0.0609 0.0425
[0.0882] [0.0889] [0.0953] [0.105]
No pooling 0.0124 0.0293 0.139 0.149
[0.207] [0.202] [0.223] [0.239]
ln District magnitudes X No pooling 0.0399 0.0848 0.00600 0.0364
[0.0940] [0.0954] [0.102] [0.113]
Clientelism -0.0444 -0.0469 -0.000993 -0.000453
[0.0335] [0.0322] [0.0362] [0.0381]
Parties’ control over assignments 0.347** -0.0337
[0.154] [0.183]
Presidential power 0.0160 0.0139 0.0116 0.00500
[0.0132] [0.0131] [0.0142] [0.0155]
Polity 0.0470 0.0344 -0.0217 0.0157
[0.0478] [0.0515] [0.0517] [0.0608]
ln GDP per capita PPP -0.0205 -0.0543 0.0117 -0.114
[0.128] [0.129] [0.138] [0.153]
British colonialism -0.272 -0.403 -0.149 -0.134
[0.340] [0.342] [0.367] [0.404]
cons 0.312 0.141 -0.267 0.759
[1.467] [1.484] [1.584] [1.754]
N 75 67 75 67
adj. R-sq 0.025 0.079 -0.065 -0.070
ll -66.21 -53.67 -71.96 -64.90
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01
control over the member assignment process, party members tend to vote cohesively,
and members are less likely to utilize committees to achieve their individualistic goals.
Committees’ positive power allows individual members to also have chances to affect
legislative outcomes. It is expected that when party leaders have less control over
members’ behavior, committees are likely to have extensive positive agenda-setting
power. In contrast, committees’ negative power, which effectively gives a committee
majority a veto over referred bills, is less preferred when the composition of a com-
mittee is fragmented. The results of model 4 in Table 5.1 and the second model in
5.2 are consistent with the expectations.
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Table 5.3: Politicians’ accountability strategies, party organization, and committees’
positive agenda power (OLS regression)
(1) (2)
DV Positive agenda power
Clientelism 0.304*** 0.436***
[0.0769] [0.136]
Parties organizational centralization 1.036***
[0.314]
Parties organizational extensiveness 1.489***
[0.560]
Clientelism X Centralization -0.0852***
[0.0261]
Clientelism X Extensiveness -0.110***
[0.0402]
Presidential power -0.00436 -0.00202
[0.00996] [0.00999]
Polity -0.0647 -0.0419
[0.0389] [0.0370]
ln GDP per capita PPP 0.0721 0.0993
[0.0953] [0.0988]
British colonialism -0.859*** -0.698***
[0.205] [0.200]
cons -3.689*** -6.395***
[1.260] [2.129]
N 75 75
adj. R-sq 0.324 0.290
ll -45.61 -47.44
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01
Other models in Table 5.2 examine the relations between politicians’ electoral
incentives and other two dimensions of committee power. The results suggest that
politicians’ clientelistic tendency and personalized electoral systems are not signifi-
cantly associated with committee strength with regard to veto power and information
capacity. This pattern also provides support for the arguments that different dimen-
sions of committee power respond to different demands, and thus are not consistently
strong or weak.
To test whether the effects of legislators’ accountability strategies on committee
power are conditional on parties’ organizational features, models in Table 5.3 include
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indicators of these conditions, as well as the interaction terms between measures of
clientelistic effort and party organization. The results of these two models provide
evidence in support of hypotheses 4. These two models show the pattern that the
more heavily parties rely on particularistic goods distribution, the stronger positive
agenda power the committees have is attenuated if parties have centralized candidate
nomination procedures or have extensive local organization. Figure 5.3 display the
relationships between these indicators estimated with the models. The left panel of
the figure shows the relation between clientelistic tendency and committees’ positive
power across countries where parties apply different ways to nominate candidates
for national legislative elections. Among countries where the nomination process is
entirely controlled by national party leaders (the indicator of centralization “ 4),
committees’ positive power does not increase with the extent to which parties rely
on clientelism. If local level actors are also included in the nomination process
(centralization “ 2), clientelistic effort is significantly associated with committee
strength with regard to their positive power.
The right panel displays the similar pattern, and suggests that the positive cor-
relation between politicians’ reliance on clientelism and committees’ positive power
is significant only among countries where parties tend to lack local branches. It is
expected that extra-legislative benefits can be delivered through parties’ local offices.
Legislators who are able to rely on parties’ local networks to distribute targeted ser-
vice and claim credit may have less incentives to invest in committee work. These
interactive effects suggest that when legislators’ career opportunities are controlled
by party leaders and when parties have extensive local organization to distribute ben-
efits, committee systems are less likely to be designed to reflect legislators’ reelection
strategies.
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Figure 5.3: Estimated relationships between clientelism, party organization, and
committees’ positive agenda power
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6Multiparty Government and Committee Power
This chapter displays empirical tests of the hypothesis that when there is a higher
propensity for multiparty governments, committees are likely to be strong with re-
gard to all three dimensions, and explores whether different compositions of coalition
memberships are associated with the development of different dimensions of commit-
tee power.
6.1 Introduction
The exploration is based on the assumption that faced with the potential problems
of delegation resulted from multiparty governments, coalition parties are interested
in establishing a review system to check the behavior of ministers from their partner
parties. Committee systems, through which ministers’ proposals can be scrutinized
more closely than on the floor, thus are likely to be granted more institutional in-
struments in countries with higher rates of multiparty governments.
The compositions of coalition memberships are also expected to have effects on
committee strength with regard to all three dimensions. In countries where the
governing coalition is dominated by one party, the committee systems may be less
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powerful than those in countries where the government is composed of parties with
relatively equal share of seats. As the research on how coalition parties choose to
use junior ministers to keep tabs on ministers from their partners has mentioned
(Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011), all parties have an incentive to maximize the degree to
which their partners are subject to oversight, but to minimize the degree to which
their own partners are monitored. On average, the largest government parties who
have substantially more coalition seats than all other partners are less interested
in institutionalizing a monitoring mechanism. When the largest government parties
tend to be smaller, committees are more likely to be granted instruments for coalition
parties to monitor partners.
To enable coalition partners to monitor each other, committees should have the
power to receive and amend bill proposals, and have the power to collect information
about policies. That is, all three dimensions of committee functions allow coalition
partners to be better able to monitor their agents. As Chapter 2 argues, the three
dimensions of committee power benefit legislative actors as self-interested legislators
or as cohesive voting blocs in different ways. It is expected that depending on
the composition of coalition memberships and parties’ policy positions, different
dimensions of committee power are particularly developed. Committees’ positive
agenda power provides opportunities for all members to receive and amend bills
at an early stage of legislation. Minority parties in coalition governments can also
benefit from the positive power.
Committees’ negative agenda power serves large and cohesive parties who have
higher probabilities to be included in a winning coalition for committee decisions,
especially when these parties have distinct policy positions from other members.
With the negative agenda power, coalition parties are able to block legislation that
is not in line with the coalition contract. Coalition partners are pivotal voters to
ministers’ proposals, particularly when they control more seats. The authority to
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decide which bills to review first allows the larger coalition parties to delay legislation
without fear of being excluded from the winning coalition. It is expected that when
government parties tend be confronted with other powerful partners, that is, when
the difference between coalition partners’ relative seat shares is smaller, committees’
negative agenda power is likely to be stronger. This relationship is strengthened if
parties more likely to be included in a winning coalition have distinct policy positions.
Consistent with the argument that committees’ negative power especially benefits
large and cohesive voting blocs, it is also expected that when party leaders have more
control over legislators’ access to committee positions, committees are more likely to
be granted the negative power.
This chapter also tests the relationships between Committees’ information ca-
pacity and government types. Coalition partners have less information access than
ministers. Committees’ ability to compel executive officials to supply documents and
attend hearings allows members to have more information about policy outcomes,
and thus potentially benefit all coalition parties. It is expected that in countries
with higher rates of multiparty governments, committees tend to have more insti-
tutional instruments to obtain information. As Chapter 2 points out, larger parties
are better able to utilize committees’ information capacity. They may reveal biased
information, or may only devote resources to gather information for bills through
which their interests are most likely to be realized. It is also likely that committees’
information capacity tends to be enhanced in countries where government parties
are usually confronted with other powerful partners within coalitions.
6.2 Measuring Multiparty Government
To test these hypotheses, the three factor scores generated in Chapter 4, committees’
positive and negative agenda power and their information capacity, are used as the
dependent variables. All the independent variables are lagged by at least one year.
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If time-series data is available, the variables are annual averages over the 2000s and
1990s.
Multiparty government. Several indicators on the composition of a govern-
ment coalition are included in the analyses. The indicator of rate of coalition gov-
ernment is the percentage of coalition governments during the period of 1990–2009.
The information for the variable is from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI)
(Keefer 2009). A government is coded as a coalition if more than one parties are
represented in the cabinet. Based on the coding rules of DPI, in the case of presi-
dential system, in addition to those represented in the government, parties that are
supportive of the president on substantial issues are also classified as coalition part-
ners. The aggregate measure of rate of coalition government is intended to capture
a general tendency toward coalition or one-party government.
To examine the effects of power relationships among coalition parties in the legis-
lature, the indicator of government fractionalization is also included. This indicator
measures the probability that two randomly picked legislators from among the gov-
ernment parties will be of different parties. The indicator is especially high if a
coalition is composed of many small parties. The indicators of largest government
party / government seats and 2nd largest government party / government seats are
the seats held by the largest and the second largest government parties as a per-
centage of total number of seats held by all government parties, respectively. In
presidential systems, the party of the president is classified as the largest govern-
ment party. The other independent variable, 2nd largest / largest government party,
is the number of seats held by the second largest government party as a percentage of
the largest government party’s seats. All these variables are intended to capture the
extend to which government parties are confronted with powerful coalition partners.
In addition to indicators on the composition of government coalitions, the variable
of opposition fractionalization is also included. It measures the probability that two
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randomly chosen legislators belonging to the parties in the opposition will be of
different parties. It captures the extent to which opposition parties are in a position
to form a credible alternative, and whether they could also benefit from powerful
committees. The information for these variables are from DPI. Annual averages
between 1990 and 2009 are computed.
Policy distance. The indicator of the policy distance between the main parties
is also derived from DPI. It measures the maximum difference between the left-
right-center orientation of the chief executive’s party and the placement of other
government parties and the largest opposition party. This variable ranges between 0
and 2, where 2 refers to divergent positions on the left-right scale between any two
of these main parties. Annual averages from 1990 to 2009 are also computed.
Control variables. Consistent with analyses in Chapter 5, indicators of the
presidential power, countries’ per capita GDP, democratic quality, and British colo-
nial origin are also included as control variables. For models with committees’ pos-
itive agenda power as the dependent variable, the indicator of the extent to which
parties make clientelistic effort to obtain votes is also controlled.
For models with committees’ informational control as the dependent variable,
a measure of parties’ electoral volatility is included. As Chapter 2 argues, when
there tends to be large influx of new legislators, the information asymmetry between
executive and legislative branches is exacerbated. The instability of legislative mem-
bership may constitute a condition under which instruments that foster committee
specialization are particularly developed. It is expected that when legislative terms
are short, restrictive amendment procedures and other instruments that foster com-
mittee specialization are likely to be established to meet the demand for information.
The information about the average terms of individual legislators across countries
is difficult to collect. The variable of parties’ electoral volatility is included to ap-
proximately capture the legislative terms of parties. Extra-system electoral volatility
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measures the vote share won by newly created parties in national legislative elec-
tions. It captures the extent to which the vote share of established parties declines
and is grabbed by new contenders, and thus the change and stability of parties’
membership in a legislature. The average volatility for all post-1945 elections since
the inauguration of the most recent democratic regime is computed. The informa-
tion for 50 countries is from Mainwaring, Espan˜a and Gervasoni’s work (2009), and
I have computed the indicator for other 25 countries, based on the data collected
by African Election Database, Latin American Election Results with Party Ideology
Scores (Baker and Greene 2011), and ParlGov (Do¨ring and Manow 2012).
Descriptive statistics for all the independent variables are listed in Table A.1 in
Appendix A.
6.3 Empirical Results
Table 6.1 shows the results of models estimating the effects of government types
and characteristics of coalitions on committees positive agenda-setting power. The
models suggest that it is not the general propensity for multiparty governments,
but particular compositions of the government coalitions, that leads to committee
strength with regard to positive power.
Figure 6.1 provides some evidence supporting the positive association between
government fragmentation and committees’ positive power. The second model in
Table 6.1 further confirms this relationship and suggests that in countries where
the coalition governments are composed of ministers from several smaller parties,
the committee systems are more likely to be granted the authority of receiving and
amending most bills in the early legislative process. The third model includes the
number of seats held by the second largest government party as a percentage of the
largest government party’s seats, and shows that when they tend to have equal sizes,
committees are stronger in terms of their positive power. Models in Table B.5 in
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Appendix B include the number of seats of the two largest government parties as
percentages of total seats held by all government parties as independent variables.
They show consistent patterns. In general, when the largest government parties are
smaller, and when the second largest coalition parties have more legislative seats,
committees are granted more positive power.
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Figure 6.1: Government fragmentation and committees’ positive power
These models suggest that when there is no dominant party in the government
coalition, and when the larger government parties are confronted with powerful coali-
tion partners, the committee systems tend to be established to allow the collective
leadership to review and amend most proposals early in the legislative process. The
fourth model in Table 6.1 tests whether the effects of government types on committee
power are strengthened if parties tend to have divergent policy positions. However,
the coefficient of the interaction term is not significant. The results suggest that the
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Table 6.1: Multi-party governments and committees’ positive agenda power (OLS
regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV Positive agenda power
Coalition government 0.196
[0.173]
Government fractionalization 0.624**
[0.294]
2nd largest / Largest gov party 0.637*** 0.761**
[0.197] [0.333]
Policy difference 0.161
[0.125]
2nd largest / Largest gov party -0.180
X Policy difference [0.295]
Opposition fractionalization -0.208 -0.372 -0.419 -0.467
[0.304] [0.308] [0.286] [0.288]
Clientelism 0.0736*** 0.0761*** 0.0754*** 0.0801***
[0.0255] [0.0250] [0.0240] [0.0245]
Presidential power 0.00196 0.00451 0.00334 0.00293
[0.0104] [0.0102] [0.00963] [0.00965]
Polity -0.0428 -0.0377 -0.0407 -0.0469
[0.0385] [0.0376] [0.0361] [0.0369]
ln GDP per capita PPP 0.0891 0.106 0.112 0.111
[0.102] [0.0995] [0.0956] [0.0969]
British colonialism -0.730*** -0.628*** -0.575*** -0.514**
[0.210] [0.212] [0.203] [0.210]
cons -1.413 -1.645 -1.637 -1.730
[1.128] [1.110] [1.062] [1.068]
N 75 75 75 75
adj. R-sq 0.227 0.262 0.319 0.318
ll -50.62 -48.90 -45.88 -44.80
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01
effects of the composition of coalition governments are not conditional on the policy
disagreement among the main parties.
Models in Table 6.2 examine the relations between government types and com-
mittees’ negative power. Similar to the model with committees’ positive power as
the dependent variable, the general propensity for multiparty governments is not
significantly associated with committee strength in terms of the negative power. In
contrast, the positive correlation between government fragmentation and commit-
120
tees’ negative power is not significant.
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Figure 6.2: The relative sizes of the two largest coalition parties and committees’
negative power
Figure 6.2 displays the bivariate correlation between the relative power of the sec-
ond largest coalition party and committees’ negative power. The positive association
between them is not very clear. This relationship becomes significant, as the third
model in Table 6.2 shows, when other relevant independent variables are controlled.
The comparison between the second and the third model suggests that only when
the coalition partners tend to be equally powerful, committees are more likely to
have the authority to delay and block legislation. These patterns are in accordance
with the arguments specified in Chapter 2, that committees’ negative agenda power
particularly benefits larger parties who have higher probabilities to be included in
a winning coalition for committees’ collective decisions. When one of the partner
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parties is powerful and its vote is more likely to be pivotal to the coalition’s decision,
the negative agenda power allows it to delay ministers’ proposals, without fear of
being left out of the winning coalition.
Table 6.2: Multi-party governments and committees’ negative agenda power (OLS
regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DV Negative agenda power
Coalition government 0.0211
[0.211]
Government fractionalization 0.365
[0.365]
2nd largest / Largest gov party 0.683*** -0.163 0.731***
[0.243] [0.396] [0.247]
Policy difference -0.302**
[0.148]
2nd largest / Largest gov party 0.938***
X Policy difference [0.350]
Opposition fractionalization -0.494 -0.651* -0.842** -0.781** -0.733**
[0.371] [0.384] [0.352] [0.342] [0.354]
Parties’ control over assignments 0.311**
[0.143]
Presidential power 0.0125 0.0154 0.0168 0.0164 0.0172
[0.0125] [0.0125] [0.0116] [0.0112] [0.0117]
Polity 0.0398 0.0420 0.0406 0.0640 0.0185
[0.0471] [0.0468] [0.0446] [0.0439] [0.0488]
ln GDP per capita PPP 0.0785 0.0831 0.0948 0.0445 0.108
[0.108] [0.107] [0.102] [0.102] [0.110]
British colonialism -0.252 -0.190 -0.0790 -0.236 -0.200
[0.254] [0.260] [0.249] [0.248] [0.266]
cons -0.863 -0.966 -1.071 -0.600 -1.687
[0.977] [0.975] [0.927] [0.922] [1.025]
N 75 75 75 75 67
adj. R-sq 0.048 0.062 0.147 0.208 0.174
ll -66.44 -65.90 -62.32 -58.45 -51.18
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01
The coefficients of opposition party fragmentation and party leaders’ control over
committee assignments are also consistent with the argument. When opposition
parties are fragmented and the probabilities for them to form a credible alternative
and be included in a winning coalition for committee decisions are low, committees’
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negative power is likely to be weak. If party members are able to vote cohesively
on committee decisions, committees tend to be granted the authority to decide their
own agenda freely.
To examine whether the effects of government types on committees’ negative
power are conditional on policy disagreement between the main parties, the fourth
model in Table 6.2 included the indicator of parties’ policy differences as well as the
interaction term. The results suggest that the association between coalition gov-
ernment representing two equally powerful parties and committees’ negative power
is strengthened if the main parties have divergent positions on the left-right scale.
Committees are especially strong in their negative power if the second largest party
in the coalition is relatively powerful and the ideological polarization among parties
is high. Figure 6.3 displays the relationships between these indicators estimated
with the model. Among countries where the main parties have similar positions on
the left-right scale (policy differences “ 0), committees’ negative power does not in-
crease with the relative sizes between the second largest and the largest government
parties. When any two among the government parties and the largest opposition
party have distinct ideological positions, coalition governments involving two pow-
erful partners confronting each other are associated with committee strength with
regard to their negative power. Substantively, when policy disagreement is at its
maximum, committees’ negative power increases by 0.17 if the relative size of the
second largest government party increases by 10%, holding all other independent
variables as constant.
Models in Table 6.3 show the relations between multiparty governments and com-
mittees’ information capacity. Similar to models with committees’ negative power
as the dependent variable, the first and the second models suggest that the fre-
quency of coalition governments and the level of government fragmentation are not
significantly associated with committees’ information capacity. If the two largest
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Figure 6.3: Estimated relationships between coalition governments, parties’ policy
positions, and committees’ negative agenda power
government parties tend to have equal seat shares, and if the oppositions is less frag-
mented, committees are more likely to have institutional instruments that encourage
members to collect and transfer information. Different from the models estimating
committees’ negative power, the fourth model shows that the relationship between
the composition of a governing coalition and committees’ information capacity is not
conditional on parties’ policy positions. The results suggest that as larger parties
are better able to utilize committee procedures, and a committee majority may only
devote time to gather information for bills that they are most interested in or reveal
biased information, committees’ information capacity is particularly developed when
the challenging parties within and outside a governing coalition are powerful.
The analyses test hypotheses on the relations between government types and
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Table 6.3: Multi-party governments and committees’ information capacity (OLS
regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV Information capacity
Coalition government 0.111
[0.211]
Government fractionalization 0.135
[0.385]
2nd largest / Largest gov party 0.515** 0.428
[0.256] [0.414]
Policy difference -0.229
[0.152]
2nd largest / Largest gov party 0.178
X Policy difference [0.365]
Opposition fractionalization -1.019*** -1.007** -1.211*** -1.107***
[0.380] [0.393] [0.368] [0.371]
Extra-system volatility 0.0288*** 0.0285*** 0.0287*** 0.0265***
[0.00873] [0.00872] [0.00847] [0.00875]
Presidential power 0.0163 0.0161 0.0191 0.0191
[0.0128] [0.0131] [0.0123] [0.0122]
Polity 0.00581 0.00718 0.00787 0.0142
[0.0478] [0.0480] [0.0466] [0.0482]
ln GDP per capita PPP 0.101 0.104 0.110 0.136
[0.105] [0.106] [0.103] [0.104]
British colonialism 0.0914 0.109 0.223 0.179
[0.208] [0.223] [0.214] [0.214]
cons -1.049 -1.056 -1.167 -1.318
[0.979] [0.984] [0.953] [0.952]
N 75 75 75 75
adj. R-sq 0.121 0.119 0.167 0.179
ll -65.35 -65.43 -63.31 -61.62
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01
the three dimensions of committee power. Overall, the results suggest that coun-
tries’ general tendency for multiparty or single party governments is not sufficient
to distinguish between strong and weak committees. It is not the frequency of mul-
tiparty governments, but the particular composition of a governing coalition that is
associated with committee strength with regard to the three different dimensions.
Coalition partner parties have incentives to monitor ministers through a committee
system. Committees’ positive power enables all coalition partners to have opportu-
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nities to review and amend most ministerial proposals. Compared to their positive
power, committees’ negative and information capacity especially benefit large groups.
Their negative power allow larger coalition partners to delay and block ministerial
proposals, without fear of being excluded from the wining coalition. Large parties
are able to use the information collection procedures more effectively. Empirical
results show that, consistent with the expectations, when there are more than one
parties represented in the government and the largest governing party is smaller,
committees are likely to have more positive power. However, the fragmentation of
government coalitions is not the sufficient condition for committee strength with re-
gard to the negative power and information capacity. Only when the government
parties confront equally powerful coalition partners, and a more cohesive opposition,
committees are more likely to have strong negative power and information capacity.
The negative correlation between opposition fragmentation and committees’ positive
power is not significant, since this dimension of power also allows minorities access
to legislative process.
Figure 6.4 shows the estimated relations between the relative sizes of the two
largest government parties and committee power. All three dimensions of committee
power increase as the size of the second largest coalition party becomes comparable
to the largest one. The positive correlation is especially strong for committees’
negative power, and is less pronounced for their information capacity. In countries
with a coalition government in which the legislative seats held by the second largest
party amount to half of those held by the largest party, the committee systems are
scored 0.35 higher on the negative power dimension than committees systems in
countries with a single party government.
Figure 6.5 further specifies the different effects of the sizes of the the largest
and the second largest government parties. As the estimated relations suggest1, all
1 The values of the three dimensions of committee power are estimated with model 1 and 2 in
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Figure 6.4: Estimated relationships between the relative sizes of coalition parties
and committee power
three dimensions of committee power decrease with the size of the largest govern-
ment party, but increase with the size of the second largest party. Across the three
dimensions, the correlation between committee power and the size of the second
largest party is two times stronger than that with the size of the largest government
party, holding other covariates as constant. Similar to what suggested by Figure
6.4, the composition of government coalitions explains less variances in committees’
information capacity than in their positive and negative power.
The empirical results also suggest that, different from the explanations for com-
mittees’ positive power and information capacity, the association between the relative
sizes of coalition partner parties and committees’ negative power is conditional on
Table B.5 (positive power), B.6 (negative power), and B.7 (information capacity) in the appendix.
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Figure 6.5: Estimated relationships between the composition of coalition govern-
ments and committee power
parties’ policy positions. The patterns are consistent with expectations, that when
parties who are more likely to be included in a winning coalition have distinct posi-
tions from others, the negative power is especially beneficial for them, since they are
able to utilize the power to push committee decisions further to their side. Further
tests are still required to verify the arguments. The measure of policy disagreement
between main parties is based on parties’ general left-right orientations. There are
other policy dimensions on which parties may be divided. In addition, the levels of
policy disagreement may vary across committees with different jurisdictions. Further
analyses on whether committees with different levels of disagreement may have differ-
ent informal procedures to decide which bills to consider first could more thoroughly
examine the arguments.
Among the control variables, the coefficients of the indicators of clientelism and
extra-system electoral volatility are significant and consistent with theoretical ex-
pectations. Similar to what Figure 4.2 shows, committees tend to be granted strong
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positive power in countries without the Westminster tradition. Other contextual
variables do not significantly explain the variance in committee power.
The exiting literature on the relations between multiparty governments and com-
mittee procedures has focused on parliamentary systems. The analyses in the chap-
ter, though including the indicator on presidential power, does not distinguish the
sample between presidential and parliamentary systems, but assume that collec-
tive leadership under presidentialism may also utilize committee systems to monitor
coalition partners. Models in Table B.8 and Table B.9 in Appendix B include the
interaction terms between the relative sizes of the two largest government parties
and the dummy variable of presidentialism2 (1 “presidential systems, 0 “ mixed or
parliamentary systems based on the classification by Golder (2005)), and the interac-
tion between the relative sizes of the two largest government parties and presidential
power. The results of the models suggest that the correlation between the composi-
tion of government coalitions and committee power is not conditional on a particular
type of executive-legislative relationships. In presidentialism, cabinet ministers are
formally accountable only to the presidents, and the delegation relations between
legislators, the cabinet, and individual ministers are less clear. The coalition for-
mation process tends to be unilaterally initiated by the presidents. In addition, the
allocation of portfolios to a party does not necessarily guarantee the party’s decision
making power within the cabinet. Although the analyses suggest that multiparty
governments in presidentialism are also associated with strong committees, further
studies are required to examine whether coalition parties in presidentialism utilize
committee systems to monitor their partners in the same way as coalition parties do
in parliamentary systems.
2 Consistent with patterns found previously (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004), multiparty
governments are less frequent under presidentialism in my sample. In countries with parliamentary
systems, coalitions exist in 73 percent of the country-year observations in the sample. In presidential
countries, coalition governments exist in 45 percent of the country-year observations.
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7Uncertainty and Changes in Legislative
Composition and Committee Power
This chapter displays the relations between changes in legislative personnel and com-
mittee power. It empirically tests the hypothesis that if politicians were less certain
about the future political composition of the legislature at the time of institutional
design, and if the pre-existing authoritarian parties largely lost power through de-
mocratization, the resulting legislative procedures are expected to grant committees
more positive power. It also tests the hypothesis that when there tend to be great
changes in legislative membership, committees are granted more instruments to col-
lect and transmit information.
7.1 Introduction
The exploration on how uncertainty about the political composition of the legislature
has impact on committee procedures is focused on countries’ experience of demo-
cratic transition. Legislative institutions in new democracy present an opportunity
to study how politicians choose institutions under varying degree of uncertainty.
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The literature on institutional design in new democracies has examined the choices
of electoral rules (e.g. Benoit and Schiemann 2001, Negretto 2006, Remington and
Smith 1996) and executive-legislative relations (e.g. Cheibub 2007, Easter 1997, Frye
1997, Shugart 1998). Among the factors that have been identified to account for
the variation in institutional choices, this chapter focuses on the relative bargaining
power and levels of uncertainty of politicians during regime transition, both of which
were to some extent shaped by a country’s authoritarian experience. It has been
argued that if electoral favorite is less obvious at the time of institutional choice,
the resulting institutions are expected to be more inclusive and grant more rights
to minorities. If the relative power of political actors is known at the time of bar-
gaining, and the actors who have bargaining power over institutions anticipate losing
popularity through democratization, the resulting institutions are also expected to
be more inclusive (Carroll and Nalepa 2010, Frye 1997, Przeworski 1991).
This chapter aims to test these arguments against legislative committee proce-
dures, and focuses on authoritarian elections as a mechanism that affects politi-
cians’ levels of uncertainty. Elections under authoritarianism, while not totally free
and fair, still provide some information about the relative power of political groups
(Blaydes 2008, Brownlee 2007, Magaloni 2006). It is expected that when the pre-
existing authoritarian regimes had held elections, especially when the elections had
allowed more competition, parties were more certain about their relative power.
Consequently, committees were less likely to be designed to provide minorities with
equal opportunities to affect policies. If the relative power of potential participants
were less clear, committee procedures are expected to be more inclusive. To provide
committee minorities with more opportunities to exert influence, committees should
have extensive positive power. With the positive power, most proposals have to be
submitted to committees at an early stage of legislation, and all committee members
have opportunities to make decisions on them. In addition, as Chapter 4 suggests,
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several procedures that allow individual legislators more access to committee affairs,
such as minority reports, multiple committee assignments, and multiple referrals,
also load on the the dimension of committees’ positive power. It is expected that in
countries where the preexisting authoritarian regimes did not hold elections, commit-
tees are likely to be stronger in terms of the positive power. However, committees’
negative power, the authority to freely decide their own agenda, is less relevant, be-
cause the negative power does not increase minorities’ probabilities of being included
in a winning coalition for committee decisions.
When politicians had some idea about their expected electoral return in democ-
racies at the time of institutional design, and authoritarian incumbents anticipated
greatly losing power in democracies, the committee procedures are also expected to
be more inclusive. That is, committees are likely to be granted more positive power.
This argument is based on the assumption that authoritarian incumbents are impor-
tant actors during the transition phase, and have interests in choosing institutions
that limit other actors’ access to power (Easter 1997). Authoritarian incumbents
prefer more inclusive committee procedures only when they anticipate there will be
great changes in the political composition of the legislatures, and their power will be
largely diminished.
It has to be noted that different from electoral rules and executive-legislative
arrangements, which are usually defined in the constitutions and chosen during or
right after the process of regime transition, procedures of legislative organization
tend to be determined in the later stage of transition. In addition, committees are
likely to be reinforced in the process of legislative institutionalization, which may
be long after the inauguration of the first democratic government (Carey, Formanek,
and Karpowicz 1999, Khmelko 2011, Norton and Leston-Bandeira 2003). My dataset
does not document when a particular committee rule was codified. The following
analyses assume that the current committee procedures in new democracies still
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reflect politicians’ relative power and levels of uncertainty during regime transition
to certain degrees. The analyses also take into account the effects of the number of
years since regime change to explore whether the relations between committee power
and countries’ transition experience are conditional on how long a democracy has
been established.
Great changes in the composition of legislatures may also have effects on commit-
tees’ information capacity. Newly elected legislators are less familiar with legislative
process and it is more costly for them to acquire expertise. The information asym-
metry between executive and legislative branches is thus exacerbated. When there
tends to be a large influx of new legislators, legislators may find it in their interests to
establish a committee system that reduces the costs of information collection1. This
chapter examines the relations, and expects that in countries where the legislative
turnover rates are high, either during or after democratic transition, committees are
likely to be granted more instruments to collect and transmit information.
7.2 Measuring Uncertainty and Changes in Legislative Composition
To test these hypotheses, the three factor scores generated in Chapter 4, committees’
positive and negative agenda power and their information capacity, are used as the
dependent variables. All the independent variables are lagged by at least one year.
Authoritarian elections. In the analyses, it is assumed that if the preexist-
ing authoritarian regimes had held elections, and the elections had allowed more
competition, politicians had a better idea about their expected electoral return in
democracies at the time of institutional design. The indicator of elections under
1 Diermeier (1995) has provided alternative explanation for the relationship between legislative
membership stability and committee procedures: the longer legislative terms facilitate the develop-
ment of floor deference to committees’ decisions, which sustains committee specialization even in
the absence of restrictive. When there tends to be a large influx of new legislators, the norm of floor
deference, and thus committee specialization, is less likely to be sustained. This argument may also
suggest that committee procedures that facilitate policy specialization are especially required when
there tend to be great changes in the composition of legislatures
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authoritarianism is from the dataset assembled by Hadenius and Teorell (2007). Au-
thoritarian regimes that did not hold elections are coded as ‘0’; those held elections
and all parties but one was forbidden from taking part are coded as ‘1’. ‘2’ refers
to authoritarian regimes that held elections in which candidates independent from
the ruling party were able to participate, and the vote share of the largest party
was greater than 67 percent. ‘3’ refers to authoritarian regimes that held multiparty
elections and the the vote share of the largest party was smaller than 67 percent.
Annual average between 1972 and the year before democratization is calculated for
each country. Countries had experienced authoritarianism after 1972 and were clas-
sified as democracy in 2010 by Hadenius and Teorell are included in the analyses. A
higher value of this indicator means that the preexisting authoritarianism had more
experience with (limited) competitive elections, and the relative power of political
groups is expected to be more evident at the time of regime transition.
Authoritarian legacy parties. The indicator of authoritarian incumbents’ ex-
pected electoral return is measured as the vote share of the authoritarian legacy
parties in the first national legislative election since the country has become democ-
racy (scored equal or greater than 6 on the polity scale). Only the most recent
transition experience is taken into account. Authoritarian legacy parties are defined
as parties that had the largest vote share before regime transition based on Hadenius
and Teorell’s dataset. If the authoritarian ruling parties were abolished or did not
participate in elections after transition, their vote shares are coded as zero. Coun-
tries had experienced one-party or multi-party authoritarianism after 1972 and were
classified as democracy in 2010 by Hadenius and Teorell are included in the analyses.
Table A.2 in Appendix A lists names of the authoritarian legacy parties and transi-
tion year of each country included. These authoritarian legacy parties’ vote share in
the first democratic national legislative elections as a percentage of their vote share
in the last national legislative elections under authoritarianism are also calculated.
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Their average vote shares between the first and the most recent democratic national
legislative elections before 2009 are also included. To measure the extent to which
the authoritarian legacy parties were faced with other challenging parties, the levels
of fragmentation of other non-authoritarian parties in the first democratic elections
are calculated.
Electoral volatility. As described in Chapter 6, the information about the aver-
age terms of individual legislators across countries is difficult to collect. The variable
of parties’ electoral volatility is included to approximately capture the legislative
terms of parties. As previous research has pointed out, parties’ electoral volatil-
ity and legislative turnover rates are highly correlated with each other (Heinsohn
and Freitag 2012, Matland and Studlar 2004). In addition to extra-system electoral
volatility, which measures the vote share won by newly created parties in national leg-
islative elections, the analyses also include within-system electoral volatility. Within-
system volatility measures the extent to which votes are transferred from one to
another established parties based on the Pedersen index (Pedersen 1979). For both
indexes, the average volatility for all post-1945 elections since the inauguration of
the most recent democratic regime is computed. The information for 50 countries
is from Mainwaring, Espan˜a and Gervasoni’s work (2009), and I have computed the
indicators for other 25 countries.
Control variables. Consistent with analyses in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the
control variables include the presidential power, countries’ per capita GDP, demo-
cratic quality, British colonial origin, and clientelistic effort for models with com-
mittees’ positive agenda power as the dependent variable. The variable of age of
democracy, which measures the number of years since the most recent democratic
transition, is also included in the models.
Descriptive statistics for all the independent variables are listed in Table A.1 in
Appendix A.
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7.3 Empirical Results
Figure 7.1 displays that there is a negative association between authoritarian elec-
tions and committees’ positive agenda-setting power.
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Figure 7.1: Authoritarian elections and committees’ positive power
The relationships are further examined with models shown in Table 7.1. They
provide evidence in support of hypothesis 8. In countries where the preexisting
authoritarian regime held elections that allowed limited multiparty competition, the
committees are less likely to have strong positive power. The age of democracy is
not significantly correlated to committee strength with regard to the positive power.
Models in Table B.10 use two alternative measures of authoritarian regime types.
They show consistent patterns. In general, if the preexisting authoritarianism held
elections, and if non-governmental parties were allowed to participate in the elections,
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the committees are less likely to be granted the authority of receiving and amending
most bills in early stage of legislative process.
Table 7.1: Authoritarian elections and committees’ positive agenda power (OLS
regression)
(1) (2) (3)
DV Positive power
Authoritarian elections -0.188** -0.171** -0.116
[0.0728] [0.0809] [0.231]
Age of democracy -0.000855 0.00222 0.00438
[0.00750] [0.00852] [0.0178]
Authoritarian elections X Age of democracy -0.00297
[0.00913]
Clientelism 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.105***
[0.0301] [0.0328] [0.0304]
Presidential power -0.00686 -0.00712 -0.00736
[0.00881] [0.0115] [0.00904]
Polity -0.0445 -0.0468 -0.0456
[0.0349] [0.0370] [0.0355]
ln GDP per capita PPP 0.129 0.0797 0.131
[0.0812] [0.0981] [0.0825]
British colonialism -0.534*** -0.396 -0.518**
[0.191] [0.241] [0.199]
Latin America 0.000126
[0.198]
Africa -0.248
[0.279]
Asia/ Mideast -0.145
[0.222]
cons -1.764* -1.312 -1.903*
[0.910] [1.087] [1.015]
N 48 48 48
adj. R-sq 0.354 0.325 0.340
ll -14.55 -13.74 -14.49
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01. Variance inflation factors
(VIF), the measure of multicollinearity, of all independent variables are below 3, except for
the interaction term and regional dummies.
The second model in Table 7.1 includes the dummy variables of different regions
(post-communist countries as the reference category), to capture the existence of
democratic waves and institutional spillovers. The association between more closed
authoritarianism and committees’ positive power is still significant. The third model
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includes the interaction term between authoritarian elections and the age of democ-
racy. The model suggests that the relationship between committees’ positive power
and authoritarian elections does not vary as a function of the age of democracy.
Models in Table 7.2 examine the relations between authoritarian elections and
other two dimensions of committee power. The results suggest that authoritarian
regime types are not significantly associated with committee strength with regard to
their veto power and information capacity.
Table 7.2: Authoritarian elections and committees’ negative agenda power and in-
formation capacity (OLS regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV Negative power Information capacity
Authoritarian elections 0.112 -0.343 0.136 0.409
[0.123] [0.396] [0.126] [0.412]
Age of democracy 0.0175 -0.0162 0.00290 0.0230
[0.0131] [0.0307] [0.0134] [0.0318]
Authoritarian elections 0.0190 -0.0114
X Age of democracy [0.0157] [0.0163]
Extra-system volatility 0.0296*** 0.0303***
[0.0102] [0.0103]
Presidential power 0.0120 0.0153 0.00538 0.00365
[0.0149] [0.0150] [0.0156] [0.0159]
Polity 0.00915 0.0162 0.0410 0.0385
[0.0612] [0.0611] [0.0681] [0.0686]
ln GDP per capita PPP -0.0521 -0.0697 0.0136 0.0242
[0.136] [0.136] [0.139] [0.141]
British colonialism -0.260 -0.366 0.0963 0.165
[0.327] [0.337] [0.346] [0.362]
cons -0.254 0.654 -1.190 -1.759
[1.204] [1.413] [1.298] [1.541]
N 48 48 48 48
adj. R-sq -0.042 -0.031 0.051 0.038
ll -42.06 -41.19 -42.46 -42.16
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01
Models in Table 7.3 estimate the effects of the size of authoritarian legacy parties
on committees’ positive agenda power. The results are consistent with hypothesis
9. If the authoritarian legacy parties still retained power after regime change, the
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Figure 7.2: Authoritarian legacy parties and committees’ positive power
committee system is less likely to allow members opportunities to vote on bills. The
bivariate correlation between them is shown in Figure 7.2. The second model includes
the level of fragmentation of all other non-authoritarian parties2, and suggests that
if authoritarian legacy parties were faced with a more cohesive opposition at the
transition phase, committees are likely to be strong with regard to their positive
power. The first model in Table B.11 in Appendix B suggest that these relationships
are still substantial when the regional dummies are controlled. The third model
takes into account the conditional effect of the age of democracy. However, the model
shows that the relationship between authoritarian parties’ electoral return in the first
democratic election and committees’ positive power is not conditional on countries’
2 This indicator does not distinguished between parties in opposition to authoritarianism during
transition and those allied with or split from authoritarian incumbents. The indicator approximately
captures the extent to which other political actors were able to challenge the legacy parties.
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Table 7.3: Authoritarian legacy parties and committees’ positive agenda power (OLS
regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV Positive power
ALP in the first democratic election -0.522** -0.940*** -1.213**
[0.238] [0.249] [0.466]
Age of democracy -0.00283 -0.00870 -0.0131 -0.00957
[0.00894] [0.00874] [0.0109] [0.00976]
Non-ALP party fragmentation -0.988*** -1.032*** -0.585*
[0.324] [0.332] [0.322]
ALP in the first democratic election 0.0131
X Age of democracy [0.0189]
ALP in the first democratic election -0.355**
/ ALP in the last authoritarian election [0.147]
Clientelism 0.108*** 0.0773** 0.0770** 0.0906**
[0.0363] [0.0342] [0.0344] [0.0378]
Presidential power -0.0126 -0.0123 -0.0128 -0.0110
[0.0111] [0.0102] [0.0103] [0.0114]
Polity -0.0482 -0.0309 -0.0286 -0.0402
[0.0374] [0.0340] [0.0344] [0.0374]
ln GDP per capita PPP 0.114 0.114 0.105 0.156*
[0.0936] [0.0836] [0.0852] [0.0920]
British colonialism -0.478** -0.463** -0.471** -0.488**
[0.204] [0.183] [0.184] [0.204]
cons -1.753 -0.670 -0.479 -1.464
[1.065] [1.023] [1.068] [1.104]
N 41 40 40 40
adj. R-sq 0.358 0.499 0.491 0.386
ll -11.88 -6.321 -6.001 -10.40
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01. Variance inflation factors
(VIF), the measure of multicollinearity, of all independent variables are below 3, except for the
interaction term.
experience with democracy. The result seems to suggest that even though there
may be changes on legislative procedures years after regime transition, committee
procedures still reflect the power of authoritarian incumbents during regime change
to a certain extent.
Models in Table 7.4 estimate the relations between the power of authoritarian
legacy parties and committees’ negative power, and suggest that the association
between these two variables is not significantly different from zero.
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Table 7.4: Authoritarian legacy parties and committees’ negative agenda power (OLS
regression)
(1) (2)
DV Negative power
ALP in the first democratic election 0.268
[0.506]
ALP in the first democratic election 0.126
/ ALP in the last authoritarian election [0.269]
Non-ALP party fragmentation 0.314 0.225
[0.625] [0.565]
Age of democracy 0.0285 0.0292
[0.0174] [0.0176]
Presidential power 0.0146 0.0135
[0.0194] [0.0198]
Polity -0.00950 -0.00834
[0.0677] [0.0676]
ln GDP per capita PPP -0.0567 -0.0660
[0.162] [0.161]
British colonialism -0.308 -0.306
[0.367] [0.369]
cons -0.332 -0.200
[1.464] [1.421]
N 40 40
adj. R-sq -0.085 -0.087
ll -35.34 -35.38
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01
Table 7.5 includes models that examine the effects of the size of authoritarian
legacy parties with committees’ information capacity as the dependent variable. Sim-
ilar to the models with committees’ positive power as the dependent variable, the
results show that if authoritarian incumbents did not substantially lose power in
democratic elections, the committees are less likely to be granted the instruments
to gather and transmit information. The coefficients are slightly different from the
explanation for committees’ positive power: what is especially associated with com-
mittees’ information capacity is not the performance of authoritarian legacy parties
in the first democratic elections, but the change in their vote shares before and after
regime transition.
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Table 7.5: Authoritarian legacy parties and committees’ information capacity (OLS
regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV Information capacity
ALP in the first democratic election -0.794* -0.940* -1.415*
[0.406] [0.494] [0.817]
Age of democracy 0.0245 0.0254 0.0151 0.0216
[0.0147] [0.0162] [0.0182] [0.0161]
Non-ALP party fragmentation -0.215
[0.584]
ALP in the first democratic election 0.0305
X Age of democracy [0.0348]
ALP in the first democratic election -0.557**
/ ALP in the last authoritarian election [0.255]
Extra-system volatility 0.0293** 0.0275** 0.0270** 0.0276**
[0.0113] [0.0119] [0.0116] [0.0115]
Presidential power 0.0152 0.0165 0.0146 0.0224
[0.0168] [0.0181] [0.0168] [0.0181]
Polity 0.00847 0.00595 0.00691 0.00570
[0.0661] [0.0685] [0.0664] [0.0673]
ln GDP per capita PPP -0.105 -0.0966 -0.123 -0.0638
[0.149] [0.154] [0.151] [0.151]
British colonialism 0.0505 0.0503 0.0203 0.0837
[0.334] [0.343] [0.336] [0.339]
cons 0.161 0.269 0.569 -0.128
[1.307] [1.373] [1.392] [1.303]
N 41 40 41 40
adj. R-sq 0.205 0.186 0.199 0.212
ll -32.41 -31.81 -31.92 -31.15
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01. Variance inflation factors
(VIF), the measure of multicollinearity, of all independent variables are below 3, except for the
interaction term.
The results shown in Table 7.1 to 7.5 explore the relations between authoritarian
regime types and the three dimensions of committee power. If there had been no elec-
tions under authoritarianism, and thus electoral favorite was less obvious at the time
of institutional choice, or if the authoritarian legacy parties largely lost power after
regime transition, committees tend to be strong with regard to their positive power.
That is, the committee system is likely to provide members with more opportunities
to make decisions on bill proposals. Furthermore, if there was a great change in the
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political composition of the legislature after regime transition, committees are likely
to have more information capacity. Multiparty authoritarianism and a prolonged
transition process during which old regime elites still retain some control result in
less inclusive committee procedures, because under these conditions, authoritarian
incumbents have more time and bargaining power to craft institutions that restrict
other actors’ access to political power. The association is evident even after years
of transition. If the founding democratic elections do lead to great changes in the
composition of the legislatures, and thus the power of old regime elites is reduced,
the resulting committee procedures may allow more checks and balances. Similar
patterns have be identified in the research on Mexico’s state legislatures: electoral
competition yields the development of legislative oversight only to the extent that
the competition is translated into more pluralistic legislatures (Beer 2003, Solt 2004).
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Figure 7.3: Extra-system electoral volatility and committees’ information capacity
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Finally, the relations between electoral volatility and committees’ information
capacity is explored. Figure 7.3 displays that there is a clear positive correlation
between extra-system electoral volatility and committees’ information capacity.
Table 7.6: Electoral volatility and committees’ information capacity (OLS regression)
(1) (2) (3)
DV Information capacity
Extra-system volatility 0.0296***
[0.00890]
Total electoral volatility 0.0155**
[0.00599]
Within-system volatility 0.00839
[0.0108]
2nd largest / Largest gov party 0.484* 0.487* 0.507*
[0.250] [0.257] [0.268]
Opposition fractionalization -1.204*** -1.274*** -1.049**
[0.370] [0.394] [0.412]
Presidential power 0.0185 0.0157 0.0121
[0.0121] [0.0124] [0.0128]
Polity 0.00631 -0.0239 -0.0318
[0.0492] [0.0498] [0.0532]
Democracy stock 0.000113 0.000215 -0.0000705
[0.000313] [0.000348] [0.000366]
ln GDP per capita PPP 0.116 0.146 0.0950
[0.114] [0.120] [0.127]
British colonialism 0.256 0.248 0.106
[0.281] [0.292] [0.301]
cons -1.213 -1.305 -0.532
[1.111] [1.179] [1.217]
N 75 75 75
adj. R-sq 0.157 0.106 0.025
ll -63.21 -65.42 -68.68
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01.
Models in Table 7.6 further tests the correlation. Since extra-system volatility
is correlated with countries’ experience with democracy (Sikk 2005, Tavits 2005),
the democracy stock variable created by Gerring et al. (2005) is included. Consis-
tent with previous analyses, in countries with less stable party systems, committees
are granted more power to acquire information about policies. Hypothesis 10 is
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Table 7.7: Electoral volatility and committees’ positive and negative power (OLS
regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV Positive power Negative power
Extra-system volatility -0.00261 0.00961
[0.00727] [0.00859]
Within-system volatility -0.00140 -0.00782
[0.00785] [0.00973]
Clientelism 0.0564* 0.0555*
[0.0294] [0.0293]
2nd largest / Largest gov party 0.671*** 0.686***
[0.241] [0.242]
Opposition fractionalization -0.915** -0.733*
[0.357] [0.371]
Presidential power 0.00105 0.00172 0.0182 0.0159
[0.0105] [0.0104] [0.0117] [0.0116]
Polity -0.0246 -0.0203 0.0292 0.0278
[0.0421] [0.0418] [0.0474] [0.0480]
Democracy stock -0.000368 -0.000367 0.000506* 0.000272
[0.000296] [0.000317] [0.000302] [0.000330]
ln GDP per capita PPP 0.101 0.0988 0.0561 0.0124
[0.102] [0.105] [0.110] [0.114]
British colonialism -0.656*** -0.645*** -0.151 -0.258
[0.230] [0.229] [0.271] [0.271]
cons -1.361 -1.380 -0.732 -0.127
[1.126] [1.155] [1.072] [1.096]
N 75 75 75 75
adj. R-sq 0.229 0.228 0.162 0.155
ll -50.53 -50.59 -60.54 -60.88
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01.
supported. The comparison between the three models suggest that it is the vote
share of the newly created parties, rather than the percentage of votes transferred
to other existing parties, that is especially associated with committees’ information
capacity. It is still likely that the newly created parties are composed of politicians
with legislative experience. However, on average, it is expected that in countries
with higher levels of extra-system volatility, the composition of the legislature is less
stable. Models in Table 7.7 shows the estimated relations between electoral volatil-
ity and committees’ positive and negative power, and suggest that the instability of
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legislative composition is not significantly associated with these two dimensions of
committee power.
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8Conclusion
In this concluding chapter, I summarize the dissertation’s main theoretical explana-
tions and empirical findings. I then acknowledge the limits of the study and avenues
for future research on legislative internal organization.
8.1 Findings
Based on an original dataset, this dissertation provides a framework to classify and
compare committee powers across democratic legislatures. It argues that commit-
tee power is a multidimensional concept. Committee powers cluster empirically in
three distinct dimensions: positive agenda-setting power, negative agenda-setting
power, and information capacity. They benefit different legislative actors. There-
fore, they are correlated with different features of a political system, and may not
be consistently strong or week. Legislators’ electoral incentives, the composition of
multiparty governments, preexisting authoritarian incumbents’ uncertainty and bar-
gaining power, and the changes in legislative memberships are correlated to different
dimensions of committee power.
I highlight several empirical patterns in particular. First, if legislators tend to
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pursue individualistic goals and focus on particularistic spending in their districts,
committees’ positive power is likely to be strengthened to provide members more op-
portunities to express preferences and influence legislative outputs. Second, if party
leaders’ have more control over members’ behavior, committees tend to have strong
negative power and allow the larger and more cohesive parties to delay legislation.
Third, if the coalition governments are composed of parties of relatively equal size,
committees are likely to be powerful with regard to all dimensions so that coalition
partners are able to receive, scrutinize, and amend or delay proposals deviating from
the coalition contracts.
One implication of the findings is that treating different committee functions as
one-dimensional phenomena and then exploring correlates of the one-dimensional
indicator may be misleading. The multi-dimensional framework proposed in the
dissertation attempts to encompass the major theories on legislative committees, and
suggest the conditions under which the arguments of these theories can be reconciled.
The empirical findings demonstrate that the determinants of committee strength
pointed on in these theories are correlated to distinct dimensions of committee power.
This dissertation also attempts to bridge the “Atlantic divide” (Martin 2008) in
legislative research. It demonstrates whether and how the theoretical approaches
developed based on the experience of the U.S. Congress can be applied to committee
systems in other institutional contexts. It also shows how comparative studies could
extends and reshape these theoretical approaches.
There are also some notable “non-findings” in the empirical analyses. One of
them is the insignificance of most contextual indicators on committee power. In
every single regression model on different dimensions of committee power, countries’
per capita GDP and quality of democracy are included as independent variables,
and not once do they achieve statistical significance. The claim that committees
in countries with higher income levels are more powerful is not supported by the
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sample. The analyses on the relationships between authoritarian legacy parties and
committees’ positive power also suggest that compared to the levels of countries’
general democratic quality, the uncertainty and bargaining power of authoritarian
incumbents have more effects on committee procedures1.
The other surprising non-finding is the insignificance of executive-legislative ar-
rangements on committee power. Once the effects of other independent variables
are taken into account, committees under presidential systems are not on average
more powerful on any of the dimensions. What is identified in the empirical anal-
yses is that executive-legislative arrangements have indirect effects on committee
power. Coalition governments, which are more common in parliamentary systems,
are associated with committee strength on all dimensions.
8.2 Limitations
The dissertation assumes that committee procedures, at least in part, are endoge-
nous to legislators and parties’ preferences. It is expected that political actors have
incentives to create or maintain committee procedures that help them achieve their
goals. However, the relationships may be in fact reversed. It is also plausible that
with powerful committees, the costs of monitoring coalition partners and trading lo-
cally targeted benefits decrease, and thus coalition governments are more likely to be
established and politicians tend to supply targeted benefits to attract votes. Com-
mittee power and the conditions identified in the analyses could indeed be engaged
in a circular relationship.
The main limitation of the dissertation is that my dataset is exclusively cross-
sectional and does not allow to solve the endogeneity problem. The causal direction
1 The coefficients of correlations is -0.13 between countries’ Polity scores and authoritarian elec-
tions and -0.26 between Polity scores and vote shares of authoritarian legacy parties in the founding
democratic elections. Only countries that experienced democratic transition between 1972 and 2010
are included in the calculation
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cannot be verified with the quantitative analyses based on the cross-sectional data.
The empirical results can only show that there are significant association between
committee power and several features of a political system. To partially address this
concern, all the independent variables used in the analyses temporally precede the
indicators on committee procedures. However, this does not mean that the causal
explanations proposed in the dissertation have been thoroughly tested and confirmed.
Within the quantitative research approach, one way to improve the limitation
in future iterations of similar research and data collection projects would be includ-
ing the indicators specifying when each particular committee procedure was cho-
sen/changed, so that the temporal separation between the independent and depen-
dent variables will be more clear. Another indicator that has to be included is the
process through which legislative internal organization can be changed. If there are
more constitutional or legal constraints on such changes, it is expected that commit-
tee strength is less likely to reflect legislators and parties’ preferences. Furthermore,
to more closely trace the causal mechanisms between the conditions identified in the
dissertation and committee strength, evidence from case studies will be also required.
8.3 Extensions
In addition to further research addressing methodological limitations of cross-sectional
quantitative analysis pointed out in the previous section, there are other ways in
which the project could be extended. First, there may be other potential explana-
tions for committee strength. For example, Western donors have launched various
legislative strengthening programs in developing democracies. Many of the programs
have focused on the capacity of committees, such as advising the drafting of legisla-
tive internal rules, encouraging committees to hold hearings, or training committee
staff (NDI 2000, UNDP 2009). More systematic data has to be collected to explore
the extent to which these programs shapes committee procedures. Another potential
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explanation is institutional spillovers. Legislatures may adopt internal rules similar
to those of their neighboring countries or countries of common language or cultural
heritage. In the empirical analyses of the dissertation, regional and British colonial
dummies are included to control for the effects. Spatial regression analysis could be
the next step to more fully examine the possibility of legislative institution spillovers.
Inspired by the non-findings of the dissertation, another avenue for further re-
search could involve a deeper exploration of the relationship between committee
strength and other legislative oversight tools. As Chapter 4 shows, the correlations
between the indicators of committee power and PPI, the measure of general legisla-
tive capacity, are close to zero. It could be that there may be trade-offs between
powerful committees and certain other legislative control devices. As the research
based on the experience of Norwegian parliamentary committees has pointed out, it
is likely that the general influence of the parliament increased simultaneously with
the declining functioning of committees (Rommetvedt 1998). What needs to be
examined is the conditions under which politicians would prefer to utilize other ple-
nary procedures than the committee systems to achieve their goals, and what those
plenary procedures are.
Finally, it would be also interesting to explore whether powerful committees do
help politicians and parties achieve their goals. Martin and Vanberg (2011) have
found that with strong committees, bills proposed by hostile ministers are more
likely to be delayed and amended. Similarly, it also needs to be examined whether
legislative outputs in countries where the committees have extensive positive power
are more likely to contain pork barrel projects. Furthermore, for legislatures where
the committees have different levels of positive and negative power, one could com-
pare the extent to which bills supported by minorities have access to committee time.
The evidence from such research could strengthen the arguments of the dissertation.
Extending the research on the effects of different committee capacities, it would be
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also valuable to explore how various committee functions are related to democratic
performance. The literature has argued that weak legislatures result in diminished
democratic accountability and threats to the survival of new democracies. What has
not been clearly addressed is why and how legislative institutional arrangements have
effects on the fortunes of democracies. Focusing on committee procedures and ex-
amining whether powerful committee systems, either directly or in interaction with
well-developed parties, affect the responsiveness of democratic process, could help
address this gap.
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Appendix A
Appendix A: Variables and Coding
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of independent variables used in Chapter 5, 6, and
7
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln District magnitudes 75 2.146 1.48 0.095 6.109
No pooling 75 0.662 0.81 0 2
Clientelism 75 12.958 3.39 5.785 18.047
Parties control over assignments 67 2.064 0.50 1 3
Parties organizational centralization 75 3.059 0.60 1.116 4
Parties organizational extensiveness 75 3.377 0.41 1.935 3.959
Coalition government 75 0.618 0.39 0 1
Government fractionalization 75 0.267 0.24 0 0.804
2nd largest / Largest gov party 75 0.239 0.27 0 0.928
Policy difference 75 0.801 0.76 0 2
Opposition fractionalization 75 0.482 0.21 0 0.821
Extra-system volatility 75 10.054 9.74 0.100 41.8
Total electoral volatility 75 26.251 17.21 3.4 77.087
Within-system volatility 75 16.197 9.81 3.3 45.333
Authoritarian elections 48 1.601 0.78 0 3
Age of democracy 48 19.479 8.95 4 40
ALP in the first democratic election 41 0.274 0.27 0 0.953
Non-ALP party fragmentation 40 0.560 0.22 0 0.842
ALP in the first democratic election
41 0.501 0.47 0 1.661
/ ALP in the last authoritarian election
Presidential power 75 8.267 7.64 0 20
Polity 75 8.067 2.40 -2 10
ln GDP per capita PPP 75 9.249 1.10 6.630 10.807
British colonialism 75 0.147 0.36 0 1
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Table A.2: One-party and multi-party authoritarianism and authoritarian legacy
parties
Country The last year Authoritarian legacy party
before transition
Albania 2001 Socialist Party
Bangladesh 2008 none
Botswana 1972 Botswana Democratic Party
Brazil 1984 none
Bulgaria 1989 Bulgarian Socialist Party
Croatia 1999 Social Democratic Party
Czech Rep. 1992 Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
Dominican Rep. 1995 Social Christian Reformist Party
Ecuador 2008 none
El Salvador 1990 Nationalist Republican Alliance
Estonia 1992 none
Georgia 2008 none
Ghana 2000 National Democratic Congress
Greece 1974 none
Guatemala 1995 none
Honduras 1996 Liberal Party of Honduras and National Party
Hungary 1989 Hungarian Socialist Party
Indonesia 2003 Golkar
Kenya 2001 Kenya African National Union
Latvia 1990 none
Lithuania 1990 none
Macedonia 2001 Social Democratic Union of Macedonia
Mexico 1999 Institutional Revolutionary Party
Moldova 1994 Communist Party of Moldova
Mozambique 1993 Liberation Front of Mozambique
Panama 1990 Democratic Revolutionary Party
Paraguay 1998 National Republican Association-Colorado Party
Peru 2000 none
Philippines 1986 none
Poland 1989 Democratic Left Alliance
ROK 1987 Grand National Party
Romania 1995 Social Democratic Party
Senegal 1999 Socialist Party
Serbia 1999 Socialist Party of Serbia
Slovakia 1992 none
Slovenia 1990 Social Democrats
South Africa 1992 none
Spain 1976 none
Taiwan 1991 Kuomintang
Ukraine 2005 Party of Regions
Zambia 2007 Movement for Multiparty Democracy
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Appendix B: Supplemental Analyses
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Table B.1: Parameter estimates of the dimensionality of committee powers (CFA
with GDP per capita as a covariate)
Factor
Regressing
indicators on
(log)GDP pc
Positive Negative Information
power power capacity
Indicator
No plenary action before com-
mittee stage
.813 (.12) .000 (.00) .000 (.00) -.036 (.14)
All bills are referred to com-
mittees
.729 (.09) -.052 (.18) .088 (.14) .048 (.13)
Minority reports .380 (.14) .156 (.17) .132 (.16) .032 (.12)
Multiple referrals .531 (.09) .057 (.17) .045 (.16) -.039 (.12)
(log) Committee assignments
per legislator
.234 (.05) .077 (.08) -.114 (.08) -.047 (.05)
Committee time is unique .383 (.15) .250 (.18) .079 (.14) -.099 (.11)
Floor considers bills as
amended by committees
.458 (.13) .340 (.16) .177 (.17) .077 (.11)
Committees do not have to re-
port all referred bills
.000 (.00) .791 (.13) .000 (.00) .211 (.11)
No time constraint on com-
mittee reports
-.004 (.13) .855 (.13) -.141 (.16) .256 (.14)
Agenda control .227 (.14) .540 (.11) -.042 (.15) .033 (.14)
(log) Number and functions of
committee staff
.180 (.11) .233 (.13) .364 (.11) .234 (.11)
Committees can compel gov-
ernment officials’ attendance
-.007 (.11) .033 (.16) .789 (.12) -.084 (.14)
Committees can demand doc-
uments from government
.000 (.00) .000 (.00) .991 (.08) -.167 (.14)
Committees have the right to
introduce bills
.141 (.12) -.306 (.15) .640 (.14) -.156 (.12)
Committees can grant a
closed rule
.226 (.12) .016 (.17) .617 (.13) -.162 (.17)
Serving in the same commit-
tee is desirable
.047 (.06) -.024 (.07) .143 (.07) -.007 (.06)
Correlation Matrix of Factors
Positive Negative Information
Positive power 1.00
Negative power -.231 (.21) 1.00
Information capacity -.095 (.19) .277 (.17) 1.00
Note: Parameters were estimated with Mplus. The covariate is countries’ log transformed per
capita GDP in 2007. p ă 0.05 are in bold. N=75. Multiple imputations were used for the
indicators of the desirability of serving in consecutive terms in the same committee (N=68) and
committee staff (N=69). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. χ2=56.14 (p “ .90). RMSEA
= .000 (90% CI: .000/.030). CFI= 1.00.
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Table B.2: Parameter estimates of the dimensionality of committee powers (CFA
with Polity score as a covariate)
Factor
Regressing
indicators on
Polity
Positive Negative Information
power power capacity
Indicator
No plenary action before com-
mittee stage
.829 (.12) .000 (.00) .000 (.00) -.063 (.07)
All bills are referred to com-
mittees
.717 (.09) -.040 (.16) .090 (.14) -.036 (.06)
Minority reports .386 (.14) .074 (.18) .194 (.15) .056 (.05)
Multiple referrals .516 (.10) .008 (.17) .077 (.16) .003 (.05)
(log) Committee assignments
per legislator
.226 (.05) .037 (.07) -.079 (.08) .008 (.04)
Committee time is unique .378 (.15) .212 (.17) .101 (.13) -.021 (.05)
Floor considers bills as
amended by committees
.453 (.13) .256 (.13) .251 (.16) .094 (.06)
Committees do not have to re-
port all referred bills
.000 (.00) .806 (.13) .000 (.00) .089 (.08)
No time constraint on com-
mittee reports
-.021 (.13) .847 (.14) -.123 (.16) .151 (.09)
Agenda control .218 (.14) .487 (.11) .007 (.15) .057 (.08)
(log) Number and functions of
committee staff
.175 (.11) .253 (.14) .359 (.11) .065 (.06)
Committees can compel gov-
ernment officials’ attendance
-.014 (.11) .064 (.16) .776 (.12) -.063 (.08)
Committees can demand doc-
uments from government
.000 (.00) .000 (.00) .995 (.08) -.094 (.09)
Committees have the right to
introduce bills
.142 (.12) -.306 (.16) .646 (.14) -.100 (.05)
Committees can grant a
closed rule
.226 (.12) .010 (.16) .620 (.14) -.058 (.07)
Serving in the same commit-
tee is desirable
.054 (.07) -.037 (.07) .157 (.07) .001 (.03)
Correlation Matrix of Factors
Positive Negative Information
Positive power 1.00
Negative power -.172 (.20) 1.00
Information capacity -.136 (.20) .257 (.16) 1.00
Note: Parameters were estimated with Mplus. The covariate is countries’ scores in 2007 on the
Polity IV scale. p ă 0.05 are in bold. N=75. Multiple imputations were used for the indicators of
the desirability of serving in consecutive terms in the same committee (N=68) and committee staff
(N=69). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. χ2=55.67 (p “ .90). RMSEA = .000 (90% CI:
.000/.028). CFI= 1.00.
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Table B.3: Parameter estimates of the dimensionality of committee powers (CFA
with executive-legislative relations as a covariate)
Factor Regressing
indicators on
presidential/
parliamentary
systems
Positive Negative Information
power power capacity
Indicator
No plenary action before com-
mittee stage
.795 (.11) .000 (.00) .000 (.00) .474 (.30)
All bills are referred to com-
mittees
.746 (.09) -.043 (.16) .132 (.14) .105 (.30)
Minority reports .373 (.14) .143 (.17) .162 (.16) .105 (.28)
Multiple referrals .493 (.11) .031 (.16) .070 (.16) .529 (.26)
(log) Committee assignments
per legislator
.213 (.05) .043 (.07) -.086 (.08) .223 (.14)
Committee time is unique .365 (.14) .190 (.17) .118 (.12) .237 (.28)
Floor considers bills as
amended by committees
.441 (.14) .372 (.15) .180 (.17) .278 (.28)
Committees do not have to re-
port all referred bills
.000 (.00) .783 (.12) .000 (.00) -.036 (.27)
No time constraint on com-
mittee reports
-.021 (.14) .882 (.12) -.163 (.16) -.112 (.27)
Agenda control .230 (.15) .514 (.10) -.001 (.15) .068 (.29)
(log) Number and functions of
committee staff
.131 (.12) .353 (.14) .270 (.12) .326 (.24)
Committees can compel gov-
ernment officials’ attendance
.007 (.12) .054 (.15) .774 (.12) -.018 (.29)
Committees can demand doc-
uments from government
.000 (.00) .000 (.00) 1.020 (.09) .122 (.30)
Committees have the right to
introduce bills
.072 (.13) -.334 (.16) .652 (.13) .497 (.27)
Committees can grant a
closed rule
.175 (.11) -.002 (.16) .620 (.13) .394 (.30)
Serving in the same commit-
tee is desirable
.054 (.07) -.013 (.08) .138 (.07) .059 (.19)
Correlation Matrix of Factors
Positive Negative Information
Positive power 1.00
Negative power -.207 (.20) 1.00
Information capacity -.139 (.20) .232 (.16) 1.00
Note: Parameters were estimated with Mplus. The covariate is represented by a dummy code
(parliamentary systems=0, presidential and mixed systems=1), based on Golder’s classification
(2005). p ă 0.05 are in bold. N=75. Multiple imputations were used for the indicators of the
desirability of serving in consecutive terms in the same committee (N=68) and committee staff
(N=69). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. χ2=55.97 (p “ .90). RMSEA = .000 (90% CI:
.000/.029). CFI= 1.00.
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Table B.4: Parameter estimates of the dimensionality of committee powers (CFA, the
indicator of staff support forced to only load on the factor of information capacity)
Factor
Positive Negative Information
power power capacity
Indicator
No plenary action before committee stage .739 (.13)
All bills are referred to committees .787 (.09)
Minority reports .380 (.14)
Multiple referrals .509 (.10)
(log) Committee assignments per legislator .329 (.10)
Committee time is unique .366 (.13)
Floor considers bills as amended by committees .407 (.13) .377 (.13)
Committees do not have to report all referred
bills
.819 (.14)
No time constraint on committee reports .770 (.12)
Agenda control .513 (.09)
(log) Number and functions of committee staff .454 (.10)
Committees can compel government officials’ at-
tendance
.821 (.09)
Committees can demand documents from gov-
ernment
.962 (.08)
Committees have the right to introduce bills .518 (.12)
Committees can grant a closed rule .619 (.11)
Serving in the same committee is desirable .249 (.10)
Correlation Matrix of Factors
Positive Negative Information
Positive power 1.00
Negative power -.031 (.15) 1.00
Information capacity .132 (.14) .259 (.13) 1.00
Note: Parameters were estimated with Mplus. N=75. Multiple imputations were used for the
indicators of the desirability of serving in consecutive terms in the same committee (N=68) and
committee staff (N=69). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. χ2=92.385 (p “ .61). RMSEA
= .000 (90% CI: .000/.054). CFI= 1.00.
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Table B.5: Multi-party governments and committees’ positive power (OLS regres-
sion)
(1) (2) (3)
DV Positive agenda power
Largest gov party/ Government seats -0.861***
[0.318]
2nd largest gov party/ Government seats 1.613***
[0.471]
2nd largest gov party vote share 0.0290***
[0.00765]
Opposition fractionalization -0.429 -0.418 -0.385
[0.300] [0.282] [0.272]
Clientelism 0.0751*** 0.0751*** 0.0750***
[0.0245] [0.0238] [0.0234]
Presidential power 0.00374 0.00474 0.00668
[0.00989] [0.00961] [0.00952]
Polity -0.0373 -0.0396 -0.0380
[0.0369] [0.0358] [0.0352]
ln GDP per capita PPP 0.107 0.108 0.108
[0.0976] [0.0947] [0.0932]
British colonialism -0.551** -0.524** -0.542***
[0.213] [0.205] [0.199]
cons -0.781 -1.691 -1.709
[1.100] [1.054] [1.037]
N 75 75 75
adj. R-sq 0.290 0.330 0.351
ll -47.45 -45.28 -44.04
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01
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Table B.6: Multi-party governments and committees’ negative power (OLS regres-
sion)
(1) (2) (3)
Negative agenda power
Largest gov party/ Government seats -0.806**
[0.394]
2nd largest gov party/ Government seats 1.274**
[0.599]
2nd largest gov party vote share 0.0213***
[0.00750]
Opposition fractionalization -0.806** -0.746** -0.821**
[0.372] [0.358] [0.349]
Presidential power 0.0166 0.0167 0.0189
[0.0120] [0.0119] [0.0117]
Polity 0.0437 0.0412 0.0527
[0.0458] [0.0456] [0.0448]
ln GDP per capita PPP 0.0884 0.0876 0.0723
[0.105] [0.104] [0.102]
British colonialism -0.0777 -0.0839 -0.0924
[0.261] [0.259] [0.247]
cons -0.252 -1.064 -0.978
[0.993] [0.950] [0.924]
N 75 75 75
adj. R-sq 0.103 0.108 0.149
ll -64.21 -64.03 -62.26
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01
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Table B.7: Multi-party governments and committees’ information capacity (OLS
regression)
(1) (2) (3)
Information capacity
Largest gov party/ Government seats -0.486
[0.405]
2nd largest gov party/ Government seats 1.048*
[0.613]
2nd largest gov party vote share 0.0225**
[0.0108]
Opposition fractionalization -0.996*** -1.009*** -1.172***
[0.374] [0.356] [0.360]
Extra-system volatility 0.0241*** 0.0238*** 0.0293***
[0.00848] [0.00839] [0.00846]
Presidential power 0.0119 0.0125 0.0201
[0.0126] [0.0123] [0.0124]
Polity -0.0149 -0.0185 0.00559
[0.0472] [0.0467] [0.0465]
ln GDP per capita PPP 0.123 0.123 0.107
[0.100] [0.0994] [0.102]
British colonialism 0.103 0.129 0.233
[0.222] [0.215] [0.214]
cons -0.531 -1.028 -1.178
[0.998] [0.935] [0.952]
N 75 75 75
adj. R-sq 0.100 0.120 0.170
ll -59.75 -58.94 -63.17
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01
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Table B.8: Multi-party governments, committee power, and executive-legislative re-
lationships (OLS regression)
(1) (2) (3)
DV Positive Negative Information
power power capacity
2nd largest / Largest gov party 0.982*** 0.690* 0.353
[0.305] [0.349] [0.357]
Opposition fractionalization -0.500* -0.928*** -1.176***
[0.281] [0.345] [0.368]
Presidentialism 0.317 0.142 0.291
(presidential systems=1) [0.203] [0.248] [0.199]
2nd largest / Largest gov party -0.676 0.147 0.199
X Presidentialism [0.415] [0.473] [0.473]
Clientelism 0.0954***
[0.0315]
Extra-system volatility 0.0281***
[0.00829]
Polity -0.0000259 0.0289 0.00197
[0.0400] [0.0482] [0.0477]
ln GDP per capita PPP 0.0849 0.250** 0.151
[0.104] [0.123] [0.112]
British colonialism -0.529** -0.487* 0.245
[0.224] [0.275] [0.255]
cons -2.033* -2.531** -1.433
[1.163] [1.157] [0.977]
N 75 75 75
adj. R-sq 0.358 0.206 0.176
ll -40.73 -56.81 -62.36
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01
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Table B.9: Multi-party governments, committee power, and presidential power (OLS
regression)
(1) (2) (3)
DV Positive Negative Information
power power capacity
2nd largest / Largest gov party 1.071*** 0.526 0.372
[0.331] [0.405] [0.414]
Opposition fractionalization -0.481* -0.823** -1.182***
[0.285] [0.356] [0.373]
Presidential power 0.0144 0.0124 0.0152
[0.0134] [0.0148] [0.0154]
2nd largest / Largest gov party -0.0396 0.0171 0.0124
X Presidential power [0.0291] [0.0351] [0.0360]
Clientelism 0.0907***
[0.0322]
Extra-system volatility 0.0283***
[0.00850]
Polity -0.00794 0.0323 0.00422
[0.0411] [0.0480] [0.0512]
ln GDP per capita PPP 0.0993 0.105 0.136
[0.103] [0.105] [0.110]
British colonialism -0.434* -0.0900 0.273
[0.238] [0.251] [0.272]
cons -2.070* -1.063 -1.329
[1.172] [0.932] [1.048]
N 75 75 75
adj. R-sq 0.338 0.138 0.157
ll -41.88 -62.19 -63.22
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01
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Table B.10: Authoritarian regime types and committees’ positive agenda power (OLS
regression)
(1) (2)
DV Positive power
Authoritarian regime type -0.343*
(0= no election; 1= holding elections) [0.179]
Authoritarian regime type -0.269**
(0= no party; 1= one-party; 2=multiparty) [0.110]
Age of democracy -0.000305 -0.00401
[0.00776] [0.00786]
Clientelism 0.101*** 0.0920***
[0.0312] [0.0294]
Presidential power -0.00135 -0.00618
[0.00937] [0.00886]
Polity -0.0263 -0.0367
[0.0369] [0.0352]
ln GDP per capita PPP 0.119 0.133
[0.0838] [0.0819]
British colonialism -0.467** -0.500**
[0.208] [0.195]
cons -2.006** -1.603*
[0.951] [0.919]
N 48 48
adj. R-sq 0.311 0.345
ll -16.13 -14.92
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01
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Table B.11: Authoritarian legacy parties and committees’ positive power and infor-
mation capacity (OLS regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV Positve power Information capacity
ALP in the first democratic election -0.902***
[0.258]
Avg. ALP in all democratic elections -0.247 -0.498
[0.272] [0.463]
ALP in the first democratic election -0.619**
/ ALP in the last authoritarian election [0.232]
Non-ALP party fragmentation -1.018***
[0.341]
Age of democracy -0.00456 -0.00299 0.0129 0.0251
[0.00975] [0.00947] [0.0157] [0.0153]
Clientelism 0.0740* 0.101**
[0.0382] [0.0381]
Extra-system volatility 0.0229** 0.0314**
[0.0112] [0.0118]
Presidential power -0.00552 -0.0145 0.0133 0.0120
[0.0135] [0.0117] [0.0231] [0.0173]
Polity -0.0233 -0.0507 -0.0150 0.00981
[0.0362] [0.0396] [0.0663] [0.0687]
ln GDP per capita PPP 0.0692 0.123 0.00931 -0.0978
[0.0962] [0.100] [0.161] [0.156]
British colonialism -0.272 -0.545** -0.257 -0.0115
[0.248] [0.214] [0.434] [0.345]
Latin America -0.0900 -0.0639
[0.205] [0.332]
Africa -0.323 0.426
[0.288] [0.490]
Asia/ Mideast -0.229 0.651*
[0.223] [0.379]
cons -0.331 -1.753 -0.373 0.00700
[1.192] [1.136] [1.339] [1.377]
N 40 41 41 41
adj. R-sq 0.475 0.283 0.276 0.143
ll -5.225 -14.15 -28.52 -33.95
Standard errors in brackets; * pă0.10, ** pă0.05, *** pă0.01
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